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The Evolution of Entrepreneurial Finance: 
A New Typology 
J. Brad Bernthal* 
There has been an explosion in new types of startup finance 
instruments. Whereas twenty years ago preferred stock dominated the 
field, startup companies and investors now use at least eight different 
instruments—six of which have only become widely used in the last 
decade. Legal scholars have yet to reflect upon the proliferation of 
instrument types in the aggregate. Notably missing is a way to organize 
instruments into a common framework that highlights their similarities 
and differences. 
This Article makes four contributions. First, it catalogues the variety 
of startup investment forms. I describe novel instruments, such as 
revenue-based financing, which remain understudied within law and 
entrepreneurship. Second, this Article shows the limitations of the debt vs. 
equity distinction as a classification method for startup financial 
contracts. Reliance on this traditional distinction obscures understanding 
of how instruments function. Third, the Article proposes a “new 
typology” to classify investment instruments based upon their economic, 
control, time, and regulatory dimensions. Three new broad categories—
Payouts, Lock-in, and Park-n-ride—provide an insightful way to group 
these contracts. And fourth, the new typology explains how an expansion 
in instrument types creates complex capital structures which increase 
horizontal conflicts among startup investors. Further, new instruments 
increasingly place investors into a non-shareholder role that is outside the 
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boundaries of corporate law’s protections. As early-stage investors 
increasingly fall outside the protections of corporate law, a greater burden 
shifts to contract law to resolve disputes arising from divergent 
investor interests. 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 775 
I. THE TWO SCHOLARLY WAVES OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE ..................... 785 
II. THE VARIETY OF MODERN STARTUP INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS ................. 789 
A. A Catalogue of Nontraditional Investment Instruments ................... 789 
1. Revenue-based financing .............................................................. 790 
2. Demand dividend and social entrepreneurship variants ........... 794 
3. Venture debt .................................................................................. 798 
4. Light preferred (aka, series seed preferred) ................................. 800 
5. Convertible debt ............................................................................ 803 
6. Simple agreement for future equity (Safe) and similar 
variants ....................................................................................... 806 
7. Prepayment ................................................................................... 809 
8. Simple agreement for future tokens ............................................. 811 
B. Why Now? New Startup Investment Participants Embrace 
Novel Instruments ............................................................................ 814 
III. THE TRADITIONAL TYPOLOGY .................................................................. 817 
A. Indicia of a Functional Typology and the Capital Structure 
Decision ............................................................................................. 818 
B. The Capital Structure Paradigm Falls Short in Promoting 
Analysis of Startup Finance Instruments ......................................... 822 
IV. A NEW TYPOLOGY OF ENTREPRENEURIAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS ........ 828 
A. Lock-in .................................................................................................. 829 
B. Park-n-ride ............................................................................................ 831 
C. Payouts .................................................................................................. 838 
D. Summary Overview: Classifying Startup Financial Instruments 
with the New Typology .................................................................... 846 
V. PUTTING THE NEW TYPOLOGY TO USE........................................................ 848 
A. New Types of Horizontal Conflicts ..................................................... 849 
B. The Diminished Role of Corporate Law for Startup Investments ...... 852 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 856 
 
001.BERNTHAL_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:20 PM 
773 The Evolution of Entrepreneurial Finance 
 775 
INTRODUCTION 
New financial instruments confound the conventional wisdom 
that startups routinely rely upon stock issuances to raise capital.1 
The Telluride Venture Accelerator (TVA) is in the business of 
investing in and launching new startups.2 The TVA offers capital 
and extensive help in exchange for a stake in a startup. The unusual 
part of TVA’s program is that, in lieu of stock, the TVA invested in 
certain portfolio companies through a form of variable loan, called 
Revenue-Based Financing (RBF).3 This form of investment makes 
TVA a lender rather than a shareholder. 
Meanwhile, MadKudu is a software startup in Mountain View, 
California, that sells big data tools to analyze customer behavior 
patterns. To fuel operations, in November 2015 MadKudu raised a 
$1.4 million seed round from a French investment fund and several 
angel investors. The investment used an instrument popularized on 
the West Coast, the Simple Agreement for Future Equity (Safe).4 
 
 1. The “conventional wisdom”—increasingly debunked by scholars—is that startups 
“rely almost exclusively on equity funding from angel investors and venture capitalists 
(VCs).” Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1170 [hereinafter 
Debt as Venture Capital]. The term “startup” in general parlance refers to a private company, 
with high growth ambition, that has yet to reach an exit event. See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, Should 
Mutual Funds Invest in Startups? A Case Study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s Investments in 
Unicorns (and Other Startups) and the Regulatory Implications, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2017) 
(referring to startups including Uber and Airbnb). High growth ambition is important. 
“Startup” is typically used in contradistinction to “small business.” A startup seeks to scale—
that is, replicate and rapidly grow—a business idea or product in a short amount of time. See 
Brad Bernthal, Investment Accelerators, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 139, 142 n.8 (2016). For 
example, a nifty software solution that creates a better search engine (i.e., Google) fuels a 
startup. In contrast, a small business pursues a business model or idea that is, relative to a 
startup, less replicable and less likely to experience rapid growth. A charismatic chef in a 
food truck who creates a great experience for a customer is involved in a small business. Of 
course, boundaries between a startup and small business are a matter of degree, not binary, 
and what initially appears as a small business may prove to be surprisingly scalable. For 
example, a better coffee shop experience (i.e., Starbucks) turned out to be more than just a 
small business. 
 2. The TVA is an example of an investment accelerator program. See Bernthal, 
supra note 1 (defining the investment accelerator and describing proliferation of acceler-
ator programs). 
 3. See Program, TELLURIDE VENTURE ACCELERATOR, http://www.tellurideva.com 
/program/ [https://perma.cc/U83U-BE4H] (noting financing option borrowed from 
Indie.vc) (form of TVA revenue-based financing note on file with author). 
 4. E-mail from Sam Levan, CEO of MadKudu, to Brad Bernthal, Assoc. Professor of 
Law, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (Feb. 16, 2018) (on file with author) (disclosure: the Author 
worked as a mentor with MadKudu during the Boulder Techstars program and participated 
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Like an RBF investor, a Safe holder is not a shareholder, at least for 
an indefinite period of time following investment. 
Finally, Filecoin announced in 2017 a new type of data storage 
product. Investors piled into the proposed blockchain-based 
storage network.5 Filecoin’s financial backers purchased, in lieu of 
stock, a right to tokens that permit use of the storage service. 
Investors bet that, if Filecoin’s service takes off, then they will 
capture a profit by subsequent resale of tokens to others. As with 
an RBF investor and a Safe holder, a token holder is not 
a shareholder. 
The accumulation of new investment instruments highlights a 
notable evolution in entrepreneurial finance for early-stage 
startups.6 The traditional way an early-stage startup raises outside 
 
as an investor in the Safe offering); see also John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual 
Innovation in Venture Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 133 (2014). 
 5. Filecoin is a decentralized storage network that turns cloud storage into an 
algorithmic market. See FILECOIN, https://filecoin.io/ [https://perma.cc/FKQ3-SQ9Q] 
(Filecoin investment documents on file with author). Filecoin successfully raised $52 million 
from its earliest investors, then another $206 million in an initial coin offering. Stan Higgins, 
Filecoin Presale Raises $52 Million Ahead of ICO Launch, COINDESK (Aug. 4, 2017, 9:05 AM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/filecoin-presale-raises-52-million-ahead-ico-launch/ [https:// 
perma.cc/9LX5-PN9R]; Stan Higgins, $257 Million: Filecoin Breaks All-Time Record for ICO 
Funding, COINDESK (Sept. 7, 2017, 1:45 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/257-million-file 
coin-breaks-time-record-ico-funding/ [https://perma.cc/CF9P-C4R3]. 
 6. Investors distinguish between stages of a private company. ANDREW METRICK, 
VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION 16 (2007). Risks associated with 
investment into a newly hatched venture (think: three founders, a garage, and a PowerPoint 
deck) are markedly different than risk associated with investment into a private company 
with global operations valued at over $1 billion (i.e., a so-called “unicorn” such as Uber, 
Pinterest, or Airbnb). It is particularly important to distinguish between company stages now 
that sizable companies, reluctant to go public, are staying private longer. See generally 
MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN ET AL., CREDIT SUISSE, THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING UNIVERSE OF 
STOCKS 11 (2017). Three stages distinguish where a private company is in its lifecycle: (1) early 
stage, (2) growth stage (also known as “mid stage”), and (3) expansion stage (also known as 
“late stage”). Early stage describes a company’s most nascent period, spanning the founders’ 
original idea roughly through initial launch of a product. A thriving venture will likely reach 
the growth stage, when the company seeks to scale its operations, including ramp-up of 
production, new employee hires, and emphasis on rapid customer and revenue growth. See 
generally METRICK, supra at 16. Finally, an expansion-stage company is the most mature type 
of private company and is often preparing for an “exit” event (i.e., either a sale or an initial 
public offering). Subcategories within these three stages provide additional resolution about 
an entrepreneurial firm’s growth trajectory. See Chris Scheetz, 7 Business Stages Relating to 
Investing, 1839 VENTURES (July 30, 2016), https://www.1839ventures.com/7-business 
-stages-relating-to-investing/ [https://perma.cc/3DRX-Y5TR]. Small amounts of early-
stage capital fundraising are often initially labeled with a botanical metaphor, such as a “pre-
seed” and “seed” round. A larger investment receives an alphabetic designation, starting 
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capital is through an equity financing from an angel investor or 
venture capitalist—that is, an investor who takes an ownership 
stake in exchange for a capital contribution to the company.7 Yet 
RBF loans, Safes, and cryptocurrency tokens—as the TVA,  
MadKudu, and Filecoin examples illustrate—are part of expanding 
early-stage investment options.8 While legal literature does not yet 
include examination of RBF and crypto tokens, scholars 
 
with an “A” round. Typical early-stage activities include ideation, proof of concept, 
identifying a product/market fit, and product development. Early-stage companies often 
have little to no revenues, have unclear product or service lines, aspire to operate within an 
ill-defined or yet-to-be formed market, disclose less information than a public company, and 
are highly resource constrained. Successive alphabetic labels (e.g., “B Round” then “C 
Round”) attend subsequent equity rounds of financing. A private company valued at over 
$1 billion is a “unicorn.” See, e.g., The Global Unicorn Club, CB INSIGHTS, https://www. 
cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies [https://perma.cc/SGX8-V85G] (listing 234 
companies, each valued at over $1 billion). 
 7. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 1405, 1420 (2008) [hereinafter Puzzling Behavior]. Equity is “a stock or any other 
security representing an ownership interest” in a company. Equity, INVESTOPEDIA, https:// 
www.investopedia.com/terms/e/equity.asp [https://perma.cc/VKC7-JHE9]. An angel 
investor may purchase common stock or, more frequently, preferred equity. Puzzling 
Behavior, supra. An institutional investor, such as a venture capitalist, predominantly finances 
early-stage ventures through preferred equity. Convertible preferred stock today remains 
the most important vehicle for venture capital (VC) investment. See, e.g., BRAD FELD & JASON 
MENDELSON, VENTURE DEALS: BE SMARTER THAN YOUR LAWYER AND VENTURE CAPITALIST 68 
(3d ed. 2016); METRICK, supra note 6. Special economic and control rights make the stock 
“preferred” relative to common stock. The preferred class is “convertible” insofar as the 
holders of preferred stock may elect to convert their shares to common. VCs use preferred 
convertible equity, instead of debt instruments, because new companies lack traits associated 
with reliable loan repayment. FELD & MENDELSON, supra; PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE 
VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (2004); METRICK, supra note 6; Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a 
Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1072 (2003); 
D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 133, 151 (1998) [hereinafter VC Contracting]. State corporate laws govern how stock is 
lawfully issued. Delaware law rules for equity are set forth in Delaware Code Annotated title 
8, section 151(a). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (West 2011) (prescribing rules of stock 
issuance and permitting preferred stock) (“Every corporation may issue 1 or more classes of 
stock . . . as shall be stated and expressed in the certificate of incorporation or of any 
amendment thereto, or in the resolution or resolutions providing for the issue of such stock 
adopted by the board of directors pursuant to authority expressly vested in it by the 
provisions of its certificate of incorporation.”); Shintom Co. v. Audiovox Corp., 888 A.2d 225 
(Del. 2005) (defining minimum requirements for preferred stock under Delaware law). 
 8. Law and entrepreneurship contributes “knowledge of what types of finance 
[structures] are available to entrepreneurs.” Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1171. 
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nevertheless document startups’ use of other types of instruments, 
such as the Safe and venture debt.9 
Scholars have yet to consider, however, the proliferation in 
investment forms in the aggregate. This is not a trivial omission. It 
is critical to examine instruments not only in isolation but also 
together for two reasons. One, examining the full spectrum of 
startup investment instruments yields new insights into their 
contractual features. A panoramic perspective—namely, viewing 
instruments together—is needed to compare how investment 
structures function and, relatedly, the circumstances in which a 
particular instrument is (and is not) useful. Two, a company may 
use different types of instruments to raise capital over multiple 
rounds of financing during the course of a firm’s lifecycle. Variety 
in investment structures provides different investors with 
disparate contingent and residual rights in a company. Law and 
entrepreneurship scholars have not examined the consequences 
when diverse instruments interact over time.10 
This Article fills a gap in legal literature by reflecting upon the 
diversification of startup investment forms. I make four contributions. 
First, this Article catalogues forms of startup investment 
instruments. A combination of academic literature and original 
research details how startups and investors today structure finan-
cial deals. I define an instrument as one or more contractual 
agreements that structure a high-risk capital investment into an 
entrepreneurial venture.11 At least eight types of instruments, 
 
 9. See, e.g., Coyle & Green, supra note 4 (analyzing the Safe); Debt as Venture Capital, 
supra note 1 (discussing venture debt). 
 10. Robert Bartlett sets forth the importance of a dynamic model of agency costs 
arising from the staging of VC investments and use of convertible stock. See Robert P. 
Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA 
L. REV. 37, 111 (2006) (“The dynamic character of agency problems has important—and 
understudied—implications for corporate scholarship.”). Elizabeth Pollman furthers this 
analysis through close examination of agency costs resulting from changes over the lifecycle 
of an emerging private company. Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance (forthcoming) (on 
file with author). Dynamic agency costs are further discussed in Part V infra. 
 11. This Article refers to a form of financing as an “instrument.” Implementation of an 
“instrument” may require amending entity documents filed with a secretary of state (aka, 
the “charter”) as well as execution of private contractual arrangements. The instrument level 
of analysis typically encompasses more than isolated examination of an individual contract 
or specific provisions within an agreement. A preferred convertible equity financing, for 
example, is an instrument whose critical provisions are negotiated and set forth in a term 
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different than conventional common and preferred stock, now 
structure early-stage startup investments: (1) RBF, (2) investment 
structures customized for social entrepreneurship ventures, 
(3) venture debt, (4) permutations of light preferred contracts, 
(5) convertible debt, (6) the Safe and variants such as the Keep It 
Simple Security (KISS), (7) prepayment, and (8) the Simple Agree-
ment for Future Tokens (SAFT).12 These are each described in 
section II.A infra. 
Second, this Article highlights the limited analytic value of 
existing categories used to classify startup instruments. Financial 
innovation yields instruments that are difficult—and even 
misleading—to classify as debt or equity.13 What the derivatives 
revolution did to traditional corporate finance categories, the new 
entrepreneurial finance revolution has done to the world of startup 
finance. Yet even as forms of startup investment proliferate, 
academic discussions default to the capital structure categories of 
debt and equity.14 The debt/equity dichotomy remains important 
 
sheet. Upon closing a financing, parties operationalize the term sheet by amending a 
company’s “charter” (i.e., the “articles of incorporation” or “certificate of incorporation,” 
depending on jurisdiction) and bylaws, as well as entering into related contracts, including 
voting agreements and stock purchase agreements. The suite of documents typically 
involved in a VC financing is available through the National Venture Capital Association 
(NVCA). See Model Legal Documents, NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, https://nvca.org 
/resources/model-legal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/KT74-AD2M]. 
 12. Whether an instrument is labeled “debt” or “equity” often turns on cosmetic—
rather than functional—features of an instrument. Moreover, the debt/equity distinction 
also fails to capture some novel instruments. For example, Filecoin’s crypto tokens defy the 
traditional boxes of debt/equity. So does the Safe, an instrument widely used by investors 
and nascent startups. See infra Parts II–III. 
 13. See, e.g., Paul Carman & Kelley Bender, Debt, Equity or Other: Applying a Binary 
Analysis in a Multidimensional World, J. TAX’N, July 2007, at 17, 17 (“Under a binary analysis, 
an investment along the borders of one or the other classification gets pushed completely 
into one of the two baskets, disguising the hybrid nature of the investment.”). Financial 
innovation makes the traditional legal notions of how investors should be characterized 
“contradictory and meaningless.” Frank Partnoy, Financial Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 799, 802 (2006); see also Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s 
Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309, 1312 n.15 (2008) (“Modern financial engineering . . . make[s] 
any attempt to pigeonhole investments as one type or another nearly meaningless.”); 
Alexander J. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Conversion Rights and the Design of Financial 
Contracts, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 1231, 1231 (1994) (“[T]he attention of financial economists seems 
to have shifted from the optimal mix of debt and equity financing to the design 
of securities.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1; Triantis & Triantis, supra note 13, at 
1231 (“Most of the academic insights into the capital structure decision of a corporation have 
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since regulations ranging from corporate law to tax still incorporate 
the distinction.15 But as a matter of contractual analysis, the oft-
criticized debt/equity distinction16 fails to capture important 
dimensions of how contracts operate. The debt/equity framework 
need not frustrate development of more valuable analytic tools.17 
A useful typology would liberate contractual analysis from 
legacy categories to promote understanding of how the contracts 
 
been based on the dichotomous choice between debt and equity.”). Capital structure presents 
two broad financing options: rely upon internal company cash flows or, alternatively, attract 
money from outside the startup in the form of a loan (debt) or sale of stock (equity). Since 
entrepreneurial firms often lack revenues sufficient to fund operations, startups often choose 
to pursue outside financing. As discussed in Part II, ad hoc categories also describe novel 
instruments. See, e.g., Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe Safe, 
102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168, 169 (2016) (discussing the simple agreement for future equity 
(Safe), an equity derivative); Joan MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment 
Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments That Begs for 
a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865, 878 (2013) (analyzing investment contracts, termed 
“unequity” by Heminway, which is “a particular type of financial interest that provides for 
profit-sharing or revenue-sharing on a short-term basis, with no accompanying gover-
nance rights.”). 
 15. Certain legal, regulatory, and accounting determinations embed capital structure 
concepts and provide differing treatment based on whether an instrument is debt or equity. 
See infra Part III. This Article does not take a position on the utility of capital structure 
categories for the purposes for which they developed: matters of finance, accounting, and 
tax. But even in these contexts, there are reasons to suspect that these categories collapse. 
 16. Scholars criticize the distinction’s usage in tax law. “Few aspects of U.S. tax law 
have received greater criticism—and attracted fewer defenders—than the long-standing 
distinction between debt and equity.” Camden Hutchison, The Historical Origins of the Debt-
Equity Distinction, 18 FLA. TAX REV. 95, 96 (2015); see also Baird & Henderson, supra note 13, 
at 1312 n.15; Partnoy, supra note 13, at 802; Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a 
Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1056 (2000). Hutchison argues that the inertia of 
the tax system and path dependence may explain why the distinction persists today. 
Hutchison, supra at 101–02. Hutchison examines development of the debt/equity distinction 
in tax during the eighty-year period beginning with the Civil War—and first U.S. income 
tax—up through the establishment of taxation of dividends in the 1930s. Hutchi-
son concludes  
that the debt-equity distinction is the unintended consequence of an extended 
series of discrete, reactive, short-term political decisions, rather than the 
intentional realization of any broader policy goal. . . . Due to the significant inertia 
of tax policy, decisions made in response to specific historical circumstances 
became difficult to change—even after the circumstances themselves changed or 
were no longer relevant. 
Id. at 101–02. 
 17. The focus of this investigation is upon startup financial contracts. Notably, the 
logic behind the need for a better way to classify instruments, shedding the intellectual 
limitations of the debt/equity dichotomy, applies outside of startup instruments. Indeed, 
Triantis and Triantis anticipated the need for a new analytical scheme almost twenty-five 
years ago. Triantis & Triantis, supra note 13, at 1232. 
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work and to reveal similarities and differences between financial 
instruments. A classification scheme should account for elements 
that functionally differentiate one instrument form from another.18 
I analyze instruments across a multidimensional framework: 
(1) economic rights (i.e., how the instrument allocates economic 
risk and reward), (2) control mechanisms (i.e., levers that constrain 
and influence the firm’s actions), (3) use of time (i.e., when an 
investor’s funds are provided to a startup and when monies are 
returned to an investor), and (4) regulatory status (i.e., whether 
investors are shareholders under corporate law, whether instru-
ment is a security, and tax implications). 
Third, this Article presents a new typology of modern entre-
preneurial finance instruments. A typology is a working tool, less 
scientifically robust than a taxonomy, used to classify artifacts 
observed in empirical research.19 A typology of startup instruments 
was unnecessary in, say 1998, when entrepreneurs and investors 
had limited choices about how to structure capital investment. Yet 
today’s landscape involves an array of alternatives. This Article 
delineates three categories to classify entrepreneurial investment 
instruments: (1) Lock-in, (2) Park-n-ride, and (3) Payout.20 Each 
classification is described in turn. 
 
 18. See Emily Sherwin, Legal Taxonomy, 15 LEGAL THEORY 25, 32 (2009) (discussing 
functional taxonomies). Sherwin notes three organizational schemes used by modern 
scholars. Id. at 25 (“The first is a formal taxonomy that classifies legal materials according to 
rules of order and clarity. Formal taxonomy is primarily conventional and has no normative 
implications for judicial decision-making. The second possibility is a function-based taxonomy 
that classifies laws according to their social functions. Function-based taxonomy can influence 
legal decision-making indirectly, as a gatekeeping mechanism, but it does not provide 
decisional standards for courts. Its objective is to assist in analysis and criticism of law by 
providing an overview of the body of legal doctrine. The third possibility is a reason-based 
taxonomy that classifies legal rules and decisions according to the moral principles or ‘legal 
principles’ thought to justify them.” (emphasis added)). 
 19. Typologies serve as “working tools in the identification of artifacts as empirical 
research progresses.” RICHARD P. SMIRAGLIA, THE ELEMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE ORGANIZATION 
53 (2014). In contrast to a taxonomy, a typology is generally viewed as “less robust 
scientifically than” a taxonomy. Id.; see infra Part III. 
 20. This typology comes with the humility of a pre-tenure professor that other minds 
can—and should—improve upon this approach. Yet there is force behind the old saying that 
“it takes a theory to beat a theory.” This legal scholarly cliché apparently goes back to Richard 
Epstein. See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: It Takes a Theory to Beat a Theory, LEGAL 
THEORY BLOG (Oct. 21, 2012), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2012/10/introduction 
-it-takes-a-theory-to-beat-a-theory-this-is-surely-one-of-the-top-ten-all-time-comments-utter 
ed-by-law-professo.html [https://perma.cc/EPM8-945M]. An objection to classification of 
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Lock-in is an ownership interest where an early-stage investor’s 
return is (1) uncertain as to timing, (2) not realistically expected 
until five to eight years after initial investment, and (3) a function 
of the underlying valuation of the company. This classification is 
where most of the traditional investment instruments fit—that is, 
common and preferred stock. Founders typically hold common 
stock, one type of Lock-in instrument, at the outset of a new ven-
ture.21 Convertible preferred equity, a second type of Lock-in 
instrument that features special economic and control rights, is 
traditionally sold to outside investors such as venture capital-
ists (VCs).22 
The typology’s second category of investment structure is the 
Park-n-ride. In contrast to a Lock-in holder’s present ownership 
interest, a Park-n-ride structure contemplates a future ownership 
interest in a company. Legal scholars document two instruments 
that the new typology classifies as a Park-n-ride: (1) convertible 
debt and (2) future equity derivative instruments, most notably the 
Safe.23 I use the term Park-n-ride to highlight the two-step process 
common to these instruments. Step one is that an investor “parks” 
money with a startup. The startup puts capital to use during an 
indefinite period in which the investor lacks ownership. Step two 
is triggered by a financing tied to issuance of preferred stock. Upon 
a preferred financing, the investor’s money converts automatically 
into equity and “rides” along the terms negotiated by the new 
 
startup instruments is that, if financial engineering simply renders attempts to “pigeonhole 
investments as one type or another nearly meaningless,” why is classification worth the 
candle? See Baird & Henderson, supra note 13, at 1312. As explained in Part III, typologies 
and classifications are nonetheless going to be used and serve a crucial role in framing 
understanding. See infra Part III. Broadly speaking, the history of contract scholarship reflects 
that fruitful examinations often require new terminology and categories to describe evolving 
business and legal practices. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: 
A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (categorizing relational and discrete contracts 
after surveying literature, case law, and interviews with practitioners); Ian R. Macneil, Values 
in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340, 383 (1983) (developing terminology 
and categories associated with relational contracts). 
 21. Angels occasionally take common stock; however, this is more infrequent today. 
See generally Puzzling Behavior, supra note 7, at 1405, 1413–14, 1422, 1446–47. 
 22. Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1170. Preferred equity still dominates in 
terms of total VC investment dollars. 
 23. Safe documents are publicly available through Y Combinator. Startup Documents, 
Y COMBINATOR (Feb. 2016), https://www.ycombinator.com/documents/ [https://perma 
.cc/FT5M-4NC2]. 
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investor(s).24 Accordingly, a Park-n-ride structure exists where an 
investor (1) invests capital into a company, (2) lacks ownership for 
an indefinite post-investment period, and (3) agrees to take owner-
ship, upon occurrence of a preferred financing event, on unknown 
terms led by an unknown future investor. 
A Payout is where an investor’s return is not based upon sale of 
company shares and, instead, an investor’s return directly flows 
from startup revenues, profits, or provision of goods or services. 
Payouts avoid extreme investor lock-in—namely, instances where 
shareholders cannot redeem their shares for cash directly from a 
company or readily sell shares to other purchasers on a secondary 
market.25 The relaxation of extreme investor lock-in is among the 
most notable developments associated with the proliferation of 
investment instrument forms.26 Payouts are better suited than 
preferred equity for high-risk capital investment into certain 
startups—such as many so-called social impact ventures—that lack 
potential to reach a large enterprise valuation.27 Additionally, a 
 
 24. Automatic conversion, especially associated with convertible debt, often requires 
a “qualified financing,” defined as an equity issuance over a certain threshold (typically 
pegged at an amount between $250,000 and $1 million). A Boulder-based attorney who 
actively works with startup companies reported that the qualified financing number “is 
more of a function of the size of the ‘park and ride’ round.” E-mail from Matt Burns, 
Attorney, Koenig, Oelsner, Taylor, Schoenfeld & Gaddis PC, to Brad Bernthal, Assoc. 
Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (Jan. 30, 2018) (on file with author). That is, the 
smaller (or larger) the Park-n-ride, the smaller (or larger) the qualified financing prescribed 
to trigger conversation. Id. This attorney said he rarely sees qualified financing set at $1 
million. Id. 
 25. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6–7 
(2012) [hereinafter New Exit in VC] (distinguishing capital lock-in—i.e., the inability of an 
investor to demand redemption from the company—from investor lock-in). 
 26. Payouts respond to problems associated with “the reality that most preferred stock 
is structured in a way that never obligates the corporation to redeem it and thus return 
equity, suggest[ing] that the preferred stockholders can, with impunity, be frozen out of 
realizing any value from the enterprise.” Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of 
Preferred Stock (And Why We Should Care About It), 51 BUS. LAW. 443, 444 (1996). 
 27. Investment into social impact ventures often comes from an impact investor or 
group of social VCs that provides capital to a social enterprise in hopes of a return in the 
form of financial gains as well as company actions that address a social problem. See infra 
Part II; see, e.g., MILLER CTR. FOR SOC. ENTREPREN., DEMAND DIVIDEND: CREATING RELIABLE 
RETURNS IN IMPACT INVESTING 2, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55036eefe4b0fe6c 
8e833e4a/t/56428004e4b024d1dbe1a775/1447198724492/Demand-Dividend-Description 
-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/76FZ-QYM2] [hereinafter DEMAND DIVIDEND] (“[The] Demand 
Dividend grew out of the need to find alternatives to debt, convertible debt, and equity as 
funding mechanisms for social enterprises.”). 
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startup manager may desire a Payout structure if she would like to 
raise outside capital while avoiding a “shot clock”—that is, a 
timetable by which a company must sell itself, wind down, or, less 
frequently, conduct an initial public offering (IPO). Examples of 
Payout instruments include RBF, demand dividend, prepayments, 
and venture debt.28 
The Article’s fourth contribution is that the new typology 
underscores an important but little-discussed development: an 
increasing number of startup investors—that is, sources of outside 
capital—are not shareholders.29 New instruments leave some 
capital providers, wittingly or not, outside the shareholder protec-
tions of corporate law.30 Startup investors now include inter alia 
creditors, derivative holders, consumers, and token holders. These 
developments shift a burden to contract law to interpret and 
determine the relationship between a startup and its non-
shareholder investors. 
The new typology reveals, further, that new types of conflicts 
between investors (i.e., “horizontal conflicts”) are on the horizon.31 
As capital structure gets more crowded and complex, the conflicts 
among shareholders also become more complicated. This Article 
highlights that scholars need to study and consider the changed 
role of corporate law as it relates to modern realities of entre-
preneurial investment. More work is needed to appreciate the role 
performed by corporate law protections in the startup environment 
and, moreover, what contractual measures could compensate for 
its displacement.32 
 
 28. See infra Section II.A. 
 29. This Article takes a capacious view of an “investor” as a provider of capital from 
outside the company with some expectation of return. Other scholars take a similar view. 
See, e.g., Baird & Henderson, supra note 13, at 1311 (“Identifying only shareholders as 
investors, as opposed to all providers of capital, is misleading.”). 
 30. Douglas Baird and Todd Henderson, observing a broader set of instruments than 
startup finance, make a similar observation. Baird & Henderson, supra note 13, at 1311 (“As 
financial innovation has accelerated over the past two decades, the terms ‘shareholder’ and 
‘debtholder’ or ‘creditor’ have become less meaningful. Identifying only shareholders as 
investors, as opposed to all providers of capital, is misleading.”). 
 31. Mitchell, supra note 26, at 449 (defining horizontal conflicts between shareholders, 
as well as between shareholders and “bondholders, employees, and other corporate 
constituencies”); see infra Section V.B. 
 32. Ronald Gilson highlights the economic advantage that the United States enjoys as 
a consequence of healthy markets that match VC and startup entrepreneurs. Gilson, supra 
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This Article proceeds in five parts. Following this Introduction, 
Part I describes two waves of legal scholarship about entrepre-
neurial finance, which each emphasize categories of debt and 
equity. Part II then surveys the range of modern-day startup 
finance instruments. This includes discussion of two instruments: 
RBF and the SAFT, which legal literature has yet to explore. Part III 
examines existing classifications that frustrate rigorous analysis of 
investment instruments. Part IV then proposes a new typology of 
startup finance instruments to promote a more accurate analysis of 
investment arrangements. Finally, Part V considers implications 
with respect to corporate law. 
I. THE TWO SCHOLARLY WAVES OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 
Scholars document a variety of instruments used in entrepre-
neurial finance. A first wave of legal scholarship, initiated in 1992, 
examined preferred equity structures familiar to venture capital 
(VC) deals. More recently, a second wave of scholarship explores 
debt and other non-equity instruments associated with entrepre-
neurial investments. 
Combined, these two scholarly waves reflect that a debt/equity 
dichotomy is deeply rooted in law and entrepreneurship as a high-
level way to classify investment instruments. The debt/equity 
distinction arises from a choice—known as the “capital structure 
decision”—which company managers must make about how to 
fuel company operations and growth.33 Classic corporate finance 
 
note 7, at 1067. Scholars have yet to address whether or not the diminished role of corporate 
law protection is problematic for the United States’ startup market and, if so, what changes 
in corporate law or entrepreneurial investment contracts might be warranted. 
 33. “[C]apital structure is how a firm finances its overall operations and growth by 
using different sources of funds.” Capital Structure, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investo 
pedia.com/terms/c/capitalstructure.asp#ixzz4qPl0KmU3 [https://perma.cc/44NH-9BNX]. 
Regarding capital structure decisions, Darian Ibrahim wrote, “Nobel Prize-winning 
economists have struggled to understand firm capital structures for over fifty years, devising 
grand theories that are consumed by students in corporate finance courses.” Debt as Venture 
Capital, supra note 1, at 1174. The goal is to maximize the firm’s value and the shareholders’ 
interests. STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 490 (11th ed. 2016). The calculus 
considers risk principally in the forms of information asymmetry and agency costs; 
ultimately, investors will demand greater returns for higher risk. Debt as Venture Capital, 
supra note 1, at 1203; see also Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and 
Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 
187 (1984). 
 
001.BERNTHAL_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
786 
presents three funding alternatives: (1) finance company operations 
through internal cash flows,34 (2) borrow money through debt 
issuance, or (3) raise money through sale of company equity.35 A 
startup firm’s de facto alternatives are often debt or equity since a 
startup’s revenues are typically insufficient to support operations.36 
Accordingly, outside financing (viz., funding from outside the 
firm) in the form of debt or equity is required to obtain cash needed 
to hire a team, conduct research, and engage in activities to bring a 
new product or service to market.37 
The debt/equity dichotomy intends to demarcate relative levels 
of risk associated with the provision of capital.38 The comparatively 
greater level of risk is what—at least in theory— distinguishes an 
equity holder from a creditor. Creditors—so goes the argument—
do not fully put their capital at risk when contracting with a 
borrower. Equity holders, in contrast, are owners who are 
“adventurers in the business”—that is, investors who tie the fate of 
their capital directly to the fortunes of the enterprise.39 
An initial wave of legal scholarship highlighted VCs’ extensive 
reliance on equity instruments. In 1992, George Dent noted that 
although law review articles had largely ignored VC, the equity 
structure favored by VCs merited scholarly attention as a template 
for minority investor protection within close corporations.40 Dent’s 
analysis of VC agreements tracked the classic capital structure 
decision’s framework, which emphasizes the debt/equity distinc-
tion. Dent observed that non-equity financing options are unavail-
able to entrepreneurial ventures because (1) a new company lacks 
retained earnings as a source of funding, (2) a new venture is too 
 
 34. A firm’s business activities, such as the sale of goods and services, may generate 
internal cash flows available to finance operations. ROSS ET AL., supra note 33, at 32. 
 35. Id. at 474–77. A firm’s “[c]apital structure can be a mixture of . . . long-term debt, 
short-term debt, common equity and preferred equity.” Capital Structure, supra note 33. 
 36. Typically, but not always. A startup’s principle may “bootstrap” a company by 
selling services (e.g., consulting) that generate revenues. Such revenues are then used to 
finance costs associated with bringing a product to market. 
 37. Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1203. Capital structure theory posits that a 
firm is likely to use its cash flows—which are known, predictable, and less costly—before 
drawing upon external sources. 
 38. Pratt, supra note 16, at 1057. 
 39. Id.  
 40. George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1029, 1031 (1992). 
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risky for debt, and relatedly, (3) regulatory requirements militate 
against high-risk loans, especially by institutional lenders.41 
Accordingly, while Dent argued that VC equity investment is 
“often the last choice of financing” as compared to internal cash 
flow or issuance of debt, VC investment is nonetheless attractive for 
entrepreneurs when it is the “only method of raising capi-
tal available.”42 
Legal scholars following Dent43 analyze functional aspects of 
VC contracts through the prism of problems associated with financ-
ing a new venture (e.g., agency costs and information asymmetries 
between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur)44 and contractual 
and extra-contractual solutions to those problems (e.g., staging, 
compensation strategies, and use of reputation markets).45 As a 
matter of instrument classification, commenters categorized VC 
investment agreements as equity, as set in contradistinction to debt. 
For example, an equity form of financing is explicitly set forth as 
part of Bernard Black and Ronald Gilson’s 1998 definition of VC.46 
 
 41. Dent, supra note 40, at 1032–34. Dent notably explores some uses for convertible 
debt in the entrepreneurial context, arguing that convertible debt sometimes “modulates risk 
and payouts better than either straight debt or straight equity.” Id. at 1042. This observation 
is prescient insofar as many startup investment instruments blend traditional debt and 
equity elements. 
 42. Id. at 1032–34. 
 43. For a representative sample of legal scholarship that examines preferred 
convertible equity structures, which today still dominate VC investment, see Bartlett, supra 
note 10; William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate 
Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 891 (2002); Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Do VCs Use 
Inside Rounds to Dilute Founders? Some Evidence from Silicon Valley, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1104 (2012); 
Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 967, 971–72 (2006); Gilson, supra note 7, at 1070–71; D. Gordon Smith, The Exit 
Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315 (2005) [hereinafter Exit Structure of VC]; VC 
Contracting, supra note 7. 
 44. For example, Gordon Smith focuses extensively on the problem of agency costs, 
especially ways that a venture capitalist may harm an entrepreneur through shirking, 
opportunism, and incompetence. VC Contracting, supra note 7, at 150. Ronald Gilson 
additionally focuses on problems of information asymmetries arising from an entrepreneur 
knowing more about the venture than an investor. Gilson, supra note 7, at 1076. 
 45. For example, Ronald Gilson highlights staging, control, compensation, exit, and 
reliance upon reputation markets as contractual and extra-contractual responses to problems 
associated with an early-stage financing. Gilson, supra note 7, at 1078–87. 
 46. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital 
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 245 (1998). 
  We define “venture capital,” consistent with American understanding, as 
investment by specialized venture capital organizations (which we call “venture 
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Gordon Smith, in another influential early work on VC, highlighted 
that the equity form of investment—as opposed to debt—
motivated a VC to stay involved with and work to maximize the 
value of portfolio companies.47 
Beginning in the mid-2000s, a second wave of scholarship 
documented additional ways that startups acquire capital.48 The 
pronounced theme of this second wave is that, with respect to a 
startup’s capital structure decision, non-equity financing alterna-
tives exist and—indeed—are expanding.49 A variety of “new” 
instruments reveal that early-stage entrepreneurial ventures solve 
funding needs through a surprising range of options, including 
venture debt, convertible debt, the Safe, and crowdfunding tools.50 
Additional instruments, which legal scholars are only starting to 
examine, continue to surface.51 Part II infra catalogues and describes 
these instruments. 
Accordingly, over the past thirty years the capital structure 
decision—especially classic conceptions of debt and equity—
provided the dominant, default high-level categorization mech-
anism for startup instruments. Common stock and preferred stock 
 
capital funds”) in high-growth, high-risk, often high-technology firms that need 
capital to finance product development or growth and must, by the nature of their 
business, obtain this capital largely in the form of equity rather than debt. 
Id. 
 47. “By using equity rather than debt and by restricting the payment of dividends, a 
venture capital contract often limits the ability of a venture capitalist to exit without losing 
at least part of its investment.” VC Contracting, supra note 7, at 150. 
 48. A chronological exception is Ronald Mann. In 1999, Mann wrote about a type of 
alternative startup financing instrument, software financing, well ahead of other scholars. 
Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134, 158 (1999) 
(documenting banks in the late 1990s willing to provide funding to software companies upon 
VC investment, “even if the company ha[d] no revenues at that time”). 
 49. Scholars observed adoption of instruments that contravened the received 
knowledge that startups “rely almost exclusively on equity funding from angel investors 
and venture capitalists (VCs).” Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1170. 
 50. See discussion of each instrument and relevant legal literature in section II.A, infra. 
 51. Legal scholars have works in progress on two notable instruments—Revenue-
Based Financing (RBF) and the Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT)—which are 
discussed in section II.A, infra. The Author is working on a study of RBF. Further, Shlomit 
Azgad-Tromer examines SAFTs and other cryptocurrency offerings. Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, 
Crypto Securities: Blockchain-Based Assets and the Dilemmas of Securities Regulations (forth-
coming) (on file with author). And, more broadly, Usha Rodrigues considers implications of 
blockchain forms of organization for corporate law. Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the 
Blockchain (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
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are, for example, characterized as equity instruments.52 Convertible 
debt and venture debt are, in contrast, cast as debt instruments.53 
We will return to the debt/equity dichotomy in Part III infra, where 
the shortcomings and problems of debt and equity classifications 
are addressed. 
II. THE VARIETY OF MODERN STARTUP INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS 
Nontraditional instruments complicate the “conventional 
wisdom” that startup investment is synonymous with equity 
fundraising.54 Section A surveys and defines nontraditional startup 
instruments (i.e., finance structures that differ from standard 
common or preferred stock).55 Moreover, the expansion in 
investment instrument forms raises questions of “why now”—that 
is, why are certain instruments used today but not twenty years ago 
to fund startups? Section B presents factors relevant as to why the 
forms of startup instruments have proliferated. 
A. A Catalogue of Nontraditional Investment Instruments 
Eight types of instruments, in addition to standard common 
and convertible preferred stock, are available to structure startup 
investment. This Part examines each instrument from four 
perspectives in order to explain how the instrument functions: 
 
 52. Gilson, supra note 7, at 1072 (“The venture capital fund’s equity investments in 
portfolio companies typically take the form of convertible preferred stock.”). 
 53. Debt is a loan where a borrower contracts for repayment of principal plus interest 
to a lender. Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1175. Banks, finance and leasing com-
panies, and government lending programs are each traditional sources of debt and issue debt 
instruments like notes, debentures, and bonds. ROSS ET AL., supra note 33, at 477. 
 54. See, e.g., Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1176 (discussing venture debt and 
scholarship that “rebuke[s] the conventional wisdom about debt and start-ups”). 
 55. This Part aims to make accessible the basic contours of startup investment 
agreements and, where appropriate, demystify terminology. Vivid terminology, such as 
“clawbacks,” “drag-alongs,” and “zombies,” populates startup finance. While these terms 
can be colorful, startup nomenclature can frustrate comprehension with a mix of acronym 
soup and word salad. FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 7, at 68 (clawbacks and drag-alongs). 
A “zombie” refers to startups that are “really hyped, raise a ton of money at high valuations 
[and] then stagnate”—that is, a company that should be dead (i.e., liquidated and no longer 
operating) but nonetheless survives. See Sathvik Tantry, How Venture Capital Incentives 
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(1) economic rights (how the instrument allocates economic risk 
and reward), (2) control mechanisms (levers that constrain and 
influence the firm’s actions), (3) use of time (when an investor’s 
funds are provided to a startup and when monies are returned to 
an investor), and (4) regulatory status (whether instrument is a 
security, whether investors are shareholders under corporate law, 
and tax implications).56 
1. Revenue-based financing 
The TVA’s loans to three of its 2018 early-stage portfolio startup 
companies used RBF.57 In simplest terms, RBF is a loan with vari-
able repayment terms.58 
Legal authors rarely discuss RBF.59 But RBF is a high-risk capital 
version of retro fashion chic. RBF’s basic structure—namely, an 
 
 56. This multidimensional approach incorporates considerations beyond economic 
rights and waterfall payouts. Control provisions permit consideration of the safeguards by 
which parties protect against agency costs. Time considerations affect how parties address 
information asymmetry, uncertainty associated with the startup, and how an instrument’s 
time horizon influences the incentives of relevant parties. Scholars make a distinction, 
following Frank Knight’s classic work, between uncertainty and risk. Knight argues that 
uncertainty—and the willingness to bear it—is the essential element of entrepreneurship. 
Uncertainty refers to unknown data points, relevant to a firm’s prospects, which frustrate 
probabilistic projections about future outcomes. Risk, in contrast, refers to future projections 
that may be meaningfully expressed in objectively measurable probabilities. FRANK H. 
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 231 (Dover 2006) (1971) (defining uncertainty as 
instances in which “an objectively measurable probability or chance is simply inapplicable”). 
Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner define uncertainty as “a measure of the array of potential 
outcomes for a company or project.” GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 7, at 157. Uncertainty is 
endemic to entrepreneurial ventures because information gaps inevitably exist about a firm 
at its earliest stages. Information gaps are irresolvable for two reasons. One, the data does 
not yet exist. Two, to the extent relevant data points exist, the data is so highly dispersed as 
to be impractical to assemble. Id. 
 57. See supra text accompanying note 2. The form of RBF agreement used by TVA, 
entitled Revenue Loan Agreement (hereinafter TVA Revenue Loan Agreement), is on file with 
the Author. 
 58. More traditional versions of debt—including bank debt—historically offered some 
level of financing help to certain software companies. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 48, at 158 
(documenting banks in the late 1990s willing to provide funding to software companies upon 
VC investment, “even if the company ha[d] no revenues at that time”). 
 59. To date, only one scholarly article briefly identifies RBF usage in the startup world. 
Abraham J.B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow’s Economy, Yesterday’s Start-Ups, 2 MICH. J. 
PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 195, 241–42 (2013) (“Entrepreneurs are making increasing 
use of revenue loans. . . . [and the RBF instrument] fund[s] a mix of livelihood businesses 
and high-growth start-ups.”). More broadly, even outside of startups, RBF is little discussed 
in legal scholarship. Only a few secondary sources even mention RBF or the variant of 
 
001.BERNTHAL_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:20 PM 
773 The Evolution of Entrepreneurial Finance 
 791 
investor gets repaid as a percentage of a company’s revenue 
stream—is not a novel financial tool. 60 Oil and gas ventures have 
long used RBF structures and continue to do so today.61 RBF-type 
instruments have been used in film production.62 Moreover, bio-
sciences and healthcare commonly use a closely related variant, 
royalty-based financing,63 where an investor contracts for a 
 
royalty-based financing. See Jim Chester, Level Up: Legal Issues Facing Software, App, and Video 
Game Entrepreneurs, 80 TEX. B.J. 334 (2017) (“Debt and royalty-based financing can be difficult 
to obtain for early stage companies except at outrageous interest rates.”); JOSEPH W. 
BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL BUYOUTS, RESTRUCTURINGS AND REORGANI-
ZATION §6.21 (Aspen Publishers 2d ed. 2018) (§6.21, “Royalty Based Financing as a New Tool 
for Start-Up Financing?,” authored by Beth J. Felder) (“One innovative vehicle for raising 
capital that is generating attention in the market lately is royalty-based financing.”). 
“Unequity,” as described by Joan Heminway, is a financial instrument used in crowdfunding 
contexts with some resemblance to RBF. Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security in the 
Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 335, 360 (2012). Unequity provides an 
investor a short-term profit or revenue-sharing interest without governance or ownership 
rights in a startup. 
 60. For example, payment of a percentage of revenues (or royalties) has long been 
used in consideration for funding in sectors such as biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and 
mining. See Scott Austin, An Alternative Financing Option for Start-Ups; Entrepreneurs Going 
the Royalty Route Use a Share of Revenue to Pay Back Loans, WALL STREET J., Dec. 2, 2010, at B6 
(“Traditionally found in industries such as mining, film production and drug development, 
royalty financing is being seen more among technology companies and other early-stage 
firms with growth potential.”). 
 61. Dating back to the 1930s in Texas and Oklahoma, “[f]unds were made available to 
oil and gas companies based on the revenues generated from the exploration activities and 
subsequent long-term sale contracts of oil and gas extracted from wells.” Muhammad 
Waqas, Project Finance, OIL & GAS FIN. J. (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.ogfj.com/articles 
/print/volume-12/issue-3/features/energy-banking-section/project-finance.html [https:// 
perma.cc/PLR7-VVMD]. The structure remains in use today. See, e.g., Business Model: 
Overview, ROYAL GOLD, INC., http://www.royalgold.com/business-model/overview 
/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/QLU3-HFGL] (describing how a company “provid[es] 
capital to an operator or explorer in exchange for a royalty”); see also Royalty Based 
Financing—Don’t Give Up Your Equity!, FIN. RESOURCE, http://www.thefinanceresource 
.com/article14.aspx [https://perma.cc/H2CK-P5B8] (“The model for royalty based finan-
cing is not new, and has been in use for countless decades in oil and gas reserves and other 
stream of income trusts.”). 
 62. See Fred Wilson, Revenue Based Financing, AVC (Oct. 17, 2011), http://avc.com 
/2011/10/revenue-based-financing/ [https://perma.cc/D89C-W6K8]. 
 63. Also sometimes known as “revenue interest financing.” See John R. Leone & 
Louis P. Berneman, Revenue Interest Financing: A Strategic Alternative to Accessing Capital 
Through Licensing in the Life Sciences, 43 LES NOUVELLES 285, 285 (2008) (“Revenue interest 
financing is a transaction that involves the creation of a synthetic royalty derived from 
product revenues for products that are developed and marketed internally . . . and selling 
that revenue interest to a buyer (capital provider).”). On use of RBF in biotech, see Eric David 
et al., New Frontiers in Pharma R&D Investment, MCKINSEY & CO. (Feb. 2010) (discussing the 
July 2008 deal where TPG-Axon Capital “agreed to finance up to $325 million of 
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percentage of cash streams arising from sales of a specific product 
or asset.64 
What is new is investors’ use of RBF instruments to fund the 
initial portions of private company lifecycles.65 Early-stage RBF 
investors, like the TVA, target new companies previously thought 
unsuitable for high-risk credit instruments.66 New crowdfunding 
portals, furthermore, offer RBF as a template that companies seek-
ing investment may use in fundraising over the internet pursuant 
to Regulation Crowdfunding rules.67 
RBF agreements have two significant economic terms. One, a 
debtor company pays back the loan as a percentage (typically in the 
4–5% range) of its top line monthly cash receipts.68 In this way, 
repayment is variable, as RBF creates a “blend between bank debt 
and venture capital,” where a lender’s return varies with company 
performance.69 The startup’s revenue-based payments continue, 
acting as a lien on future revenues, until the investment is repaid 
 
development expenses in exchange for milestones and royalties” on products involved in a 
Phase III development). 
 64. Under royalty-based financing, the investor contracts for a percentage of a 
product’s revenues rather than a percentage of the entire company’s revenues. 
 65. See Austin, supra note 60. RBF is also used to fund growth-stage companies. See 
generally BARTLETT, supra note 59 (emphasizing profit margins of RBF targets). RBF funds, 
such as Cypress and Decathlon Capital, have over $50 million under management. 
 66. IndieVC specializes in loans to early-stage businesses with revenue, a sustainable 
business model, and long-term prospects. See INDIEVC, http://www.indie.vc/  [https:// 
perma.cc/9259-8AC2]. Seedlify (now “Corl”) allows individuals worldwide to fund Canadian 
companies using cryptocurrency and share in the companies’ profits. See SEEDLIFY, https:// 
perma.cc/5NFD-489S. Startwise similarly focuses on crowdfunding startups with returns 
via a revenue share. See STARTWISE, https://angel.co/startwise/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2019). 
 67. Legal Primer for Founders, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/faq/legal-primer# 
securities [https://perma.cc/LM57-CG5Y]. A Revenue Loan Agreement form, described as 
“[b]est for businesses with revenues[.] This is a promissory note that is paid back from a 
share of the revenues of the business. It’s typically more exciting for investors than a 
standard loan. Since the payments vary based on revenues, it can also be safer for a company 
with less predictable cash flows.” 
 68. TVA Revenue Loan Agreement, supra note 57, § 3. The repayment obligation is trig-
gered when a startup reaches an agreed-upon amount of gross revenues, an executive 
receives salary of over $100,000, or when there is a distribution to a shareholder. See TVA 
Revenue Loan Agreement, supra note 57, § 3(a). 
 69. An RBF investor acts like a bank insofar as the investment is a loan. Meanwhile, 
an RBF investor acts like a venture capitalist insofar as her return is largely predicated on 
company performance. Sam Kawtharani, Legal 101 for Revenue Based Financing, CORAL 
(Dec. 7, 2016) https://medium.com/corl/legal-101-for-revenue-based-financing-1cde8763 
b2af [https://perma.cc/T4TA-CT7E]; see also George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in 
the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305 (2001) (comparing bank financing and VC). 
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up to an agreed-upon multiple, such as three times the original 
investment. Two, RBF caps an investor’s upside (i.e., profits) 
associated with the investment.70 Once a debtor startup pays back 
three times the loan to TVA, for example, then the loan is repaid. A 
notable exception to limits on a lender’s upside is that if a startup 
issues preferred stock in exchange for an investment in excess of 
$500,000, then the lender receives stock worth 2–5% of the startup, 
depending on how much of the loan has been paid off at the time 
of the sale of shares.71 Relatedly, the lender also retains an option to 
participate in any future sale of the startup’s preferred stock until 
the company reaches a liquidity event.72 
From a control perspective, RBF structures investment as a loan 
secured against the company’s assets.73 As a lender, the RBF 
investor has a priority over shareholders in case of liquidation of 
the company.74 Unlike bank debt, however, founders and managers 
are not required to personally guarantee the RBF loan,75 even in the 
absence of significant tangible collateral or revenue streams.76 As a 
 
 70. RBF’s inherent limitations on investment return (i.e., a capped multiple of the 
investment) precludes a home run (i.e., 10x or greater) return on investment. Such outsized 
returns are often thought necessary to make a venture fund successful since outsized returns 
compensate for the many inevitable investment failures associated with highly uncertain 
environments. Fred Wilson, What Is a Good Venture Return?, AVC (Mar. 20, 2009), http:// 
avc.com/2009/03/what-is-a-good-venture-return/ [https://perma.cc/H64P-VC6F]. 
 71. TVA Revenue Loan Agreement, supra note 57, §§ 1, 2, Exhibit A. A minor exception 
is that if a startup debtor raises a qualified financing within six months following full 
repayment of the loan, then TVA is entitled to 1% of the startup. See id. § 3. 
 72. Id. §§ 4, 10, Exhibit A. 
 73. See, e.g., Revenue Loan Agreement, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder-production.s3 
.amazonaws.com/static/RevenueLoanAgreement.rtf [hereinafter Wefunder Revenue Loan 
Agreement]. Section 7 of this form states that the borrower “grants Lender a security interest 
in all its personal property.” This security interest is not robust as many startups are asset-
light, i.e., company assets are intangible, typically intellectual property, with high asset 
specificity characteristics that make the startup’s IP of low value to users outside the 
company. See generally Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1175 (“Intangible assets are 
more difficult to foreclose on and realize value from.”). 
 74. Lenders are creditors that receive preferential treatment ahead of firm share-
holders in the event of liquidation or bankruptcy. Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1203. 
 75. RBF “typically requires no personal guarantees from management.” Wilson, supra 
note 62. As a practical matter, banks are unlikely to lend to early-stage startups due to their 
high risk and intangible assets. See generally Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1175 
(explaining business and regulatory reasons why banks and traditional lenders must “use 
extreme caution when choosing their borrowers to avoid defaults”). 
 76. As RBF is used in the information technology sector, two aspects distinguish RBF 
from bank debt. One, RBF lacks the type of robust downside protection secured by a bank 
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mechanism to monitor startup activities, a debtor company con-
tracts to provide financial information to the lender upon request.77 
The lender does not take a governance role in the startup. Instead, 
the debtor startup agrees to a restrictive covenant that restricts how 
loan proceeds will be used and, further, limits the company’s ability 
to incur additional indebtedness absent lender consent.78 
From a time perspective, parties to RBF agreements anticipate 
financial returns to investors within a few years of investment, even 
in the absence of a company-wide liquidity event (such as a sale of 
the company or an IPO). For example, a startup’s repayment 
obligation to the TVA is triggered when the company reaches an 
agreed-upon amount of gross revenues, an executive receives 
salary of over $100,000, or when there is a distribution to a 
shareholder.79 Three regulatory dimensions of RBF are notable. As 
a matter of securities law, RBF instruments are a security. Further, 
an RBF investor is a lender, not a shareholder entitled to fiduciary 
duties or other state law shareholder rights under corporate law.80 
Finally, tax deductions on RBF interest payments may be attractive 
to a debtor company. 
2. Demand dividend and social entrepreneurship variants 
A type of startup, often referred to as a social impact venture, 
has gained popularity over the past decade. So-called social entre-
preneurs launch startups with a business model reflecting twin 
aspirations: (1) impact a social problem and (2) generate financial 
returns.81 Motivations of social enterprise investors vary. But at 
 
lender. Two, RBF repayment is variable, rather than fixed by a predetermined repayment 
schedule. BARTLETT, supra note 59. Variable repayment may be attractive for startups that 
have uncertainty about their future cash flows or expect to have “lumpy” revenue streams. 
A business with seasonal aspects, for example, may have lumpy revenues where sales are 
higher at some portions of the year than others. Wilson, supra note 62. 
 77. See TVA Revenue Loan Agreement, supra note 57, § 5. But see Wefunder Revenue Loan 
Agreement, supra note 73 (no obligation of company to provide financial information 
to lender). 
 78. See TVA Revenue Loan Agreement, supra note 57, § 8. 
 79. See id. § 3(a). 
 80. See Wefunder Revenue Loan Agreement, supra note 73, § 17 (lender not entitled to be 
deemed “holder of capital stock” for any purpose). 
 81. One description is that social enterprise startups are more “zebras” than 
unicorns—i.e., they aspire to be “both black and white: they are profitable and improve 
society.” See Jennifer Brandel et al., Zebras Fix What Unicorns Break, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2017), 
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least a subset is willing to fund an impact venture, even when the 
“risk profile of an angel impact investment is insane.”82 
Nontraditional structures, at least in theory,83 could be especial-
ly useful for impact startups and their investors.84 Traditional 
 
https://medium.com/@sexandstartups/zebrasfix-c467e55f9d96 [https://perma.cc/PP4H 
-RXJ8] (“The business model is the message. . . . We believe that developing alternative 
business models to the startup status quo has become a central moral challenge of our time.” 
(internal punctuation omitted)). 
 82. Interview with Tom Virden, angel investor (May 26, 2017). Virden, a Boulder-
based investor who invested in over thirty startups in 2016–17, readily acknowledges the 
long-shot nature of many of his impact investments. But he sees it as a way to give back to 
the community and “invest in people that I care about.” 
 83. Contractual innovation in impact investing merits further study. Social impact 
investing presents a puzzle in contractual innovation. Interviews with individuals in social 
entrepreneurship suggest relatively slow adoption of nontraditional types of investment 
instruments for impact companies. One view hypothesizes that social impact already 
involves a lot of uncertainty and that a “new” instrument would create more problems. 
Interview with Brian Axelrad, Attorney with Illinois-based startup practice that works with 
twenty-five to forty deals per year (Sept. 22, 2017). Another suggests that investors would 
like new instruments but entrepreneurs are less interested. Interview with Victor Grau, 
Former Director, MIT D-Lab (June 28, 2017). A third view is that lawyers are risk-averse and 
“aren’t going to school to be creative.” Interview with Stephanie Gripne, Director, Impact 
Finance Center (July 3, 2017). 
84. Experimentation with new instruments is ongoing. Some high-profile impact 
investors, such as Village Capital, advocate for the utility of novel instruments. For example, 
Village Capital highlights that nine of its seventy early-stage investments involve “non-
equity structures such as revenue share agreements or flexible debt.” See, e.g., Victoria Fram, 
Why an Equity-Only Investment Strategy Overlooks Many Promising Entrepreneurs, MEDIUM 
(Feb. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/village-capital/why-an-equity-only-investment-strategy 
-overlooks-many-promising-entrepreneurs-ec5f69bd104c [https://perma.cc/B9B5-7J8C]. 
Startwise, Fledge, and certain angel investors use nontraditional investment 
instruments in connection with social enterprise. See supra note 66. Fledge is a social impact 
accelerator that uses RBF instruments with its portfolio companies. About, FLEDGE, http:// 
fledge.co/about/ [https://perma.cc/E9K7-24CF]. Fledge actually mixes a 6% ownership 
stake alongside a revenue-based agreement as part of its investment arrangement. Details, 
FLEDGE, http://fledge.co/about/details/#investment [https://perma.cc/TC58-9UET] (“[W]e 
ask for 6% ownership in each startup. This investment is uniquely structured as redeemable 
equity, with the startup repurchasing Fledge’s shares using 4% of future revenues.”). 
Another alternative form of social impact investment is FLY Paper, a hybrid debt 
instrument proposed by Professors Reiser and Dean, which is designed to make an 
enterprise’s social mission “sticky” for both investors and entrepreneurs. Dana Brakman 
Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with Fly Paper: A Hybrid Financial Instrument for Social 
Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2013). A company receives modest capital from a FLY 
Paper holder, who in return receives a below-market return on a flexible repayment 
schedule. If the entrepreneur sells her shares, then the FLY Paper holder may convert her 
debt into equity to capture any benefit associated with the sale. This way, an early enterprise 
with an aspirational social mission gains flexibility to choose between profits and mission 
while avoiding the permanency associated with a charitable organization. If an entrepreneur 
chooses to sell, the instrument provides equity-type benefit to the capital provider. 
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instruments such as common and preferred equity typically require 
a sale, IPO, or other “exit” event before an investor receives a 
return. But the “notion of an exit is artificial and weird” for a social 
impact startup that lacks high growth potential and, moreover, 
does not aspire to a future sale.85 Social investment instruments 
address this problem through investor liquidity based on a 
startup’s revenues or profits.86 These instruments allow a social 
entrepreneur to be more “honest” with investors about likely 
outcomes since they avoid a structure where investor return is 
predicated on a large—and highly unlikely—exit.87 
One type of instrument expressly designed for social impact 
ventures, the demand dividend, is styled as a “debt vehicle” that 
blends equity-like aspects.88 The demand dividend provides an 
investor a temporary ownership stake, labeled as preferred stock. 
From an economic perspective, the demand dividend has two key 
characteristics. One, after investment the demand dividend allows 
for a holiday period (typically ten to twenty-four months) during 
which the company does not owe payment to an investor. Follow-
ing the dividend holiday, a startup pays a dividend to the investor 
based on a percentage of its “free cash flow”— defined roughly as 
a percentage of the company’s profits. In this way, demand divi-
dends share a key characteristic—variable repayment—with RBF.89 
 
 85. Gripne Interview, supra note 83. 
 86. One social impact investor said that when he received his first wire transferring 
funds that provided liquidity from a social venture, “I almost cried.” Interview with Rich 
Hoops, Cofounder, Board Chair, Impact HUB Boulder (Dec. 8, 2016). See, e.g., DEMAND 
DIVIDEND, supra note 27 (“[The] Demand Dividend grew out of the need to find alternatives 
to debt, convertible debt, and equity as funding mechanisms for social enterprises.”). 
 87. Under a structure that builds in liquidity, an entrepreneur can be honest with the 
investor and say “there is not a chance of an exit . . . but there is a chance I can pay your 
money back.” Virden Interview, supra note 82. 
 88. See DEMAND DIVIDEND, supra note 27 (demand dividend is “a debt vehicle”); Term 
Sheet for Variable Dividend, MILLER CTR. FOR SOC. ENTREPREN., https://static1.squarespace 
.com/static/55036eefe4b0fe6c8e833e4a/t/5642944be4b07a45a862cce6/1447203915020/Term+ 
Sheet-for-Variable+Dividend.pdf [https://perma.cc/JC4R-6R3B]. 
 89. The demand dividend attracts more scholarly attention. See, e.g., Dana Brakman 
Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Financing the Benefit Corporation, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 793, 814 
(2017) (“Intentionally a profit-sharing—rather than merely revenue-sharing—vehicle, [the 
demand dividend] will appeal to the needs of more mature benefit corporations and 
dedicated impact investors.”). The demand dividend is also briefly mentioned by Deborah 
Burand. See Deborah Burand, Resolving Impact Investment Disputes: When Doing Good Goes 
Bad, 48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62 n.21 (2015). 
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Unlike RBF payments to investors, which are predicated upon top-
line revenues, demand dividends are bottom line based (i.e., 
payments to investors are tied to profits). Dividends are payable 
when declared by the board of directors. Two, similar to RBF, the 
demand dividend caps the investor’s upside in a startup’s profits. 
Once a startup pays back a multiple of the original investment, the 
investor’s shares are “redeemed” by the company (i.e., the shares 
go away and the investor is no longer a shareholder).90 
The demand dividend has three notable control elements. One, 
similar to RBF, a demand dividend instrument entitles an investor 
to financial information about the company. This allows an investor 
to monitor payments from the startup to investor. Two, a demand 
dividend empowers investors to affect a startup’s spending 
decisions. A startup must provide to investors “an outline of 
projected spending revenue, and capital use[,]” and once approved, 
any change to a business plan requires written consent of 
investors.91 This control provision provides an exceptional amount 
of power to investors who, typically, are at an information disad-
vantage relative to management about company strategy. At a 
minimum, this control provision reduces the ability of startups to 
quickly change direction. Heightened transaction costs may result 
from steps associated with business plan discussions between a 
company and its investors, as well as obtaining investor approvals 
for changes. Three, a demand dividend holder does not have 
shareholder voting rights. But the demand dividend holders are 
entitled to a board seat. The preferred shareholder aspect of the 
demand dividend, including the governance right to a board seat, 
may be viewed as a type of “collateral” that is held pending repay-
ment to investors. 
With respect to time, like RBF, the demand dividend instru-
ment intends to create financial returns to investors within a few 
years of investment, even in the absence of a company-wide 
liquidity event (such as a sale or IPO). In an effort to force liquidity, 
a demand dividend must be paid in full by the startup to the 
 
 90. See Term Sheet for Variable Dividend, supra note 88, at 2. 
 91. Id. at 1. 
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investor within seven years.92 As a matter of securities law, demand 
dividend instruments are a security. Further, the intent is that a 
demand dividend investor is a lender rather than a shareholder 
entitled to fiduciary duties or other state law shareholder rights 
under corporate law.93 If tested in court, however, it is unclear 
whether a demand dividend holder may successfully claim that her 
preferred stock entitles her to basic shareholder rights under 
state law. 
3. Venture debt 
In his detailed study of venture debt, Darian Ibrahim highlights 
that venture lenders—typically specialty banks or venture debt 
firms94—offer debt to VC-backed startups.95 Venture debt lending 
extends to early-stage startups.96 A startup’s eligibility for venture 
debt, importantly, does not hinge on commonly used bank loan 
criteria like cash flows or tangible assets.97 Rather, venture debt is 
typically available to startups that reach a VC funding round.98 
From an economic perspective, venture debt differs from RBF 
and other variable instruments insofar as the repayment schedule 
is fixed.99 Venture loans are usually straight (not convertible) debt, 
have an average term of two to three years, and are fully amortized, 
with equal monthly payments of principal and interest.100 Interest 
 
 92. This is accomplished through a redemption provision. Of course, if a startup lacks 
funds, then this provision has little benefit to an investor. See id. at 2. 
 93. In this respect, drafters intend that a demand dividend be treated similarly to a 
revenue loan agreement. See Wefunder Revenue Loan Agreement, supra note 73, § 17 (lender not 
entitled to be deemed “holder of capital stock” for any purpose). 
 94. Prominent specialty venture banks include Silicon Valley Bank, Comerica, and 
Square 1, while venture debt firms include Western Technology Investment (WTI) and Orix 
Capital. See Samir Kaji, Venture Debt 101—Banks vs. Venture Debt Firms, PEVCBANKER (May 19, 
2013), http://pevcbanker.com/venture-debt-101-banks-vs-venture-debt-firms/ [https:// 
perma.cc/TM3D-6H27]. 
 95. Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1173. 
 96. Id. at 1185 (discussing lenders’ preference for loans to startups at early, pre-
revenue stages). 
 97. Id. at 1173. 
 98. Low interest rates in recent years made venture debt attractive for early-stage 
companies. Early-stage startups use venture debt for purposes such as financing inventory. 
 99. Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1179. 
 100. Id. (24–36 months, “sometimes with an interest-only period of three to nine months 
before the term begins”). 
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rates are in the 10–15% range.101 Another distinguishing economic 
feature of venture debt is that warrants accompany the loan. 
Venture lenders take warrant coverage in the startups, typically 
ranging from 5 to 15% of the loan amount, which provides an 
option for equity ownership in the startup.102 If the company fails 
or is unable to pay, lenders retain traditional debt remedies, 
including repayment ahead of equity holders. If the company 
succeeds, lenders not only receive principal plus interest but also 
often have the option to share in the upside through exercise of 
warrants traditionally bundled with the debt.103 
From a control perspective, a startup’s intellectual property 
provides intangible collateral that holds some value by venture 
lenders.104 But venture lenders primarily rely upon third parties, 
VCs, for an “implicit guarantee” that the startup will pay back the 
loan.105 From a time perspective, venture debt agreements provide 
for repayment to investors within two to three years of invest-
ment.106 As a matter of securities law, venture debt instruments are 
a security. Further, the RBF investor is a lender, not a shareholder 
entitled to fiduciary duties or other state law shareholder rights 
under corporate law. 
 
 101. Patrick Gordan, Venture Debt: A Capital Idea for Startups, KAUFFMAN FELLOWS REP., 
Fall/Winter 2012, https://www.kauffmanfellows.org/journal_posts/venture-debt-a-capital 
-idea-for-startups/ [https://perma.cc/MC4Y-J4BF]. 
 102. Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1179–80. 
 103. Id. at 1175, 1179. 
 104. Id. at 1187; see also Gordan, supra note 101 (“Growth capital term loans are secured 
by a blanket lien on a company’s assets, which may nor may not include a lien on intel-
lectual property.”). 
 105. Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1184 (“VCs make an implicit promise to 
repay venture loans out of their present and future equity investments.”); Mann, supra note 
48, at 137; see also E-mail from Joel Gheen, formerly with RBF provider Cyprus Capital, to 
Brad Bernthal, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (Jan. 23, 2018) (on file with author) 
(“The reality is that true Venture Debt is almost always offered only on the tails of a 
significant equity event, and that equity has to come from a certain profile of deep-pocketed, 
institutional VC or PE. Thus, the bank’s risk is minimized by knowing there is a large, 
interested financial partner, and the bank can make more upside being . . . involved in the 
later IPO or liquidity event. Banks rarely if ever offer Venture Debt without a flagship equity 
sponsor in place.”). 
 106. Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1173 n.13, 1179 (term of loans is 24–36 
months, “sometimes with an interest-only period of three to nine months before the 
term begins”). 
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4. Light preferred (aka, series seed preferred) 
This Article refers to a stripped-down version of traditional 
preferred equity as a “light preferred” instrument.107 John Coyle 
and Joseph Green trace the development of this instrument, which 
is used for the earliest investment (i.e., pre-seed and seed stage) into 
a startup.108 Form documents that effect a light preferred 
financing—entitled “Series AA” and “Series Seed Preferred”—
publicly emerged in 2008. Series Seed documents today are shared 
through an open source license.109 
A light preferred instrument provides special economic and 
control rights to an investor. Those rights are not, however, as 
elaborate as rights that a VC takes later in the firm’s lifecycle when 
investment funding amounts increase.110 Light preferred differs 
from a traditional preferred equity round in two important ways: 
(1) lower direct transaction costs and (2) reduced investor control 
over a startup.111 Light preferred results in fewer provisions to 
 
 107. Another development in startup investment relates to dual class structures. This 
trend, however, is more important for growth-stage and emerging-stage investments. Dual 
class stock is a governance arrangement that entrenches manager power—namely, dual class 
stock that vests governance power in founders—and alters the control rights of preferred 
investors. This structure provides founder’s common stock with outsized voting power, 
giving founders up to ten times the voting rights of other equity holders (including preferred 
shareholders). Steve Blank, When Founders Go Too Far, HARV. BUS. REV. (2017), https:// 
hbr.org/2017/11/when-founders-go-too-far [https://perma.cc/HWY3-W9G6]. “This allows 
them to outvote their preferred-stock-holding VCs, giving founders extraordinary control.” 
Id. Founder’s stock is part of, as Steve Blank calls it, the “founders’ revenge”—i.e., “the 
remarkable and little-understood ways in which founders, no longer systematically pushed 
aside as their start-ups grow, have come to dominate their boardrooms.” Id. 
 108. Coyle & Green, supra note 4, at 173–74 (discussing work of Cooley attorneys Mike 
Platt and Noah Pittard in creating a Series AA set of light preferred documents, followed by 
Ted Wang’s release of Series Seed documents); FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 7. 
 109. See Brad Newman, Announcing New Series Seed Convertible Note and Updated Equity 
Financing Documents and Generators, COOLEY GO, https://www.cooleygo.com/announcing 
-new-series-seed-equity-and-note-financing-documents-and-generators/ [https://perma.cc 
/RVF7-VMV7]. The open source Series Seed documents are available at https://github.com 
/seriesseed/equity [https://perma.cc/3NHN-QBJ4]. 
 110. For example, some forms of light preferred do not provide anti-dilution protection 
to an investor, and the company’s representations and warranties are limited. See Yokum, 
How Do the Sample Series Seed Financing Documents Differ from Typical Series A Financing 
Documents? STARTUP COMPANY LAW. (Mar. 14, 2010), http://www.startupcompanylawyer 
.com/2010/03/14/how-do-the-sample-series-seed-financing-documents-differ-from-typical 
-series-a-financing-documents/ [https://perma.cc/K5T5-SWBR]. 
 111. See Ted Wang, About the Series Seed Documents, SERIES SEED (Feb. 24, 2010), https:// 
www.seriesseed.com/posts/2010/02/about-the-series-seed-documents.html [https://perma 
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negotiate and draft ex ante in the deal documents, which saves on 
legal fees.112 Transaction costs can become outsized, as a percentage 
of a small fundraise, in early-stage fundraising when negotiation 
and drafting costs become significant.113 Further, in contrast to the 
extensive involvement of a demand dividend investor in a startup’s 
business plan, fewer protections reduce the chance of ex post hold 
up by an early investor with respect to company decisions. 
Light preferred retains three notable economic provisions that 
are typical in a traditional preferred offering. One, in order to 
determine the “price” of light preferred shares, an investor and a 
company must agree upon a startup’s enterprise value. Early-stage 
private company valuation is a speculative endeavor that requires 
considerable guesswork and can be a contentious point for nego-
tiation.114 Two, a light preferred investor secures a preference, in 
the event of company liquidation, to receive payment ahead of 
common shareholders.115 Three, a light preferred investor retains 
an option to participate in future company fundraising rounds.116 
This provides an investor the ability to invest additional capital at 
a future point when uncertainty about the startup’s prospects is 
 
.cc/F9BM-PF48]. Startup attorney Ted Wang, who wrote the blog entry, notes that “[f]rom 
an investor’s perspective, while moving away from the traditional full-blown financing 
documents entails giving up a number of rights and protections, when taken across 
numerous transactions, the benefits of spending less time and money on the documents 
outweigh the cost of sacrificing these additional rights and protections.” Id. 
 112. To effectuate a series seed light preferred deal, for example, legal attention is only 
required for the charter and an investment agreement, rather than the five standard NVCA 
agreements (stock purchase agreement, voting agreement, investors’ rights agreement, 
ROFR/co-sale agreement, and charter). Moreover, negotiation of the terms is punted to the 
next round. “Deleting anti-dilution rights saves several pages of text in the Certificate of 
Incorporation.” Yokum, supra note 110. 
 113. Document standardization and automation continue to drive legal prices down. 
But even $10,000 in legal costs, for example, constitute a material portion of the small 
fundraise (e.g., 4% of a $250,000 round). 
 114. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 7; FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 7. 
 115. See Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorportation, GITHUB art. 5(B) (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://github.com/CooleyLLP/seriesseed/blob/master/equity/Series%20Seed%20-%20 
Restated%20Certificate%20of%20Incorporation.md [https://perma.cc/3J8R-CLLC] [herein-
after Certificate of Incorporation] (Cooley LLP Series Seed Form Documents). 
 116. See Series Seed Preferred Stock Investment Agreement, GITHUB § 6 (June 24, 2017), 
https://github.com/CooleyLLP/seriesseed/blob/master/equity/Series%20Seed%20-%20 
Preferred%20Stock%20Investment%20Agreement.md [https://perma.cc/ZZ2F-QQ65] [here-
inafter Preferred Stock Investment Agreement] (Cooley LLP Series Seed Form Documents) 
(discussing participation rights). 
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reduced and, moreover, information asymmetry between the com-
pany and the investor is diminished. 
With respect to control provisions, light preferred provides 
voting and board governance rights to investors.117 But a light 
preferred instrument reduces the muscle of protective provi-
sions.118 A VC typically requires extensive protective provisions, 
which function as negative covenants that prohibit company 
actions unless preferred shareholders consent.119 A light preferred 
instrument retains certain protective provisions, such as prohibi-
tion on sale of the company absent preferred investor approval. But 
the light preferred instrument relaxes other prohibitions, such as 
the ability of the company to borrow money.120 These relaxed 
investor protections may be fortified upon later financing rounds, 
however, since light preferred investors secure a modified most-
favored-nations clause.121 Upon a startup’s subsequent financing, 
the light preferred investors receive the rights granted to investors 
in the future round.122 
Counterintuitively, as a company matures, less robust deal 
terms may benefit an early-stage investor at later stages of a 
startup’s lifecycle. As a company grows, investors invest greater 
amounts of money and wield more control not only over the 
startup, but also over early-stage investors. Investors at later stages 
of a startup tend to look to the precedent terms set by early 
investment rounds—namely, a later-in-time investor seeks terms 
that are equal or superior to terms obtained by early investors.123 
 
 117. See Certificate of Incorporation, supra note 115, art. 5(B), § 2 (discussing voting and 
election of directors). 
 118. Light Preferred, STARTUP LAW., http://startuplawyer.com/startup-law-glossary 
/light-preferred [https://perma.cc/3T5S-68EC] (“Light Preferred, also known as seed 
preferred, is a term used to describe a financing via preferred stock that is watered-down or 
not up to the level of a full-fledged ‘series A’ financing.”). 
 119. FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 7, at 71. 
 120. See Certificate of Incorporation, supra note 115. 
 121. See Preferred Stock Investment Agreement, supra note 116, Exhibit B, § 4.2 (discussing 
additional rights and obligations, including registration rights and price-based anti-
dilution protection). 
 122. For example, a VC round of financing may include registration rights and co-sale 
rights that are absent in a light preferred round. 
 123. FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 7, at 153 (“Given how important precedent is in 
future financings, if you reach a bad outcome on a specific term, you might be stuck with it 
for the life of your company.”). 
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Reduced controls associated with an early investment establishes a 
precedent where the baseline level of investor control is relatively 
low. So if a later-in-time investor takes the same terms, or only 
incrementally more control terms, the net effect is that late-stage 
investor controls are lower than they would be than if the early 
control terms were set at a high level.124 
From a time perspective, light preferred investors are unlikely 
to see a financial return for an extended period of time, likely in the 
range of five to eight years required for the average startup to reach 
a liquidity event.125 In view of this extended duration, investors 
require key founders and executives to bond themselves to the 
startup. This is accomplished by forcing key founders and execu-
tives to enter into vesting agreements. An individual deemed 
critical to the company’s success must agree to stay with the com-
pany or, if the individual departs within four years, then the 
individual will lose some portion of her ownership in the startup.126 
With respect to regulation, as a matter of securities law, light 
preferred instruments are a security. A light preferred investor is a 
shareholder entitled to fiduciary duties or other state law share-
holder rights under corporate law. Finally, a light preferred 
investor’s purchase of shares starts the clock for a holding period 
required for capital gains tax treatment. 
5. Convertible debt 
Convertible debt structures a high-risk capital investment in the 
form of a loan (aka, a “note”) that anticipates a subsequent round 
of equity financing. In short, unlike a venture debt lender, a 
convertible debt investor does not seek her return through loan 
repayment. Rather, an investor parks capital with a company, in 
hopes that the investment will convert into ownership upon a 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. PITCHBOOK, PITCHBOOK 2018 VENTURE CAPITAL OUTLOOK 14 (2018) (finding a 
median time to exit of 6.8 years for an IPO, 5.1 years for an acquisition, and 7.6 years for a 
secondary buyout); see also For Largest Venture-Backed Tech Exits, It Takes 6.3 Years, CB 
INSIGHTS: RESEARCH BRIEFS (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/venture 
-time-exit-marathon/ [https://perma.cc/5T8N-7YFQ] (finding an average of 6.3 years); see 
also New Exit in VC, supra note 25, at 14 (citing an average of around 7 years). 
 126. See Preferred Stock Investment Agreement, supra note 116, Exhibit B, § 2.2.3. 
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subsequent preferred stock financing led by a sophisticated—often 
an institutional—investor. 
Investors used convertible debt prior to 2005; however, earlier 
uses were primarily for growth and emerging stage company’s 
“bridge” rounds.127 Beginning around 2005, convertible debt in-
creasingly became used as a stand-alone financing round.128 For 
example, consider a Boulder-based startup from that time, Justin’s 
Nut Butter. Justin Gold loved long bike rides.129 To power his 
bicycling passion, Justin made nut butter from original recipes, 
which provided an ideal high-protein snack during rides. In 2004, 
he produced jars of an eponymous product—Justin’s Nut Butter—
while working another full-time job. By 2006, with his product 
gaining popularity, Justin recognized a new market opportunity: 
an on-the-go squeeze pack to compete with sports gel packs and 
energy shots. To help fund this effort, Justin’s Nut Butter raised 
outside capital from angel investors through an emerging startup 
investment instrument: convertible debt. 
Convertible debt generally lowers direct, ex ante transaction 
costs relative to preferred stock issuances. Convertible debt does 
not require extended negotiations between a company and inves-
tors. Further, once an investment is complete, changes to a startup’s 
charter and associated documents are typically unnecessary. Con-
vertible debt’s direct legal costs, as a result, are typically lower than 
traditional and light preferred equity.130 
Convertible debt has three key economic features. One, parties 
create a period of temporary debt during which the note holder is 
a creditor to the firm. Interest accrues on the note; however, no 
payment is required by the startup to a noteholder prior to 
maturity.131 Convertible debt does not require that a startup and its 
 
 127. Bridge rounds are a short-term capital infusion, usually paid back within twelve 
months or less, meant to allow a company to reach another financing or a liquidation event, 
such as an IPO. See, e.g., Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, 1173 at n.13 (citing J.V. Rizzi, A 
Framework to Mitigate the Risks of Bridge Lending, 17 COM. LENDING REV. 5, 8 (2002)). 
 128. Axelrad Interview, supra note 83; Coyle & Green, supra note 4, at 162. 
 129. About Justin’s, JUSTIN’S, http://justins.com/justins-story/company-story [https:// 
perma.cc/4HRD-KTYZ]. 
 130. Burns E-mail, supra note 24; Coyle & Green, supra note 4, at 162. 
 131. At maturity, or in the event of default, a note holder has the ability to “call” the 
debt (i.e., demand payment). Most note holders, however, are hesitant to do so because— 
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investors agree upon a company valuation. Convertible debt 
postpones the valuation decision, at least in theory, until a later 
time when more information about the company is available and 
the enterprise value can be more readily determined.132 Two, 
convertible debt prescribes that a subsequent qualified financing, 
defined as an equity issuance over a prescribed amount (which may 
range from $250,000 to $1 million), triggers automatic conversion of 
the outstanding balance of the note into equity.133 Upon conversion, 
the noteholder becomes an equity shareholder that holds the same 
class of preferred stock as the later investor takes. Three, the note 
may include mechanisms that provide a price benefit to an early 
investor upon conversion. For example, a valuation cap prescribes 
a ceiling on the price at which a convertible note converts.134 A 
conversion “discount,” commonly prescribed in the note at 10–30%, 
rewards the noteholder for her early investment into a company.135 
A noteholder typically may elect the benefit of the discount or a 
valuation cap, but not both. 
From a control perspective, a holder of convertible debt has 
priority over shareholders in the event of company liquidation.136 
Further, a most-favored-nations clause guarantees a convertible 
note investor that, if the company subsequently issues more debt 
on more favorable terms, then the investor has the option to adopt 
 
even if the note has matured—the action to call a note could hasten the end of the company 
(and result in little to no payment). 
 132. As discussed in infra Part IV, a valuation cap nonetheless functions as at least a 
shadow valuation. 
 133. Convertible note holders typically have a discretionary right to convert to common 
at maturity. However, exercise of this option is attractive only in rare circumstances, such as 
when a company is so successful that additional financing is unnecessary. 
 134. For example, say an investor makes a $100,000 investment that uses a Park-n-ride 
instrument that includes a $1 million valuation cap. The company flourishes and, a year later, 
raises a qualified financing round with a $5 million pre-money valuation. Upon conversion, 
excluding any interest, the Park-n-ride holder is entitled to 10% of the company under 
the cap. 
 135. Another economic benefit to the note holder is a conversion cap. The conversion 
cap sets a maximum valuation at which the investment converts. This benefits an early 
investor when a company’s valuation skyrockets. For example, if a cap is $2 million, but a 
VC round is set at $10 million, the original investment converts at the $2 million valuation. 
FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 7, at 111. 
 136. Lenders are creditors that receive preferential treatment ahead of firm share-
holders in the event of liquidation or bankruptcy. See Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, 
at 1203. 
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the terms.137 Like RBF investment, founders and managers are not 
required to personally guarantee the convertible debt loan. Upon 
maturity of a convertible note, the investor often has the option to 
either require repayment of a note or, alternatively, to convert into 
preferred stock.138 
From a time perspective, convertible note investors resemble 
light preferred investors and are unlikely to see a financial return 
for a relatively long period of time, likely in the range of five to 
eight years required for the average startup to reach a liquidity 
event.139 Unlike a light preferred instrument, however, it is unusual 
for convertible noteholders to bind key founders and executives to 
the startup for an extended period of time through vesting agree-
ments. With respect to regulatory categories, as a matter of securi-
ties law, a convertible debt instrument is a security. Further, a 
convertible debt holder is not a shareholder entitled to fiduciary 
duties or other state law shareholder rights under corporate law.140 
Finally, tax deductions on convertible debt interest payments may 
be available to a startup, so long as the debt is not viewed as a de 
facto equity position.141 
6. Simple agreement for future equity (Safe) and similar variants 
The Simple Agreement for Future Equity (Safe) retains most 
aspects of convertible debt—except for the debt part. The Safe is an 
instrument popularized on the West Coast that is closely associated 
with accelerator programs.142 For example, MadKudu participated 
 
 137. Convertible Promissory Note, GITHUB § 1.4 (June 20, 2017), https://github.com 
/CooleyLLP/seriesseed/blob/master/notes/Series%20Seed%20Notes%20-%20Convertible% 
20Promissory%20Note.md [https://perma.cc/ED8G-67M4] [hereinafter Convertible Promis-
sory Note]. 
 138. See id. § 2.3. 
 139. PITCHBOOK, supra note 125, at 14 (finding a median time to exit of 6.8 years for an 
IPO, 5.1 years for an acquisition, and 7.6 years for a secondary buyout); see also For Largest 
Venture-Backed Tech Exits, supra note 125; New Exit in VC, supra note 25, at 14 (citing an 
average of around 7 years). 
 140. See Wefunder Revenue Loan Agreement, supra note 73, § 17 (explaining that lender 
not entitled to be deemed “holder of capital stock” for any purpose). 
 141. See Dan Wright, Convertible Debt Tax Issues for Startups: An Introduction to the Federal 
Income Tax Issues Associated with Conversion Features, STARTUP L. BLOG (June 2, 2012), http:// 
www.startuplawblog.com/2012/06/02/convertible-debt/ [https://perma.cc/VU97-HCLE]. 
 142. Coyle & Green, supra note 4, at 168 (describing origins of Safe as constructed by 
Y Combinator partner Carlynn Levy). 
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in the 2015 Techstars Boulder investment accelerator. MadKudu 
created a product, based upon big data tools and analytics, that 
small and mid-size companies use to identify useful patterns in 
customer behavior.143 Once the Techstars Boulder problem con-
cluded, the startup’s founders relocated to Mountain View, 
California. There they rejoined their families and worked to grow 
their company. To fuel operations, in November 2015 MadKudu 
raised a $1.4 million seed round from a French investment fund and 
several angel investors in the form of a Safe.144 
A Safe retains much of the structure of convertible debt; 
however, it eliminates an investor’s right to loan repayment. For a 
startup like MadKudu, the Safe presents the same attraction as 
convertible debt: (1) lower direct transaction costs145 and (2) an 
instrument that sidesteps formal valuation.146 But since a Safe 
removes the loan feature, it is most accurately viewed as a type of 
contractual derivative—that is, an instrument with value derived 
from the value of another asset, in this case the startup’s stock.147 
Economic aspects of the Safe closely resemble convertible debt. 
The Safe anticipates conversion of investment into future owner-
ship upon issuance of preferred stock.148 Upon conversion, the Safe 
holder becomes an equity shareholder that holds the same class of 
 
 143. Levan E-mail, supra note 4; Green & Coyle, supra note 14, at 172 (“The SAFE is, in 
essence, a contractual derivative instrument. It is a deferred equity investment that will 
prove valuable to the holder if, and only if, the company that issues it raises a subsequent 
round of financing, is sold, or goes public.”). 
 144. Levan E-mail, supra note 4. 
 145. All else equal, a Safe’s direct legal fees associated with investment will be lower 
than convertible debt. 
 146. As with convertible debt, a valuation cap, if included, acts as at least a shadow 
valuation in a Safe. 
 147. Green & Coyle, supra note 14, at 172 (“[Safe] is a deferred equity investment that 
will prove valuable to the holder if, and only if, the company that issues it raises a subsequent 
round of financing, is sold, or goes public.”). 
 148. Unlike convertible debt, many Safes do not require a qualifying amount of 
financing, only that the subsequent issuance involves preferred stock. See Safe Primer, Y 
COMBINATOR (Feb. 2016), https://www.ycombinator.com/documents/ [https://perma.cc 
/85GA-GM6K] (“There is no threshold amount that the company must raise to trigger 
the conversion.”). 
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preferred stock that the later investor takes.149 A valuation cap and 
a discount may be included.150 
In control aspects, however, the Safe differs considerably from 
convertible debt. The Safe diminishes the control an investor may 
exercise over a company. By removing the debt feature in the Safe, 
deal architects address two perceived problems with convertible 
debt. One, startups are often cash poor, which spurred concerns 
that use of debt may pull a startup into insolvency.151 Two, after a 
note matures, debt may be “called” by an investor. Pulling this 
control lever to demand payment after the note is due—so goes the 
argument—is inappropriately harsh in an entrepreneurial environ-
ment. The Safe removes this possibility for an early investor to 
“call” a note and potentially drag a company into insolvency.152 
Indeed, if a company does not issue preferred stock, then a Safe 
holder lacks a mechanism to force conversion or repayment, which 
may leave an investment stranded in indefinite limbo. 
From a time perspective, Safe investors are unlikely to see a 
financial return for the five-to-eight-year range that the average 
startup takes to reach a liquidity event.153 With respect to regulatory 
categories, as a matter of securities law, a Safe instrument is a 
security. Further, a Safe holder is not a shareholder entitled to 
 
 149. A minor technical exception exists where a preferred equity financing occurs at a 
valuation in excess of the valuation cap, in which case the Safe holder receives Safe preferred 
stock. See id. 
 150. See Startup Documents, Safe: Cap and Discount, Y COMBINATOR (Feb. 2016), https:// 
www.ycombinator.com/documents/ [https://perma.cc/85GA-GM6K]. 
 151. FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 7. More specifically, the Safe was created during a 
time in which Delaware courts appeared to consider a “zone of insolvency” where 
obligations could shift to creditors. In 2015, Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin brought 
some clarity concerning Delaware law’s approach to duties owed by directors to creditors. 
115 A.3d 535, 546–47 (Del. Ch. 2015). Quadrant clarified that directors owe fiduciary duties 
to residual claimants where a corporation is insolvent. Id. Creditors become a residual 
claimant at the point of insolvency and, accordingly, may bring a derivative suit against 
directors of an insolvent corporation. Id. at 546. But a “zone of insolvency” does not appear 
to trigger any shifting duties from directors to creditors. Id. 
 152. Coyle & Green, supra note 4, at 162 (discussing challenges for a startup when a 
convertible note matures prior to a conversion event). 
 153. PITCHBOOK, supra note 125, at 14 (finding a median time to exit of 6.8 years for an 
IPO, 5.1 years for an acquisition, and 7.6 years for a secondary buyout); see also For Largest 
Venture-Backed Tech Exits, supra note 125 (finding an average of 6.3 years); New Exit in VC, 
supra note 25, at 14 (citing an average of around 7 years). 
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fiduciary duties or other state law shareholder rights under 
corporate law.154 
Variants of the Safe exist, including the lesser-known Keep It 
Simple Security (“KISS”). The deferred ownership feature of these 
instruments, notably, is also attractive for regulatory reasons to 
effectuate investment into startups domesticated in certain foreign 
jurisdictions. For example, the international version of a Safe-type 
agreement used by Techstars, entitled the “Fixed Percentage Con-
vertible Equity Agreement,” avoids certain countries’ prohibitions 
on foreign ownership of companies.155 By deferring ownership 
until some future time, the Safe-variant investment provides 
Techstars a future interest in a company while maintaining formal 
compliance with foreign ownership laws in countries that ban non-
domestic shareholders.156 
7. Prepayment 
Another novel form of startup investment is prepayment for 
goods enabled by crowdfunding portals. Prepayment helps start-
ups raise money from many individuals who anticipate a “return” 
in the form of a future good or service. Online intermediaries, 
including Kickstarter and Indiegogo, match creators with crowd-
funded financial support to help produce a good or service. When 
a campaign is fully funded, a company promises to deliver the new 
product to the financial supporter. 
Whether prepayment is a form of entrepreneurial finance is 
subject to dispute. Prepayment is not designed to return profit to 
an investor and is not (usually) an investment contract. On the 
other hand, prepayment is a meaningful way by which startups 
obtain funds, and moreover, a provider of capital expects “return” 
in the form of a good or service, delivery of which is uncertain. This 
Article is not alone in taking the view that prepayment today 
 
 154. See Wefunder Revenue Loan Agreement, supra note 73, § 17 (providing that lender not 
entitled to be deemed “holder of capital stock” for any purpose). 
 155. Fixed Percentage Convertible Equity Agreement, Techstars (on file with author). 
 156. E-mail from Sierra Moller, Associate Corporate Counsel, Techstars, to Brad 
Bernthal, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (Nov. 3, 2017) (on file 
with author). 
 
001.BERNTHAL_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
810 
provides startups a notable financing option.157 Venture-funded 
startups, significantly, use prepayment to raise additional capital 
and gauge market interest. Glowforge, for example, in 2015 raised 
$27.9 million through Kickstarter presales of its 3-D laser printer. 
The Glowforge campaign is exceptional, to be sure, but it under-
scores the potential magnitude of prepayment financing as a new 
form of capital fundraising.158 
Rather than attracting investment with an expectation of profit, 
prepayment attracts capital with an expectation of early access to a 
good or service. For example, consider the financing history of New 
York City–based startup, Bluffworks. While living as an expatriate 
in Vietnam, Stefan Loble grew fond of “functional” clothes—that is, 
attire that accommodates dual demands of the workplace as well 
as travel (and other physical activity).159 Upon returning to New 
York City, Loble decided to launch a new venture, Bluffworks, to 
provide versatile apparel.160 A minimum run of pants, however, 
required production of 500 pair, for which Loble lacked capital. 
Therefore, in 2012, Loble posted a video on Kickstarter. Crowd-
funding backers ordered $129,000 worth of his functional pants 
over just thirty-five days.161 Capital raised through Kickstarter is 
 
 157. Oranburg argues that prepayment represents an important innovation in 
corporate finance. He distinguishes prepayment through online intermediaries from 
prepayment directly between a company and consumer. Seth C. Oranburg, Hyperfunding: 
Regulating Financial Innovation, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 1033, 1082 (2018). 
 158. Taylor Soper, Glowforge 3D Laser Printer Breaks 30-day Crowdfunding Record After 
$27.9M in Sales, GEEKWIRE (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.geekwire.com/2015/glowforge-3d 
-laser-printer-breaks-30-day-crowdfunding-record-after-27-9m-in-sales/ [https://perma.cc 
/A75P-D369]. A variant of prepayment, termed “hyperfunding,” cuts out the intermediary 
that matches companies and funders. Tesla’s Model 3 presales underscore the magnitude of 
prepayment financing. For example, Tesla’s 2016 presale of its Model 3 car offered customers 
an opportunity to reserve a spot in the purchase line of a forthcoming vehicle. Through this 
strategy, “in one week, Tesla, Inc. presold almost 400,000 to-be-developed Model 3 electric 
vehicles (EVs), projecting almost $20 billion in net sales.” Oranburg, supra note 157, at 1036. 
 159. Interview with Stefan Loble, Founder and CEO, Bluffworks (Feb. 6, 2018). 
 160. See BLUFFWORKS, https://shop.bluffworks.com [https://perma.cc/9EXZ-WMMU] 
(“It’s not about the clothes—it’s what you do in them. Bluffworks was founded to fit into 
every aspect of your life’s journey—work, travel, play (and everything in between). Our 
apparel’s comfort, stylish versatility, and durability are designed to go the distance and help 
you focus on the journey ahead.”). 
 161. Loble Interview, supra note 159 (“I would not have a company without Kick-
starter.”). The campaign worked so well that Bluffworks launched a blazer campaign. The 
blazer campaign raised $340,000. The Blazer by Bluffworks, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kick 
starter.com/projects/594084262/the-blazer-by-bluffworks [https://perma.cc/PUH2-3KRK]. 
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not “free.”162 But the capital, along with customer interest, allowed 
Bluffworks to grow into a viable enterprise. Bluffwork’s 2017 
revenues eclipsed $2 million and Loble is now raising an outside 
equity financing.163 
The economic aspects of prepayment are straightforward: an 
investor provides capital, and in turn, a startup agrees to produce 
a good or service. Control terms are minimal. While a portal’s terms 
of use require a creator to fulfill orders of a successful campaign,164 
in the event of a failure to fulfill an order, recovery of funds from a 
startup is unlikely as a practical matter.165 The time between pre-
payment and delivery of a product varies. A prepayment investor 
is not a shareholder for purposes of corporate law. Finally, prepay-
ment for a product does not typically involve the sale of a security. 
8. Simple agreement for future tokens 
New phenomena sometimes outrun old legal categories. 
Filecoin’s use of a Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT), for 
example, presents a form of startup investment that is difficult to 
categorize. A SAFT facilitates investment of capital to help build 
out fledging blockchain infrastructure. A SAFT involves the 
preliminary sale of tokens that anticipates a future initial coin 
offering (ICO) in a form of cryptocurrency.166 For example, when 
 
 162. A common misperception about prepayment crowdfunding, through sources like 
Kickstarter, is that it is “free” money. Loble underscores that an entrepreneur should expect 
the cost of capital through prepayment crowdfunding to run around 10% or more. First, 
Kickstarter takes a percentage (5% of money raised). Second, prepayments will be made via 
credit card, resulting in a 3% credit card processing fee. Third, in order to attract an audience 
to a campaign, most companies will need to use Facebook and other forms of advertising—
i.e., costs associated with customer acquisition. Fourth, campaigns require photography and 
videography work, which can be expensive, up to the $40,000 range. Loble Interview, supra 
note 159. 
 163. Id. (“We just completely changed. We became viable.”). 
 164. Yancey Strickler et al., Accountability on Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER: KICKSTARTER 
BLOG (Sept. 4, 2012), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/accountability-on-kickstarter 
[https://perma.cc/X88J-BYVL] (“Kickstarter’s Terms of Use require creators to fulfill all 
rewards of their project or refund any backer whose reward they do not or cannot fulfill.”). 
 165. Luke Dormehl, Too Big to Flop: Inside Indiegogo’s Plan to Circumvent Crowdfunding 
Failures, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/indie 
gogo-fighting-crowdfunding-fails/ [https://perma.cc/V8C8-48W5] (discussing portal’s 
efforts to limit high-profile failures of companies to deliver goods promised on Indiegogo). 
 166. JUAN BATIZ-BENET ET AL., THE SAFT PROJECT, THE SAFT PROJECT: TOWARD A 
COMPLIANT TOKEN SALE FRAMEWORK 3 (2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-Project 
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Filecoin announced in 2017 a new type of storage product, a SAFT 
instrument structured funding from early investors to Filecoin.167 
Filecoin successfully raised $52 million from its earliest investors, 
then another $206 million in an ICO.168 
From an economic perspective, rather than purchasing owner-
ship in a venture, the SAFT investor secures a right to “tokens”—
which the investor hopes to eventually sell at a profit—that grants 
use of the blockchain service. Investors bet that, if Filecoin’s service 
takes off, then they will capture a profit by selling tokens to others. 
From a control perspective, the SAFT is bereft of formal mech-
anisms that would allow an investor to meaningfully constrain 
company actions.169 An investor lacks voting rights, board rights, 
protective provisions, or virtually any type of control over the com-
pany. Moreover, issuance of tokens may escape investor control 
provisions of other instruments, such as protective provisions 
limiting issuance of new stock.170 From a time perspective, the 
investor’s return hinges upon the timing of a “network launch,” at 
which time tokens will be provided that an investor may resell to 
others, subject to any time-based limitations on such sales.171 
From a regulatory perspective, a SAFT is in certain respects a 
familiar legal creature—that is, a high-risk investment designed to 
generate investor profits based upon a new product or service. VCs 
and other investors invest in SAFTs, which are an investment 
contract subject to careful regulatory scrutiny.172 Yet a SAFT is, in 
 
-Whitepaper.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2018); Becky Peterson, Here’s Everything You Need to 
Know About Blockchains, the Ground-Breaking Tech That Could Be As Disruptive As the Internet, 
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 26, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-blockchain-how 
-does-it-work-explainer-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/9J9D-LLRQ]. 
 167. See Protocol Labs, Inc., Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (2017) (documents on 
file with author). 
 168. See supra note 5. 
 169. See THE SAFT PROJECT, https://saftproject.com/#saft-forms [https://perma.cc 
/BKF2-MWM7] (providing a form of Simple Agreement for Future Tokens). 
 170. Dror Futter, Opinion, “We Never Thought of That”—When Venture-Backed Companies 
Undertake Reverse ICOs, BITCOIN MAG. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles 
/op-ed-we-never-thought-when-venture-backed-companies-undertake-reverse-icos/ [https:// 
perma.cc/X9YQ-CBSQ] (discussing shareholder rights where a company raises capital through 
an ICO). 
 171. See THE SAFT PROJECT, supra note 169. 
 172. Id. As of this writing, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has not 
provided definitive guidance about SAFTs, but it has taken steps that signal skepticism about 
ICOs in general and, further, that tokens will be closely scrutinized as to whether they are 
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other respects, a financial instrument alien. A SAFT investor is not 
a company owner (at least in any conventional sense). Nor is the 
SAFT investor a creditor with significant contractual protections. 
As a result, the SAFT presents a strange type of instrument and, 
additionally, results in investors that are outside the protections of 
corporate law. Legal scholars are starting to examine the puzzle of 
SAFTs and, more broadly, cryptocurrency and blockchain forms 
of organization.173 
 
securities. See Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), SEC, https://www.sec.gov/ICO (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2019) (citing “5 Things You Need to Know About ICOs” including that “ICOs can be 
securities offerings[;] They may need to be registered[;] Tokens sold in ICOs can be called 
many things[;] ICOs may pose substantial risks[;] and Ask questions before investing”); see 
also Daniel Roberts, SEC Tightens the Noose on ICO-Funded Startups, DECRYPT MEDIA (Oct. 10, 
2018), https://decryptmedia.com/2018/10/10/sec-tightens-the-noose-on-ico-funded-startups/ 
(summarizing subpoenas issued by SEC to ICO issuers in early 2018 and subsequent activity 
between SEC and ICO issuers leading to settlements of possible securities violations). 
 173. Among works in progress, Shlomit Azgad-Tromer examines SAFTs and other 
cryptocurrency offerings in Crypto Securities: Blockchain-Based Assets and the Dilemmas of 
Securities Regulations (forthcoming) (on file with author). And, more broadly, Usha 
Rodrigues considers implications of blockchain forms of organization for corporate law. 
Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain (forthcoming) (on file with author). Crypto-
currency fundraising, as well as some of the services launched on blockchain platforms, have 
characteristics of “regulatory entrepreneurship” where companies gain advantage while 
bending or breaking existing law and policy. See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, 
Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383 (2017). Yet cryptocurrency is more than 
simply a dodge of law and policy. Two key aspects differentiate cryptocurrency from other 
types of startup investment instruments. One, cryptocurrency is in some instances more than 
just an investment security. Cryptocurrency allows an investor to buy a piece of—and access 
to—the infrastructure. A “utility token” provides its holder tangible and practical use in the 
blockchain economy, akin to an art collector who may enjoy a painting on her wall. Once a 
blockchain entity conducts an ICO, a cryptocurrency investor owns a security that is more 
liquid than most private stocks. Liquidity of cryptocurrency is unlike illiquid VC invest-
ments. From a time perspective, it is even more liquid than publicly traded stock since one 
can buy or sell cryptocurrency instantaneously at, say, 3:00 A.M. on Sunday morning—that 
is, no need to wait for a public exchange such as the NASDAQ or NYSE to open. To date, 
tokens can be readily bought and sold to accredited and unaccredited investors, at virtually 
all times and often across international borders, although nations’ regulatory approach to 
cryptocurrency is very much unsettled. South Korea was expected, for example, to ban 
cryptocurrency trades. As of this writing, however, a ban appeared much less likely. See, e.g., 
Sam Kim & Kanga Kong, Crypto Trading Ban Downplayed by South Korea After Backlash, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-14/crypto 
-trading-ban-downplayed-by-south-korea-after-backlash [https://perma.cc/2LZL-6ZJF]. Two, 
the value of cryptocurrency is not derived from an ownership stake pegged to the underlying 
enterprise value of an entity. Users build blockchain infrastructure. Cryptocurrency’s value, 
accordingly, flows from network effects associated with blockchain infrastructure and 
fluctuations in token values. 
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B. Why Now? New Startup Investment Participants 
Embrace Novel Instruments 
A panoramic twenty-year perspective, shown in Figure [1] 
below, contrasts the menu of entrepreneurial financial instruments 
between 1998 and today. The increasing variety of instruments begs 
the question “why now?” That is, why are certain instruments used 
today but not twenty years ago to fund startups? 
Figure [1]: Comparison menu of common startup finance instruments, 1998 and 2018 
Traditional instruments available 
to structure an early-stage capital 
investment in 1998 
• Common equity 
• Preferred equity 
Market accepted instruments 
available to structure an early-
stage capital investment in 2018 
• Common equity 
• Preferred equity 
• Revenue-based financing  
• Demand dividend 
• Venture debt 
• Light preferred equity 
• Convertible debt 
• Safe/KISS 
• Prepayment 
• SAFT (associated with Initial Coin 
Offerings) 
 
Empirical work that studies adoption and use of startup 
instruments remains incomplete; however, scholars are beginning 
to grapple with how traditional accounts of contractual innovation 
square with empirical observations in startup finance.174 This 
 
 174. Some scholarly efforts are in motion. John Coyle and Joseph Green recently 
conducted a survey, for example, about use of Safes and the Keep It Simple Security (KISS), 
tracking attorney familiarity and usage of the instruments across state jurisdictions. John 
Coyle, The Safe, the Kiss, and the Note: A Survey of Seed Financing Contracts in Venture 
Capital, Presentation at the BYU Law Winter Deals Conference (Mar. 2, 2018).  Jack Wroldsen 
analyzes types of instruments used in crowdfunding environments. Jack Wroldsen, 
Crowdfunding Investment Contracts, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 543, 559 (2017). 
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section describes two relevant developments correlated with adop-
tion of new investment instruments: (1) plunging information 
technology (IT) costs for startups on the demand side of capital and 
(2) the entrance of new types of startup investors on the supply side 
of capital.175 
Broad changes in IT industries shape the environment in which 
startups operate.176 Since the 1980s, the most important industry for 
high-risk investors has been software.177 Software-based IT pro-
ducts involve four basic types of information-oriented inputs: 
movement, processing, storage, and creation.178 The cost of each 
input has plummeted even as capabilities increased. Today it costs 
a startup an estimated 1/200 as much, compared to the late 1980s, 
to bring a new IT product to market.179 Shocks to the overall IT 
environment correlate with the emergence of novel startup invest-
ment instruments.180 
The changed economics in IT alters participants’ characteristics 
and behaviors on both the high-risk capital supply side (i.e., 
 
 175. Questions of contractual innovation implicate a range of issues, including 
industrial adaptation, document standardization, economic efficiency, bounded rationality, 
and path dependence. Legal scholars are using broader literature, from strategy and 
management, for tools to examine the innovation process. See, e.g., Matthew Jennejohn, The 
Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71 (2018). 
 176. Bernthal, supra note 1, at 49 n.40 (“Startup capital requirements dropped so much 
that it was said that ‘$500,000 is the new $5 million.’”). 
 177. Scott Shane & Nicos Nicolaou, Exploring the Changing Institutions of Early-Stage 
Finance, 14 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1121, 1124 (2017). 
 178. Former Level 3 CEO James Crowe highlights three core aspects of IT: storage, 
movement, and processing of information. Not included, but obviously relevant to many 
types of IT startups, is the creation of new information. See James Crowe, Regulation and Free 
Markets Redux: Additional Insights on Regulating the Telecommunications Industry in the New 
Economy, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 487, 488 (2007) (“[W]e are right in the middle of 
the information revolution . . . . That revolution is really about the three component parts of 
information technology—the things we do with information. We process it—computing, if 
you would; we store it in various forms, on magnetic media, on optical media, and on discs; 
and we move it—which is my business. . . . Today, if my calculations are somewhere near 
correct, we buy about 70 million times as much computing per dollar spent as we did in 
1965.” (emphasis added)). 
 179. See supra text accompanying note 176. Other reports estimate a 100-times reduction 
in technology costs to store, process, and move information over ten years between 2000 and 
2010. See PAUL MILLER & KRISTEN BOUND, THE STARTUP FACTORIES: THE RISE OF 
ACCELERATOR PROGRAMMES TO SUPORT NEW TECHNOLOGY VENTURES 21 (2011), https:// 
media.nesta.org.uk/documents/the_startup_factories_0.pdf. 
 180. Correlate is used intentionally. It is beyond the scope of this Article to claim a causal 
account of startup contractual innovation. 
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investors) as well as the demand side (i.e., startups). Decline in 
capital intensity required to bring a product to market, for example, 
results in a lower size of average startup investment.181 Moreover, 
a larger fraction of the general population now invests in startups, 
spurred by crowdfunding technology, regulatory changes, and the 
more mature character of public equities.182 Notably, four new 
startup investment “institutions” that did not exist twenty years 
ago—accelerators, angel groups, micro VC funds, and equity 
crowdfunding—arose amid economic shifts and are now supply-
side sources of startup financing.183 Funders behind a fifth insti-
tutional form, cryptocurrency, injected as much as an estimated 
$5.6 billion into new projects in 2017.184 Each of these new investor 
entrants is now a viable source of startup financing. 
New types of startup investment participants embraced novel 
legal instruments. Lower startup costs may partially explain some 
new instruments for two reasons. One, IT industry capital effi-
ciency creates companies that “can generate revenues quickly,”185 
relative to startups launched twenty to thirty years ago. A new 
investment thesis—derisively dubbed “spray and pray”—emerged 
whereby investors provide small amounts of capital across a range 
 
 181. Shane & Nicolaou, supra note 177, at 3. 
 182. Public companies today are larger, more mature, and more profitable. This 
development changes the opportunity set for investors in terms of the types of companies 
available on public markets. Fewer emerging companies in the United States use the public 
markets. MAUBOUSSIN ET AL., supra note 6. In fact, there were fewer public companies in 2016 
than in 1976. Id. This development alters the choices of investors and has led, for example, to 
mutual funds forays into private companies. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1348 (mutual 
fund investment into “startups” including Uber and Airbnb). 
 183. Shane & Nicolaou, supra note 177. 
 184. Oscar Williams-Grut, Only 48% of ICOs Were Successful Last Year—but Startups Still 
Managed to Raise $5.6 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2018, 1:45 AM) https://www.business 
insider.com/how-much-raised-icos-2017-tokendata-2017-2018-1. The underlying technology 
behind ICOs is blockchain. See generally Peterson, supra note 166. It remains to be seen what 
the lasting influence of funders of blockchain-enabled technologies will be. Cryptocurrency 
fundraising gained momentum in 2017; however, it is also plagued with concerns about 
fraud. One report estimates that about 10% of funds raised through Initial Coin Offerings 
(ICOs) have been stolen. Anna Irrera, More than 10 Percent of $3.7 Billion Raised in ICOs Has 
Been Stolen: Ernst & Young, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ico 
-ernst-young/more-than-10-percent-of-3-7-billion-raised-in-icos-has-been-stolen-ernst-young 
-idUSKBN1FB1MZ [https://perma.cc/T6J7-P3QQ] (“[Ernst & Young] analyzed more than 
372 ICOs, in which new digital currencies are distributed to buyers, and found that roughly 
$400 million of the total $3.7 billion funds raised to date had been stolen . . . .”). 
 185. Cable, supra note 59, at 242. 
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of capital-efficient, software-based startups.186 An investor is said 
to “spray” when she invests in a wide portfolio of IT-based 
companies, each of which puts a low amount of capital at risk while 
promising the potential of high returns. The investor is said to 
“pray” because she provides less intensive post-investment com-
pany monitoring and lower active engagement than a traditional 
VC investor.187 Two, today’s startup landscape permits decoupling 
expert help from VC investment. Startups often require help from 
experienced individuals outside the company. Such assistance 
takes many forms, ranging from strategic advice to making 
industry connections. New institutions such as accelerators, co-
working spaces, and other formal mentor networks, increase 
startups’ access to pools of expert mentors.188 This allows a startup 
manager to pursue an a la carte approach—that is, a company may 
partition its finance needs from its needs for outside expert advice. 
III. THE TRADITIONAL TYPOLOGY 
Only relatively recently have there existed enough different 
forms for a startup finance categorization scheme to be useful. To 
the extent that scholars classify entrepreneurial finance instru-
ments, as discussed in Part I supra, they default into a debt/equity 
typology.189 But this approach to classification is a choice, not a 
 
 186. For an account about Ron Conway, a prominent angel investor who is well known 
for investing across many startups, see Miguel Helft, Ron Conway Is a Silicon Valley Startup’s 
Best Friend, FORTUNE (Feb. 10, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/02/10/ron-conway-is-a 
-silicon-valley-startups-best-friend/ [https://perma.cc/W3HR-9KPA] (noting that Conway 
takes an index approach to startup investing; quoting a venture capitalist who criticizes 
super angel Ron Conway’s promiscuous approach to investing in startups). 
 187. Id. VCs bundle expert help along with financial capital. DENNIS T. JAFFE & 
PASCAL N. LEVENSOHN, AFTER THE TERM SHEET: HOW VENTURE BOARDS INFLUENCE THE 
SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 1 (2003) (describing social capital and 
expertise of VCs). 
 188. See Brad Bernthal, Who Needs Contracts? Generalized Exchange Within Investment 
Accelerators, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 997, 1010–11 (2017) (“An increasingly common feature of the 
21st Century startup world . . . is to assemble expert help in open information shar-
ing environments.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Coyle & Green, supra note 4, at 137 (arguing that startup firm’s ability to 
select between equity or debt is an example of contractual innovation); Green & Coyle, supra 
note 14 (starting with debt/equity distinction, then creating a third category, a “contractual 
derivative instrument”); Heminway, supra note 59, at 335 (starting with debt/equity 
distinction, then creating a third category, “unequity”); Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1 
(offering an extended discussion of the classic capital structure approach); Andrew A. 
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necessity. This Part examines why classification of startup invest-
ment instruments is important. Section A briefly summarizes the 
indicia of a useful legal typology. Section B then details the 
inadequacies of classification based on the debt/equity capital 
structure paradigm. 
A. Indicia of a Functional Typology and the Capital Structure Decision 
Typologies are access points to better understanding. A typo-
logy is a working tool, generally less scientifically robust than a 
taxonomy, used to classify observations in empirical research.190 
Typologies improve understanding in three broad ways. One, 
categories structure information and facilitate comparison that 
uncovers similarities and differences.191 Two, typologies resolve 
problems of information overload.192 Typologies provide short-
hand descriptors that efficiently connote information about broader 
sets of attributes and relationships.193 Three, typologies provide a 
common framework for iteration between people through shared 
vocabulary and mutually understood concepts.194 In short, effective 
 
Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457 (2013) (predicting that 
startups will prefer debt over equity in crowdfunding efforts) [hereinafter Crowdfunding 
Securities]; Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609 (2015). 
 190. Typologies serve as “working tools in the identification of artifacts as empirical 
research progresses.” SMIRAGLIA, supra note 19, at 53. In contrast to a taxonomy, a typology 
is generally viewed as “less robust scientifically than [a] taxonom[y].” Id. 
 191. The process of comparison enables a virtuous cycle that yields a more efficient and 
accurate typology by further distinguishing information. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 
19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 135 (1970). 
 192. Categories “promote intellectual and operational efficiency.” Id. at 134. Similar to 
how corporate law practitioners save on contracting costs by using standard, well-
understood default rules, typologies shortcut learning by using terms and concepts people 
already know. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 34 (1991); see also Roscoe Pound, Classification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 933, 
944 (1924). Classifying organizes the law so it is “(1) [s]tated effectively . . . (2) administered 
effectively, (3) taught effectively, and (4) developed effectively for new situations.” Id. 
(emphasis omitted). 
 193. For example, introducing new material via categories allows for faster conveyance 
and retention of our obligations, in addition to providing a more complete and accurate 
picture of our aims. Nicholas J. McBride, The Classification of Obligations and Legal Education, 
in THE CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 71 (Peter Birks ed., 1997). 
 194. Sherwin, supra note 18, at 42. Friedrich Hayek underscores the importance of 
decentralized contributions, since data and knowledge are fragmented and dispersed among 
individuals (i.e., no individual can observe and retain every fact). 1 F.A. VON HAYEK, LAW, 
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 14 (1973). 
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classification schemes provide tools to translate data (viz., unfil-
tered observations about the world) into wisdom (viz., under-
standing about the world).195 
Legal typologies, in particular, organize information in an 
“effort to understand a complex phenomenon through the inter-
play of its more general and particular aspects.”196 Just as science 
identifies clusters of variables discerned from observable phenom-
ena,197 typologies categorize a range of legal artifacts, including 
ways to organize a body of law and regulations,198 jurisprudential 
aesthetics,199 and contracts.200 Typologies are most effective when 
 
 195. See generally ALEX WRIGHT, GLUT: MASTERING INFORMATION THROUGH THE AGES 
10 (2007). Wright places information along a continuum ranging from data (unprocessed 
observations about the world) to wisdom (deep understanding). Id. at 10. Wright observes 
that “[i]nformation is the juxtaposition of data to create meaning[,]” and it lies after data but 
before knowledge and wisdom: “data > information > knowledge > wisdom.” Id. Wright’s 
book highlights historic developments in information categorization as ways in which 
humans move from “data” to “wisdom.” See generally id. 
 196. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Juridical Classification of Obligations, in THE CLASSIFI-
CATION OF OBLIGATIONS 37 (Peter Birks ed., 1997) (“Classification is necessarily instinct with 
theory, because the act of classifying is the effort to understand a complex phenomenon 
through the interplay of its more general and particular aspects.”). A legal typology may 
represent a “composite picture” or “checklist” generated by aggregating ordinary artifacts, 
like contracts, and can thus guide practitioners and laypeople alike in their everyday drafting 
and relations. See Nathan Isaacs, Part I: Contracts, Torts and Trusts, in 6 LEGAL RELATIONS 1, 
34 (Roscoe Pound et al. eds., 1939).  
If we could make an analysis and build up a composite picture of topics in many 
of the ordinary contracts of everyday life, we should have a check-list for the 
guidance of lawyers and laymen for the drawing of better contracts, for the 
guidance of legislators, and for the better social understanding of such relations, 
whether these be memberships in clubs, or domestic employment, or relations 
with professional advisers. 
Id. at 35. 
 197. HAYEK, supra note 194, at 15–16. 
 198. See, e.g., Michael N. Tennison & Amanda C. Pustilnik, “And If Your Friends Jumped 
Off a Bridge, Would You Do It Too?”: How Developmental Neuroscience Can Inform Legal Regimes 
Governing Adolescents, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 533, 546 (2015) (discussing typology of legal 
approaches concerning “Adolescent Autonomy and Responsibility”). 
 199. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (2002). 
 200. McBride, supra note 193, at 88–89 (“The classification of obligations is an integral 
part of the production of good lists of our obligations. The classification of obligations is 
therefore central to the work of any academic who is seriously concerned to teach others 
about what our obligations are.”). 
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they are limited in scope,201 informed by experience, and capable of 
iteration and expansion.202 
Scholars default to debt/equity categories in analysis of startup 
investment instruments.203 Pervasive use of the capital structure’s 
debt/equity paradigm is neither surprising nor irrational. Entre-
preneurial finance is a branch of corporate finance, which divides 
the world of investment instruments into debt and equity 
securities.204 Further, capital structure categories remain important 
because several regulatory and corporate law classifications embed 
 
 201. A typology’s scope balances accessibility with specificity. Criteria for classification 
should be specific enough to account for essential information but not so comprehensive that 
it overloads the user. Stuart P. Green, Prototype Theory and the Classification of Offenses in a 
Revised Model Penal Code: A General Approach to the Special Part, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 301, 
307 (2000). 
 202. Classification should have a “purposive aim” since, fundamentally, the act of 
categorizing is an instrumental endeavor. Leff, supra note 191, at 134; see also Pound, supra 
note 192, at 939 (“Much must depend upon the connection in which a classification is desired 
and the end for which it is set up.”). As Leff notes, for example, “if you’re interested in heat, 
you separate the coal . . . from the rocks . . . .” Leff, supra note 191, at 134. In creating 
typologies, humans drew on collective experiences and pooled data, allowing them to 
surpass together what they could not accomplish individually. WRIGHT, supra note 195, at 
12–13. Three purposes attend development of a legal typology. One, facilitate use and 
discussion of law—that is, enhance legal understanding. Two, support critical evaluation—
that is, promote legal critique and change (where appropriate). And three, influence 
outcomes associated with legal decisions. See Sherwin, supra note 18, at 39 (“At least three 
possible purposes emerge: facilitating use and discussion of law, supporting critical 
evaluation of law, and influencing the outcomes of legal decision-making.”); see also Isaacs, 
supra note 196, at 34–35 (“If we could make an analysis and build up a composite picture of 
topics in many of the ordinary contracts of everyday life, we should have a check-list for the 
guidance of lawyers and laymen for the drawing of better contracts, for the guidance of 
legislators, and for the better social understanding of such relations, whether these be 
memberships in clubs, or domestic employment, or relations with professional advisers.”). 
 203. See supra Part I. 
 204. Traditional lenders may be reluctant to provide debt to startups, given that many 
have negative cash flows and few hard assets available to secure the loan. Many startups 
issue equity which, in contrast to debt, provides an ownership interest in a firm. ROSS ET AL., 
supra note 33, at 475. If a company’s value increases, notably, lenders do not participate 
beyond their contractual rights. Stockholders, on the other hand, have an ownership stake 
with uncapped value. Investors purchase either common or preferred stock, which provides 
rights superior to common. Shintom Co.  v. Audiovox Corp., 888 A.2d 225, 227 (Del. 2005); 
Ben Walther, The Peril and Promise of Preferred Stock, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161, 163–64 (2014). 
Preferred stock may technically have a cap in value, known as a liquidation preference cap. 
But the holders of preferred stock may elect to convert into common in order to avoid the 
cap. FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 7. Of course, lenders trump stockholders—preferred or 
common—upon company liquidation. ROSS ET AL., supra note 33. 
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the debt/equity distinction.205 Tax determinations, for example, 
turn on which regulatory bucket—debt or equity—outside 
financing fits into.206 Corporate law considerations, such as fidu-
ciary duties and information rights, also hinge on the debt/equity 
characterization.207 For example, debt holders are outsiders to the 
corporation, with rights and obligations determined by contract, 
while equity holders are insiders entitled to fiduciary rights and 
benefit from other company-related obligations provided by state 
law.208 Instruments categorized as  equity include the right to 
inspect a company’s books  and  records.209 Control rights also turn 
on the equity/debt categorization.210 
 
 205. The ability to manipulate form despite similar functions gives rise to regulatory 
arbitrage opportunities. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010). The 
aesthetic nature of the debt/equity distinction means that regulatory arbitrage opportunities 
abound through “creative drafting” of instruments to fit one category over another. Joan 
MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (a Security): Funding for-Profit Social Enterprises, 
25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299, 321 (2012) (discussing inter alia why tax related considerations 
may drive nonprofit entities to issue debt rather than equity); Crowdfunding Securities, supra 
note 189, at 1489; see also Coyle & Green, supra note 4, at 153–54 (answering “[i]f bridge notes 
were really more appropriately considered deferred equity, why didn’t these firms just issue 
more equity instead?”). 
 206. Interest is a business expense that a corporation may deduct for purposes of 
corporate tax liability. Borrowers receive preferential tax treatment for their debt. ROSS ET 
AL., supra note 33, at 507–08. Most importantly, a “corporation can deduct interest paid or 
accrued on the debt it issues but cannot deduct the dividends it pays on the shares it issues.” 
Pratt, supra note 16, at 1061, 1075. This is because shareholders are deemed to “own” a 
company while creditors do not. Id. As a result, “the interest on corporate debt is deductible 
as a cost of the corporation earning income.” Id. at 1066, 1075 (“traditional debtor-creditor 
model still dominating state corporate law”). 
 207. See infra Part V. 
 208. Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1163, 1165 
(2013) (“Equity-holders are traditionally treated as corporate insiders, with any contractual 
rights and obligations they might bargain for augmented—or even supplanted—by fiduciary 
rights and obligations.”). 
 209. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2011); Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 189, 
at 1482. 
 210. Instruments categorized as debt, for example, provide a creditor de facto control 
rights as a matter of law. Lenders can sue for missed payments; if not met, creditors may 
push a firm toward bankruptcy and financial distress. ROSS ET AL., supra note 33, at 523. 
Andrew Schwartz also argues that debt classification, from the issuer’s vantage point, “much 
better protects the founder from personal liability. Selling even a single share of equity to a 
stranger creates a real risk that shareholders will sue the founder in her personal capacity.” 
Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 189, at 1482. Debtholders are limited to suing the 
corporation. Lenders are creditors that receive preferential treatment ahead of firm 
shareholders in the event of liquidation or bankruptcy. Control provisions associated with 
debt restrict a borrowing firm’s ability to take actions that affect creditworthiness. Debt as 
Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1203. Characteristics of debt and equity led one author to 
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B. The Capital Structure Paradigm Falls Short in Promoting 
Analysis of Startup Finance Instruments 
While the debt/equity classification scheme is embedded 
within corporate law,211 as a matter of contractual analysis, the 
debt/equity distinction is impoverished. It is unnecessary—and it 
would be ill advised—for law and entrepreneurship scholars to 
make debt/equity the centerpiece of startup finance classification. 




(Mostly, Albeit with 
Equity Aspects) 
Cannot Classify 
as Debt or Equity 
Equity 




• Convertible debt 
• Demand dividend 
• Venture debt 
• Simple Agreement for 
Future Tokens (SAFT, 
associated with Initial 
Coin Offerings) 
• Simple Agreement for 
Future Equity (Safe) 
• Prepayment 
• Common equity 
• Preferred equity 





Two deficiencies render the debt/equity paradigm a crude tool 
for instrument categorization: (1) most startup finance instruments 
are actually hybrids that blend debt and equity characteristics and 
 
write, “Equity is soft; debt is hard. Equity is forgiving; debt is insistent. Equity is a pillow; 
debt is a dagger.” G. BENNETT STEWART, III, THE QUEST FOR VALUE: A GUIDE FOR SENIOR 
MANAGERS 580 (1991). 
 211. Delaware law is the most significant voice in corporate law. William W. Bratton & 
Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1821 (2013) (“The 
Delaware courts have emerged as the dominant arbiters of preferred stock disputes.”). 
Capital providers that do not qualify as corporate shareholders are deemed creditors or 
another contract-specific holder. “Stockholders are corporate, lenders are contractual, and a 
well-understood wall separates their legal treatments.” Id. at 1819. Delaware law rules for 
equity are set forth in Delaware Code Annotated title 8, section 151 (West 2011) (setting the 
parameters of stock issuance under Delaware law and permitting preferred stock). 
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(2) certain novel instruments entirely defy debt/equity classi-
fication.212 Each weakness is discussed below. 
First, high-risk capital instruments routinely blend elements of 
debt and equity within a single contractual structure.213 Debt versus 
equity presents a binary classification—that is, an instrument is 
either one or the other. In practice, however, debt versus equity is 
an aesthetic—not analytic—distinction. As Katherine Pratt writes, 
“Prototypic equity and prototypic debt are end points on a 
conceptual continuum with most real securities falling in the 
middle of that continuum.”214 Categorizing mixed instruments as 
one or the other—while necessary for regulatory classifications—
contributes to misunderstanding of how contractual instruments 
actually function.215 
Deficiencies associated with the debt/equity distinction are not 
limited to entrepreneurial finance. A well-developed scholarly 
critique highlights shortcomings.216 Financial innovation in recent 
decades, for example, produced instruments that “slice and dice 
risk and reallocate it in just about any way imaginable.”217 Financial 
engineering makes an “attempt to pigeonhole investments as one 
type or another nearly meaningless.”218 New instruments render 
 
 212. Debt and equity may also be criticized as deriving from evolutionary history—
common descent—which Emily Sherwin notes often fails as a useful typology because it’s 
prone to functional overlap. (Sherwin notes the modern trend is to deemphasize the origins 
of rules.) See Sherwin, supra note 18, at 32. 
 213. Many scholars comment on the hybrid nature of startup instruments. See, e.g., 
GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 7; Coyle & Green, supra note 4; Gilson, supra note 7; Reiser & 
Dean, supra note 89, at 799. 
 214. Pratt, supra note 16, at 1067; Triantis & Triantis, supra note 13, at 1246. 
 215. That is, categorizing an instrument as one or the other inevitably overstates the 
selected category’s characteristics while understating the other category’s elements. See, e.g., 
Carman & Bender, supra note 13, at 17 (“Under a binary analysis, an investment along the 
borders of one or the other classification gets pushed completely into one of the two baskets, 
disguising the hybrid nature of the investment.”). 
 216. “Few aspects of U.S. tax law have received greater criticism—and attracted fewer 
defenders—than the long-standing distinction between debt and equity.” Hutchison, supra 
note 16, at 96. 
 217. “The problems associated with the debt-equity distinction have gotten worse in 
recent years.” Pratt, supra note 16, at 1056–57; see also Carman & Bender, supra note 13, at 17 
(arguing the debt/equity categorization is “far too limited in light of the use of guaranteed 
payments in partnerships, synthetic leases, annuities, and the almost endless variety of 
notional principal contracts”). 
 218. Baird & Henderson, supra note 13, at 1312 n.15 (“Modern financial engineering 
enables investors to parse capital structures—cash flow rights, voting, and so on—in ways 
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traditional categories of investors who provide capital—such as 
shareholder or creditor—a “misleading” matter of form over 
function.219 In a world of complex instruments that mingle debt and 
equity characteristics, a risk-based approach fails to divine debt 
from equity.220 This gives rise to regulatory arbitrage opportunities 
where, for example, tax practitioners alter the form of a deal, even 
as the underlying substance remains the same.221 To address this 
problem, granular clarifications in banking, tax, and accounting222 
try to draw the debt/equity line. Each of these areas, tellingly, 
spells out different criteria, such that “equity” for corporate law 
purposes may be booked as “debt” for accounting purposes.223 
Entrepreneurial finance instruments, while not as complex224 
and exotic as contracts in other capital markets, commonly mix 
debt- and equity-like aspects. For example, an investor in a convert-
ible preferred financing ostensibly takes equity. Yet the equity 
 
that make any attempt to pigeonhole investments as one type or another 
nearly meaningless.”). 
 219. Id. at 1311 (“As financial innovation has accelerated over the past two decades, the 
terms ‘shareholder’ and ‘debtholder’ or ‘creditor’ have become less meaningful. Identifying 
only shareholders as investors, as opposed to all providers of capital, is misleading.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 220. Such complex instruments include derivatives, partnership agreements, synthetic 
leases, annuities, and notional principal contracts. Carman & Bender, supra note 13, at 17. 
“The problems associated with the debt-equity distinction have gotten worse in recent 
years.” Pratt, supra note 16, at 1056, 1068. A sixteen-factor test, set forth by the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, illustrates the struggle to distinguish debt from equity. Fin Hay Realty 
Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968). 
 221. Carman & Bender, supra note 13; Fleischer, supra note 205; Hutchison, supra note 
16, at 96 (claiming problems distinguishing debt and equity “invite . . . tax avoidance 
strategies”); Pratt, supra note 16, at 1071–72 (“[I]nvestment banks have begun to fashion 
innovative types of traded securities that are treated like debt for tax purposes, but are 
treated like equity for accounting, regulatory, and credit rating purposes.”). 
 222. Banking regulations divide capital instruments into tiers to determine compliance 
with minimum capital requirements and leverage ratios. For bank rules, see Bank Capital 
Rules: Federal Reserve Approves Final Rules Addressing Basel III Implementation and, for All Banks, 
Substantial Revisions to Basel I-Based Rules, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 1–3 (July 3, 2012), https:// 
www.sullcrom.com/Bank_Capital_Rules_Basel_III_7_3_13/ [https://perma.cc/7FX4-NSUH]. 
 223. Bank rules, tax rules, GAAP rules, and corporate law each have their own criteria 
to separate debt from equity. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 211, at 1820–21 (noting that 
“bank capital rules treat preferred as equity (sometimes, on par with common)[,]” while 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) “require some preferred to be booked as 
debt, even though formally it is stock, while other preferred is booked as equity” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 224. See Partnoy, supra note 13, at 812 (describing “evolution of some of the most 
complex forms of hybrids that are not well understood today”). 
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class’s rights include debt-like features, such as the right to receive 
proceeds ahead of other shareholders (i.e., a liquidation prefer-
ence).225 This “hybrid character” of preferred stock results in legal 
treatment that “straddle[s] the dividing line between corporate law 
and contract law.”226 Discussing the blurry line ostensibly parti-
tioning equity and debt, one prominent business school finance 
textbook asks whether preferred stock really is debt,227 while a legal 
scholar observes that “[f]inancially, preferred stock resembles 
debt,” but legally, preferred stock “is much more like common 
equity.”228 Meanwhile, a convertible note is explicitly styled as 
debt. But its terms include equity-like features—namely, the 
opportunity upon conversion to enjoy uncapped upside partici-
pation in company value—such that a convertible note “only 
marginally qualif[ies]” as debt.229 
An extensive body of literature provides theories defending the 
classic capital structure’s utility with respect to private contracts. 
Such theories examine which type of financing—debt or equity—is 
 
 225. As Charles Pouncy aptly observed, “If preferred shares can be viewed as debt-like 
equity, then convertible bonds can be seen as equity-like debt.” See Coyle & Green, supra note 
4, at 153 n.105 (quoting Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy 
and Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 522 n.101 (1998)); see also Christopher K. Aidun & Ernest 
Ceberio, Current Trends in Venture Capital Financing: 2002, 7 CYBERSPACE L. 2, 4 (2002) 
(“Bridge notes generally carry . . . an opportunity to convert to equity.”). 
 226. Korsmo, supra note 208, at 1165. A prominent scholarly article asks, “So is 
preferred stock equity or debt? . . . Is it an incomplete contract filled out by fiduciary duty or 
a complete contract with the drafting burden on the party asserting the right? These are the 
central questions of the law of preferred stock.” Bratton & Wachter, supra note 211; see also 
Reiser & Dean, supra note 89, at 799 (discussing hybrid nature of entrepreneurial contracts). 
Another textbook’s overview provides one section on common stock and another lumping 
debt, preferred stock, and convertibles, although it notes that preferred stock is considered 
an equity security for legal purposes. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 353–60 (5th ed. 1996). 
 227. ROSS ET AL., supra note 33, at 475. 
 228. Walther, supra note 204 (“Financially, preferred stock resembles debt, in that it has 
limited upside and its return comes in the form of periodic coupon payments. Legally, 
though, it is much more like common equity: preferred shareholders, unlike creditors, cannot 
sue in contract to recoup either their principal investment or unpaid coupons, and the terms 
of a preferred stock investment, unlike those of a debt contract, can be altered unilaterally by 
the firm.”). 
 229. As Jack Wroldsen aptly observes, “convertible debt securities only marginally 
qualify as debt securities because their ultimate purpose is to provide investors with an 
equity interest in the company.” Wroldsen, supra note 174, at 582. 
 
001.BERNTHAL_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
826 
least costly for a firm.230 At least in principal, this framework would 
give scholars and practitioners useful tools to critically evaluate—
and predict—a firm’s capital structure decisions. In function, 
however, the hybrid nature of most early-stage investment instru-
ments confounds meaningful use of capital structure theory.231 
Indeed, an instrument does not necessarily have different economic 
attributes just because it is styled as debt or equity. Alexander 
Triantis and George Triantis, in comparing puttable stock and 
convertible debt, show how equity and debt contractual features 
create identical economic effects in the absence of regulation.232 
Second, another defense of the classic dichotomy is that, while 
financial instruments may blend elements of debt and equity, 
hybrid instruments could nonetheless fit into a spectrum—that is, 
a debt/equity continuum. But this approach fails with respect to 
several novel instruments. Specifically, Safes, SAFTs, and prepay-
ment do not create contingent rights arising from a company’s cash 
flows, nor do they create residual rights in company value.233 These 
instruments entirely defy categorization—namely, they are neither 
equity nor debt. 
This difficulty leads scholars to search for third-way alterna-
tives to describe new instruments. For example, Safes structure 
investment so that a startup can use an investor’s funding; 
however, the investor acquires few present rights other than the 
right to future equity upon a financing event or a return upon 
liquidation of the company. Coyle and Green, accordingly, describe 
 
 230. For example, a firm will generally rely more on debt if it has a high taxable income, 
as firms can deduct interest for tax purposes. ROSS ET AL., supra note 33, at 547. And a firm 
may rely more on equity if it holds mostly intangible assets or if its operating income is 
uncertain, as assets secure the loan and lenders demand regular interest payments. Id. 
 231. Ibrahim’s otherwise excellent description of venture debt is accompanied by an 
Olympian effort to apply traditional capital structure theory to private company financing. 
Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1198–205. The resulting intellectual contortions, while 
impressive, do not convincingly square capital structure theory with startup finance 
practice. Id. 
 232. Puttable stock involves shares that provide an investor the right to sell stock back 
to the company. Triantis & Triantis, supra note 13, at 1233, 1244–48 (showing identical 
economic effects of convertible debt and puttable stock). 
 233. A Safe provides an investor a right to future equity. A SAFT provides an investor 
a right to future tokens. And prepayment provides an investor a right to a future good or 
service. See, e.g., Green & Coyle, supra note 14, at 172 (describing Safe as a “contractual deri-
vative instrument”); Heminway, supra note 59, at 360–61. 
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the Safe as a “contractual derivative instrument” rather than debt 
or equity.234 Heminway similarly creates a third category, 
“unequity,” to describe novel crowdfunding instruments that pro-
vide an investor a short-term profit or revenue-sharing interest 
without governance or ownership rights in a startup.235 Categories 
fail their essential purpose when their boundaries do not sort 
phenomena in useful and accurate ways. Practitioners benefit, more-
over, when typologies are rooted in the practical realities of legal and 
business practices.236 Novel instruments that defy categorization 
further call into question the utility of the debt/equity typology for 
purposes of classification and analysis of private agreements. 
In sum, the debt/equity distinction falls short as an analytic 
framework to enhance understanding of instruments. Indeed, 
Triantis and Triantis anticipated the need for a new taxonomy 
almost twenty-five years ago.237 The old debt/equity dichotomy 
affords limited insight about how an instrument constrains oppor-
tunism and allocates risk and reward. Further, with respect to 
contractual considerations, the capital structure does not help 
practitioners to choose the appropriate form of instrument for their 
circumstances. In short, the capital structure paradigm is inade-
 
 234. Green & Coyle, supra note 14, at 172 (“[Safe] is a deferred equity investment that 
will prove valuable to the holder if, and only if, the company that issues it raises a subsequent 
round of financing, is sold, or goes public.”). 
 235. Heminway, supra note 59, at 360–61 (“This type of interest is a security, but it is 
neither debt (because the funded business or project has no obligation to repay the funder) 
nor traditional equity (which typically combines, based on statutory mandate or contractual 
provisions, financial and governance rights); it is properly classified as a form of investment 
contract.”). Along these lines, the SEC recognized a third type of instrument used in 
crowdfunding. See SEC, Crowdfunding, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9974; 34-76324; File No. 
S7-09-13, (May 16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf. As discus-
sed further in section II.A, crowdfunding investments may include any type of security, 
whether equity securities (e.g., stock), debt securities (e.g., promissory notes), or hybrid 
securities (e.g., “unequity” and convertible debt). Id. 
 236. See David Campbell, Classification and the Crisis of the Common Law, 26 J.L. & SOC’Y 
369 (1999). Campbell criticizes classifications derived from “what one might get up to in the 
library with a lot of reports as more or less one’s only resource.” Id. 
 237. Triantis & Triantis, supra note 13, at 1231–32 (“[A] superior taxonomy for under-
standing capital structure may be one that abandons the debt-equity dichotomy and refers 
directly to the various financial and governance features that may be embodied in any given 
financial instrument.”). 
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quate as a way to promote contractual analysis of investment in-
struments.238 Part IV proposes a new approach. 
IV. A NEW TYPOLOGY OF ENTREPRENEURIAL 
INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS 
The objective of a typology is not perfect categorization.239 The 
objective of a well-functioning typology, rather, is to provide a use-
ful way to categorize phenomena. A typology should classify 
instruments based upon the functional aspects of economics, 
control, time, and regulatory implications.240 With this in mind, I 
propose a new typology comprised of three instrument categories: 
Lock-in, Park-n-ride, and Payouts.241 Each category in the typology 
is detailed in the sections below. 
 
 238. See Sherwin, supra note 18, at 39 (“At least three possible purposes emerge: 
facilitating use and discussion of law, supporting critical evaluation of law, and influencing 
the outcomes of legal decision-making.”); see also Isaacs, supra note 196, at 35 (“If we could 
make an analysis and build up a composite picture of topics in many of the ordinary 
contracts of everyday life, we should have a check-list for the guidance of lawyers and 
laymen for the drawing of better contracts, for the guidance of legislators, and for the better 
social understanding of such relations, whether these be memberships in clubs, or domestic 
employment, or relations with professional advisers.”). 
 239. Instrument classification entails edge cases and conceptual challenges. Some 
scholars express a skepticism that speaks to any undertaking to classify instruments. 
“Modern financial engineering enables investors to parse capital structures . . . in ways that 
make any attempt to pigeonhole investments as one type or another nearly meaningless.” 
Baird & Henderson, supra note 13, at 1312 n.15; see also Partnoy, supra note 13, at 802 
(asserting that financial innovation in general makes the traditional legal notions of how 
investors should be characterized “contradictory and meaningless”). Certainly the project is 
not worth the candle if any classification attempts are more misleading than helpful. Yet 
useful typologies improve understanding. Moreover, some degree of categorization is likely 
inevitable. A thoughtful scheme to sort financial instruments is likely to be better than the 
default categories used without critical reflection. “[F]requently . . . one will discover . . . that 
objects with one thing in common have other things in common too, and that these other 
things are more practically useful identifying criteria than the ones first used.” Leff, supra 
note 191, at 135. 
 240. As discussed in Part II supra, analysis of instruments should be multidimensional. 
A single aspect of an instrument (for example, whether an investor is a shareholder, or where 
the investor fits within a company’s liquidation waterfall) is not dispositive for classification. 
 241. This Article argues that the new typology improves upon the classic debt/equity 
dichotomy. The new typology certainly does not provide the only classifications imaginable, 
and going forward, other approaches should be considered. 
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A. Lock-in 
A Lock-in instrument is an ownership interest where an equity 
holder’s return (1) is uncertain as to timing; (2) would not be 
realistically expected for a minimum of two to three years, and up 
to five to eight years, from initial investment; and (3) is a function 
of the underlying valuation of the company. Each type of Lock-in 
instrument, which includes common, preferred, and light preferred 
stock, is summarized in Figure [3]. 242 
Legal scholars carefully parse preferred convertible equity 
structures, which remain the most important form of VC invest-
ment. This Article need not rehash preferred stock characteristics in 
depth.243 The most striking aspect across Lock-in instruments, 
however, is the amount that each of these instruments has in 
common, especially in time and regulatory dimensions. The most 
important differences between preferred and common Lock-in 
instruments relate to liquidation preferences and control rights. 
Preferred shareholders have a right to take proceeds upon liqui-
dation ahead of common shareholders. Further, as Gilson 
observed, with respect to control, preferred stock turns the Berle-
Means problem244 on its head. Preferred shareholders secure an 
outsized level of control relative to their (often minority) ownership 
stake in the company.245 Figure [3] provides a summary comparison 
of Lock-in instruments. 
 
 242. A startup’s founders and employees also typically hold a Lock-in instrument: 
common stock. Founders may contribute financial capital, intellectual property, or some 
other form of valuable work in exchange for common shares. Employees receive options for 
common stock. 
 243. Ronald Gilson describes how convertible preferred equity arrangements between 
VC funds and startup companies dovetail with VC limited partnership agreements. Gilson, 
supra note 7, at 1070–71. Gordon Smith examines how greater visibility about VC firm 
reputation affects entrepreneurial managers’ ability to solve for problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection. Exit Structure of VC, supra note 43, at 315; VC Contracting, supra note 7, 
at 140–42. More recently, John Coyle and Joseph Green have discussed the emergence of a 
stripped-down preferred equity round. See Coyle & Green, supra note 4, at 168–72. 
 244. The Berle-Means problem refers to the concern that, as a company’s shareholder 
base becomes large and dispersed, management dominates control of the company. 
Directors become beholden to management, allowing managers to act in ways that are not 
responsive to owners’ interests. The so-called Berle-Means problem arises from insight from 
Berle and Means’s well-known work: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., & Gardiner C. Means, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 245. Gilson, supra note 7, at 1073–74. 
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Figure [3]: Lock-in instruments 




Economics • common 
shareholders are 
residual claimants 
(i.e., the last to get 
paid upon company 
liquidation) 
• if shareholder is an 
officer or employee, 
startup wealth can 
be channeled 
through salaries to 
common 
shareholders  
• upon sale of 
company, a portion 
of proceeds may be 
allocated to officers 
(i.e., a “carve out”) 




paid before common 
shareholders 




paid before common 
shareholders 
Time  • 5–8 years 
• founders and key 
employees may be 
able to sell limited 
number of shares on 




• 5–8 years 
• investors secure 
rights to participate 
in future financing 
rounds 
• key founders and 
executives enter into 
vesting agreements 
• early-stage 
investors may be 
able to sell limited 
number of shares on 
secondary market in 
mid- or expansion-
stage financing 
• 5–8 years 
• investors secure 
rights to participate 
in future financing 
rounds 
• key founders and 
executives enter into 
vesting agreements 
• early-stage 
investors may be 
able to sell limited 
number of shares on 
secondary market in 
mid- or expansion-
stage financing 
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Control  • voting rights  
• board of director 
representation  
• if shareholder is an 
officer or executive, 
then control may be 




• board of director 
representation  
• extensive 
protective provisions  




• stripped down 
protective provisions 
• board of director 
representation  







• equity for tax 
purposes 
• security 
• equity for tax 
purposes 
• security 
• equity for tax 
purposes 
B. Park-n-ride 
The typology’s second category of investment structure is the 
Park-n-ride. In contrast to a Lock-in holder’s present ownership 
interest, a Park-n-ride structure contemplates a future ownership 
interest in a company.246 A Park-n-ride structure exists where an 
investor (1) invests capital into a company, (2) lacks ownership for 
an indefinite post-investment period, and (3) agrees to take 
ownership on unknown terms led by an unknown future investor 
upon occurrence of a financing that involves issuance of preferred 
equity.247 I use the term Park-n-ride to highlight the two-step process 
prescribed by these instruments. Step one is that an investor 
“parks” money with a startup. The startup puts capital to use 
during an indefinite period in which the investor lacks ownership. 
Step two is triggered by a financing associated with issuance of 
preferred stock. Upon the financing, the investor’s money converts 
automatically into equity and “rides” alongside a new investment 
on the terms negotiated by the new investor(s). Typically, a Park-n-
ride investor does not lead the qualified financing round. 
 
 246. Green & Coyle, supra note 14, at 169 (discussing the simple agreement for future 
equity (Safe), an equity derivative). 
 247. Id.; see also Burns E-mail, supra note 24. 
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Legal scholars document two instruments that the new typo-
logy classifies as a Park-n-ride: (1) convertible debt and (2) equity 
derivative instruments—most notably the Simple Agreement for 
Future Equity (Safe).248 These instruments are summarized in 
Figure [4]. 
Figure [4]: Types of Park-n-ride instruments 
Convertible Debt • Note for convertible debt 
Future Equity Derivative • Simple Agreement for Future Equity (Safe) 
• Keep It Simple Security (KISS)249 
• Techstars Foreign Instrument (Fixed 
Percentage Convertible Equity Agreement) 
 
Three economic characteristics are common to Park-n-ride 
instruments. First, absent a qualified financing or successful sale of 
a startup, Park-n-ride investors are unlikely to see a meaningful 
economic return.250 The lack of a current return, prior to a company-
wide liquidity event or secondary sale, distinguishes Park-n-ride 
and Lock-in instruments from a Payout instrument (discussed in 
section IV.C infra). This underscores that Park-n-ride holders 
typically require two conditions for a successful investment: (1) a 
preferred financing and (2) a successful company-wide liquidity 
event, such as a sale or IPO. Of course, future financing risk—that 
is, the possibility that a company will run out of money and will be 
unable to raise more capital—is not unique to Park-n-ride instru-
ments. Future financing risk attends any early-stage company 
 
 248. See generally Coyle & Green, supra note 4; Foreign Instrument Documents, 
Techstars (on file with author). 
 249.  See 500 Startups KISS Convertible Debt & Equity Financing Documents, COOLEY GO, 
https://www.cooleygo.com/documents/kiss-convertible-debt-equity-agreements/ [https:// 
perma.cc/V5AU-EV8U]. 
 250. One exception to this is that a convertible noteholder may receive loan payments 
prescribed postmaturity. But, in practice, a company unable to obtain financing often lacks 
cash sufficient to service a loan. A convertible noteholder, once the note matures, may have 
a right to convert to equity at its own election. This could be attractive if a startup is profitable 
and does not raise a qualified financing round. 
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investment where a startup will require additional rounds of capi-
tal to bring a successful product to market. But future contractual 
derivative holders, such as Safe investors, face a heightened risk 
because a Safe holder lacks a way to force exit in a struggling 
company and, additionally, lacks a way to force conversion of 
investment into equity when a company thrives without a qualified 
financing.251 Additionally, the terms of the Park-n-ride instrument 
may limit the form of future financings, which could deter possible 
future investors.252 
A second economic provision common to Park-n-rides is the 
discount. A Park-n-ride investor commonly negotiates a “dis-
count.” Upon equity conversion triggered by a qualified financing, 
a discount reduces the price that the holder pays for equity relative 
to the “new” equity investors.253 In practice, a discount ultimately 
benefits a Park-n-ride holder at the direct expense of common 
shareholders. Despite the economic benefit of the discount, some 
investors are skeptical that the discount adequately compensates a 
Park-n-ride investor, who provides capital at a time of high 
uncertainty and significant information asymmetries between com-
pany and investor.254 
 
 251. See generally Coyle & Green, supra note 4. 
 252. See, e.g., Gheen E-mail, supra note 105 (“[Park-n-rides] are interesting instruments 
because they sometimes dictate what the next round needs to look like (which is annoying 
when you’re trying to get a deal done). I’ve seen good RBF investors be unable to invest in 
good tech companies where the previous [Park-n-Ride] investors couldn’t decide whether or 
not RBF investment triggered their follow-on terms. In other words, it can cause an 
unnecessarily complex capital strategy.”). 
 253. Typical discount ranges are 10–30%. The discount rewards the Park-n-ride 
holder’s willingness to invest at the earliest stages of a company’s lifecycle. See supra 
Section II.A. 
 254. The Park-n-ride structure is widely viewed as an “entrepreneur friendly” form of 
high-risk capital. Many well-known investors, including Ron Conway and Seth Levine, are 
skeptical that a discount and conversion cap adequately compensates investors for the risk 
of early investment, perils which range from the company’s uncertain prospects to whether 
future investors will try to recut the terms of the deal at a later time. See Seth Levine, Has 
Convertible Debt Won? And If It Has, Is That a Good Thing?, VCADVENTURE (Aug. 30, 2010), 
http://www.sethlevine.com/archives/2010/08/has-convertible-debt-won-and-if-it-has-is 
-that-a-good-thing.html [https://perma.cc/Y93W-3246]. Levine writes that use of convert-
ible debt is “clearly not a positive trend for early-stage investors” for two reasons. Id. One, 
an investor that does not purchase equity is more exposed to “an easier renegotiation of their 
terms by a later investor (who, almost by definition, wields more power at that time than the 
original angels, assuming the company actually needs to raise capital).” Id. Two, convertible 
debt “has the effect of raising prices for early stage investing.” Id. This is due in part to the 
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One might expect early investors to simply take a steeper dis-
count, even if out of line with market norms, in order to adequately 
compensate for the uncertainty of the early investment in a com-
pany. Yet two practical constraints limit such arrangements. One 
challenge is that a larger discount, if deemed outside market norms, 
risks deterring future qualified investors. This is not a trivial con-
cern: future capital rounds are the oxygen required to keep a 
company alive. Moreover, a large discount also invites agency 
problems—namely, opportunistic behavior by entrepreneurs at the 
expense of a Park-n-ride holder. For example, entrepreneurs may 
encourage subsequent investors to condition their investment on 
Park-n-ride holders’ acceptance of a renegotiated, reduced dis-
count.255 The entrepreneur’s impetus for such behavior is that a 
discount, in economic terms, acts as a ratchet against common 
shareholders. Founders, often including the CEO who typically 
drives a deal for the company, hold common stock. So a VC may 
condition a round of financing upon a startup’s renegotiation of the 
nonmarket discount.256 This gambit aims to benefit common share-
holders at the expense of Park-n-ride holders. 
A third shared economic attribute common among Park-n-ride 
instruments is that, while appearing to avoid company valuation, 
the instruments nevertheless set what amounts to a shadow valu-
ation. The valuation cap prescribes a ceiling on the price at which a 
 
conversion cap set to a “premium to the current fair market value of the business.” Id. Mark 
Suster, quoting Ron Conway, sizes up the problems for investors.  
Ron said he never likes to do convertible debt deals and always insists on pricing 
his investments. His rationale was clear, “If I invest in a company I open my 
Rolodex for them. I help them with business development introductions. I 
introduce employees. I give them credibility in the fund raising process. Let’s say 
the company was worth $1 million when I met them and I’ve helped them with 
both my Rolodex and my cash and they can now raise a round of venture capital 
at a valuation of $6 million. I would be hurting my own interests. A $500,000 
investment at a 30% discount to a $6 million round is still priced and [sic] more 
than $4 million and is certainly worth much less than my investing at a $1 million 
pre-money where I could own 33% of the company.” 
Mark Suster, Raising Angel Money, BOTH SIDES OF THE TABLE (July 19, 2009), https://both 
sidesofthetable.com/raising-angel-money-cc9f8ab923b6 [https://perma.cc/YXL5-RW94]. 
 255. See Levine, supra note 254. Levine writes that an investor that does not purchase 
equity is more exposed to “an easier renegotiation of their terms by a later investor (who, 
almost by definition, wields more power at that time than the original angels, assuming the 
company actually needs to raise capital).” Id. 
 256. See id. 
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Park-n-ride instrument converts.257 If a company’s valuation ex-
ceeds the cap at a qualified financing, for example, the valuation 
cap retroactively acts as a de facto valuation. Future investors, 
moreover, may use the Park-n-ride’s valuation cap as a reference 
point when negotiating valuation with a startup.258 
Park-n-ride instruments share two notable aspects with respect 
to time. One, a Park-n-ride investor’s time horizon for return is even 
longer than a Lock-in holder who invests in preferred stock sub-
sequent to a Park-n-ride round. Park-n-ride instruments are often 
used at the earliest stages of a company’s lifecycle. Moreover, a 
Park-n-ride instrument features extreme investor lock-in, and 
return is unlikely until a company-wide liquidity event. From 
initial investment to expected return, accordingly, a reasonable 
expectation is at least five to eight years. Two, a Park-n-ride holder 
is in a relational limbo with a company during the “park” period.259 
A key difference between Park-n-ride and Lock-in instruments is 
whether key terms of investment are specified at the time of 
investment or whether key terms are de facto indefinitely deferred 
until some future event. The Park-n-ride investor takes a leap of 
faith about the future—namely, an investor agrees to take later-in-
time ownership on yet-unknown terms negotiated by a yet-to-be-
determined party (if a future financing occurs at all). 
Park-n-ride instruments share a common dimension as it relates 
to control. Post-conversion, during the “ride” period, the control 
rights of Park-n-ride holders are muted. This may seem counter-
intuitive since Park-n-ride instruments convert into a class of stock 
with identical control characteristics available to other—often 
sophisticated—investors in a qualified financing. But conversion 
occurs alongside other investors in a large, qualified round. 
Investors in a qualified financing usually invest amounts well in 
excess of the amount of capital involved in the Park-n-ride. Many 
 
 257. For example, say an investor makes a $100,000 investment that uses a Park-n-ride 
instrument that includes a $1 million valuation cap. The company flourishes and, a year later, 
raises a qualified financing round with a $5 million pre-money valuation. Upon conversion, 
excluding any interest, the Park-n-ride holder is entitled to 10% of the company under 
the cap. 
 258. FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 7, at 109. 
 259. The investor’s relationship with the founder/company is put in a “[s]uspended 
state as to whether we are really partners in this or not.” Interview with Chris Marks, 
Attorney with Boulder-based private investment company (Aug. 8, 2017). 
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control provisions, such as protective provisions, may be exercised 
only by the majority-in-interest of the preferred shareholder class. 
Unless a Park-n-ride holder leads the qualified financing, the Park-
n-ride holder lacks power to unilaterally exercise control provisions 
post-conversion. 
A drawback of the new typology’s Park-n-ride category is that 
equity derivatives and convertible debt have divergent control 
characteristics. A holder of convertible debt may “call” a note. In 
contrast, an equity derivative holder—such as a Safe holder—lacks 
meaningful control protections. In this way, widespread adoption 
of the Safe illustrates a new manifestation of the angel paradox—
that is, the earliest investors who take the most risk often receive 
less favorable terms than later-in-time investors.260 One explanation 
for this is what Gilson refers to as the “conservation of discretion”—
namely, a concern that an early investor, especially if reputational 
constraints are low, may be more likely than an entrepreneurial 
manager to act opportunistically.261 On this view, a Park-n-ride 
investor cannot be trusted with powerful control rights. 
Finally, Park-n-ride instruments have two common regulatory 
elements. One, Park-n-ride instruments are securities. Two, prior to 
equity conversion, Park-n-ride holders lack shareholder rights and 
protections such as fiduciary duties and statutory information 
rights. Tax-related treatment of Park-n-ride instruments, however, 
may vary. For example, Illinois provided a tax credit for angel 
investors, yet investments in a Safe initially did not qualify for the 
tax credit. Illinois subsequently changed its approach. Further, a 
Safe and convertible debt may be treated differently for federal tax 
purposes, with a Safe categorized as a prepaid forward contract 
and convertible debt categorized as debt.262 
Figure [5] summarizes notable characteristics of Park-n-ride 
instruments, as seen through the prism of economic, time, control, 
 
 260. See supra Section II.A; Puzzling Behavior, supra note 7, at 1420–22 (discussing 
angel paradox). 
 261. Gilson, supra note 7, at 1081 (“[S]hifting discretion from the entrepreneur to the 
fund does not eliminate the potential for agency costs; it merely shifts the chance to act 
opportunistically to the fund.”). 
 262. When examining Safes under federal tax law, “in most cases, the usual treatment 
should be as a prepaid forward contract.” Lesley P. Adamo, Client Alert, Tax Treatment of 
SAFEs, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER (July 12, 2018), https://www.lowenstein.com/news-insights 
/client-alerts/tax-treatment-of-safes-tax (discussing federal tax criteria for debt classi-
fication and explaining that Safes typically do not qualify). 
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and regulatory aspects. One column, Common Characteristics, 
describes functional elements shared by Park-n-ride instruments. 
Another column, Variations and Exceptions, highlights instances 
where certain Park-n-ride instruments diverge. 
Figure [5]: Notable characteristics of Park-n-ride instruments 
 Common Characteristics Variations and Exceptions 
Economics • absent subsequent qualified 
financing or sale of a company, a 
meaningful return for investor is 
unlikely 
• Park-n-ride holder receives 
“discount” into subsequent 
equity round 
• valuation cap rewards Park-n-
ride holder in event that 
subsequent equity round is 
priced at high valuation; 
valuation cap effectively sets a 
shadow price for the company 
• convertible debt accrues 
interest so long as note is 
outstanding 
Time  • long hold period expected 
between initial investment and 
ultimate exit 
• relationship between investor 
and founder is in limbo during 
the “park” period (i.e., after 
initial investment but before 
qualified financing) 
• key founders and executives 
typically not required to enter 
into new vesting agreements 
• super pro rata rights may be 
used to give Park-n-ride holder 
the option to purchase an 
outsized ownership stake, 
relative to the size of initial 
investment, in subsequent equity 
round 
Control  • upon qualified financing, 
control rights attach to preferred 
equity; but it is unlikely that 
Park-n-ride investor will have 
majority-in-interest of preferred 
equity, which diminishes 
controls 
• there is significant difference 
between control rights of Safe 
and convertible debt 
instruments; holder of 
convertible debt may “call” note 
after maturity; Safe has few 
control rights for investor prior 
to qualified financing 
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• Park-n-ride instruments are a 
security 
• Park-n-ride holders lack 
shareholder rights and 
protections such as fiduciary 
duties and statutory information 
rights 
• state laws favoring investment 
(e.g., tax credits for angel 
investors) vary as to whether 
Park-n-ride instruments qualify 
(e.g., Illinois and Safes) 
• convertible debt is debt for 
federal tax purposes 
C. Payouts 
A Payout is where an investor’s return is not based upon sale of 
company equity and, instead, an investor’s return primarily flows 
from startup revenues, profits, or provision of goods or services. 
Payouts avoid extreme investor lock-in.263 Ibrahim details problems 
associated with “investor lock-in,” which refers to circumstances 
where a shareholder does not receive a return on investment until 
a company-wide liquidity event. Lock-in is described as “extreme” 
because a shareholder cannot (1) redeem shares for cash directly 
from a company, nor can a shareholder (2) readily sell shares to 
other purchasers on a secondary market. Where investor lock-in 
attends investment, a drawback is that investors require an  
“illiquidity premium” that raises the cost of capital for startups.264 
Much of the promise of secondary markets to relax investor lock-in 
has not come to pass due to startups’ extensive use of transfer 
restrictions in recent years when issuing stock.265 Nonetheless, 
 
 263. New Exit in VC, supra note 25, at 8 (distinguishing capital lock-in—i.e., the inability 
of an investor to demand redemption from the company—from investor lock-in). 
 264. Secondary market sales, where an investor sells ownership to another investor, 
relieves problems of “extreme investor lock-in” for certain founders, long-term employees, 
and early investors. Secondary markets involve sales between investors, rather than a direct 
investment into a startup, so a secondary sale is not a separate “instrument” for purposes of 
this Article. Darian Ibrahim’s examination of secondary markets provides careful discussion 
of investor lock-in for startups. See id. Further, Elizabeth Pollman’s study of secondary 
markets addresses problems related to information disclosures and proposes “establishing a 
minimum information requirement for secondary trading.” Elizabeth Pollman, Information 
Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 179 (2012).  
 265. Importantly, secondary sales in early-stage companies have not proven as robust 
as many observers once envisioned. Since Ibrahim’s 2012 article, for example, secondary 
sales from startup employees to new investors generated undesirable issues for startup 
managers, ranging from a new shareholder’s information rights (mandated by corporate 
law) to an employee having less interest in long-term wealth creation of the startup. Startups 
responded by imposing transfer restrictions on stock which, essentially, prevent employee 
 
001.BERNTHAL_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:20 PM 
773 The Evolution of Entrepreneurial Finance 
 839 
relaxation of investor lock-in through Payout instruments is among 
the most notable developments associated with the proliferation of 
investment instrument forms. 
Investor lock-in traditionally accompanies startup investment. 
In theory, a startup could declare and distribute dividends to share-
holders. In practice, this is extremely rare because startup cash 
flows are minimal and, to the extent a startup generates profits, 
managers desire to reinvest profits with a goal of rapid company 
growth. An investor’s stake in a company, as a result, remains 
highly illiquid, at least until a company-wide liquidity event 
occurs—that is, a sale of the company, an IPO, or a company wind 
down. Today not all high-risk capital providers, however, seek to 
invest within investor lock-in structures. Payouts secure a return 
for individual investors even in the absence of a company-wide 
liquidity event. Figure [6] shows three permutations of Payout 
instruments—variable paybacks, prepayments, and short-term 
loans. Each permutation and instrument is then described in 
turn below. 
 
sales without company authorization. As of 2018, this Author’s conversations with early-
stage investors suggest that secondary markets are primarily used in two ways: (1) to 
provide an important pressure release for founders to sell limited amounts of stock (e.g., in 
order to pay for a child’s college education) and (2) as a mechanism for late-stage and other 
investors outside the startup world to dip down and purchase pieces of highly valued 
private companies (e.g., a mutual fund that would like to purchase part of Uber). See generally 
Susan S. Muck & Michael S. Dicke, Securities Enforcement Alert: SEC Increases Scrutiny of 
“Unicorns” and Other Private Companies and Secondary Market Trading of Pre-IPO Shares, Urges 
Private Companies to Adopt Enhanced Controls Long Before IPO, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Apr. 4, 
2016), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/sec-increases-scrutiny-of-unicorns-and 
-other-private-companies-and-secondary-market-trading-of-pre-ipo-shares.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/C2BD-C8F7] (noting the SEC expressed concern that a “new [secondary sales] 
model has arisen because companies have restricted the transfer of shares, leading to 
employees and others retaining the shares themselves but selling an economic interest in the 
shares or promising to deliver shares after a liquidity event”). 
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Figure [6]: Payout instrument permutations 
Variable Paybacks  • Revenue-based financing (RBF) 




• Prepayment fundraising (e.g., using Kickstarter or 
Indiegogo) 
• Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT, 
associated with Initial Coin Offerings)  
Short-Term Loans • Venture debt 
 
The first Payout permutation, variable paybacks, is an instru-
ment that arranges variable—not fixed—returns from company to 
investor. RBF, social impact investment instruments (including the 
demand dividend), and unequity each provide a variable, short-
term profit- or revenue-sharing interest to an investor. A second 
Payout permutation, prepayment, attracts financing from backers 
in the anticipation of a “return” in the form of a future good or 
service. Further, a new prepayment variant, which emerged in 
2017, is the SAFT. The SAFT structures a preliminary sale of tokens 
that presages creation of a digital product and, ultimately, anti-
cipates an ICO in the form of cryptocurrency.266 Finally, short-term 
loans are a third Payout instrument permutation. Venture debt 
differs from variable paybacks insofar as the repayment schedule 
is fixed.267 
Payout instruments share three notable economic character-
istics. The first is that an investor’s return is “capped”—that is, even 
if a company is a rousing success, there is a ceiling on the amount 
that an investor receives as a return on investment. Such caps take 
different forms. Variable paybacks often cap returns at a multiple 
of the original investment. Companies pay back short-term loans, 
such as venture debt, based on principal plus interest. Prepayment 
does not promise any return beyond delivery of a company’s 
 
 266. See BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 166; Peterson, supra note 166. 
 267. Debt as Venture Capital, supra note 1, at 1179. 
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product. Limited upside on returns means that, from an investor’s 
portfolio perspective, longshot investments must be limited, since 
one outsized winner will not offset numerous losers. A second key 
economic feature is that, at the time of an investment, parties do not 
need to determine the value of the startup enterprise. Sale of startup 
equity requires that an investor and a company agree upon a 
startup’s value in order to determine the “price” of equity. Early-
stage private company valuation is a speculative endeavor that 
requires considerable guesswork.268 Return on a payback instru-
ment is independent of company ownership and, as a result, 
valuation is not a prerequisite to investment. A third economic 
characteristic is that Payout instruments reduce illiquidity risk—
namely, the risk that there is no ready buyer for company equity.269 
From a time perspective, Payout instruments share three attri-
butes. First, a Payout holder anticipates investment return (well) in 
advance of any company-wide liquidity event. For example, an 
RBF instrument generates returns shortly after the agreement is 
executed. This is in sharp contrast to the five-to-eight-year median 
time before Lock-in investors (i.e., investors who purchase common 
or preferred stock) will see returns.270 This shift in return time 
horizon is notable in view of the time value of money and, as noted 
above, reduces investor uncertainty associated with liquidity. 
Second, Payout misaligns the return time horizons of investors 
and startup founders. Alignment of investor and founder interests 
is tricky when a Payout instrument is used. When an investor seeks 
to exit well in advance of founders and managers, agency concerns 
arise whereby one party may act to benefit itself at the expense of 
 
 268. FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 7, at 43 (“[Valuation] is not an exact science 
regardless of the number of spreadsheets involved.”); GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 7. 
 269. New Exit in VC, supra note 25, at 8. Of course, risk remains insofar as returns are 
contingent upon a startup’s revenues, profits, or other ability of a startup to pay monies to 
an investor. But payback instruments remove a notable risk factor since an investor need not 
wait until a company-wide liquidity event before receiving an investment return. RBF 
returns only require that a company generate revenues, rather than a sale of an entire 
enterprise. Uncertainty is reduced because the trigger for return on a Payback instrument is 
more likely to occur than a company-wide liquidity event. 
 270. PITCHBOOK, supra note 125, at 14 (finding a median time to exit of 6.8 years for an 
IPO, 5.1 years for an acquisition, and 7.6 years for a secondary buyout); see also For Largest 
Venture-Backed Tech Exits, supra note 125 (finding an average of 6.3 years); New Exit in VC, 
supra note 25, at 14 (citing an average of around 7 years). 
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another—that is, a company action that benefits investors may 
harm a founder, and vice versa.271 Experienced early-stage 
investors who use preferred equity know that, because investor 
lock-in accompanies multiple rounds of financing during a 
startup’s lifecycle, over time the early investors’ equity interests 
will more closely align with startup founders than later-stage 
investors.272 Founders and early-stage equity investors—for the 
most part—expect to receive a return at the same time in the same 
event (i.e., a sale, wind down, or company IPO). In contrast, Payout 
instruments generate agency concerns insofar as an investor’s 
return and a founder’s return occur at different times and are 
contingent upon different events.273 
Third, a Payout holder is less likely to rely upon the time-based 
strategy of staging investments. Staging occurs where an investor 
holds back amounts that the investor intends to eventually invest, 
instead only providing a portion of the funds that a company will 
ultimately need to succeed. Future investment amounts are held 
back—in industry parlance, “reserved”—for future rounds of 
financing. If a company performs well, an investor infuses 
additional funds—often in progressively larger increments—into 
the startup over multiple stages. Staging allows early preferred 
equity investors to guard against opportunism by using time to 
 
 271. Gilson, supra note 7 (describing agency issues between VCs and portfolio company 
managers); see also Joseph Bankman & Marcus Cole, The Venture Capital Investment Bust: Did 
Agency Costs Play A Role? Was It Something Lawyers Helped Structure?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
211, 225 (2001) (discussing agency costs between VCs and their limited partner investors). 
 272. This is because, inter alia, additional funding rounds will entail larger amounts of 
investment from later-in-time investors with liquidation preferences. As a result, after 
multiple rounds of financing, an early-stage investor and a founder would typically benefit 
only upon a company liquidity event where proceeds are sufficient to pour over the later-
stage investors (whose liquidation preferences entitle them to receive proceeds first) and 
reach the early-stage investors and common shareholders. To be clear, the incentives of early 
investors and a founder with common shares, while overlapping, are not coterminous. For 
example, a founder who is still an executive with a company may benefit from a sale of a 
company separate from the sale of her shares in an acquisition. For example, she may benefit 
from a management carveout or from an attractive post-acquisition salary by a purchaser. 
 273. For example, an investor’s returns may be pegged to profitability and revenues, 
while a founder’s return ultimately may be a function of company valuation at the time of a 
liquidity event. 
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create powerful performance incentives for managers.274 Moreover, 
since uncertainty and information asymmetry are reduced over 
time, staging generates information that provides an investor 
greater visibility about a company’s prospects. Payout instruments 
do not eliminate staging. But they do limit reliance upon staging. 
Payout instruments’ control term characteristics, by which an 
investor protects its interests and guards against opportunism, are 
notable in two ways. One, a Payout holder lacks a strong incentive 
to push a company toward an exit and, therefore, does not contract 
for control terms that would force a startup exit event.275 
Traditional VC-fund limited partnership agreements prescribe that 
a fund’s monies must be returned to limited partners within a fixed 
(typically ten-to-twelve-year) time horizon.276 VC investment into a 
startup, accordingly, effectively puts a portfolio company on a shot 
clock to reach a company-wide liquidity event.277 VCs negotiate 
control provisions that enable the VC to pressure a company 
toward exit.278 Payout instrument holders, in contrast, need not 
seek control provisions that push a company to exit. This may be 
attractive to a startup manager, especially where the manager 
would like to avoid a “shot clock” that forces a company to sell to 
an acquirer or, less frequently, conduct an IPO. 
Two, holders of Payout instruments prioritize short-term 
contractual controls over long-term involvement in a company. 
Payout holders generally do not insist upon critical governance 
rights, such as board-of-director participation. Payouts mark an 
important departure from a model of early-stage investment that 
bundles financial capital with other types of startup assistance, 
 
 274. Gilson, supra note 7, at 1079 (“The first respect in which staged financing creates, 
rather than merely transfers, value is its reduction of the agency problems associated with the 
entrepreneur’s management of the portfolio company’s operation.”). 
 275. Some incentive to nudge for early exit may still exist. For example, an RBF investor 
may benefit upon the sale of a company because payoff of the loan is accelerated. So the RBF 
investor has at least a “secondary interest” in a company liquidity event. See Gheen E-mail, 
supra note 105. 
 276. Gilson, supra note 7, at 1071. The actual length of most VC funds exceeds the ten-
year horizon. Most funds have two automatic one-year extensions. Beyond that, funds are 
extended with the permission of limited partners. 
 277. See id. at 1074. 
 278. Id. 
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such as social capital, expertise, and reputational capital.279 Special-
ized investor intermediaries, such as VCs, traditionally combine 
active provision of business help with monitoring of firm activities 
through participation in firm governance.280 The promise of 
uncapped returns following an extended investment hold period 
justifies an investor’s lengthy ongoing involvement with a startup 
to work toward a favorable company-wide liquidity event.281 In 
contrast, Payout instrument holders do not share a common 
mission with management to build the company over an extended 
period (i.e., five to eight years) until an exit event. The shorter time 
horizon militates that Payout instrument holders rely more on 
contractual provisions, such as more onerous reporting require-
ments and restrictive covenants known as protective provisions, 
rather than governance rights to manage agency costs. 
Since many Payout instruments are relatively new to startup 
investment, it remains to be seen what effect this will have on net 
transaction costs. Returns predicated on revenues, for example, 
require controls such as greater financial reporting from company 
to investor. Such controls provide comfort that an investor receives 
what the investor is owed. But this may impose additional 
accounting costs upon a startup. Moreover, monitoring and 
enforcement of contractual rights are potentially costly. Enforce-
ment of contractual rights may necessitate litigation, especially 
since governance rights (e.g., board control that would allow CEO 
replacement) are muted. Future investors may condition invest-
ment upon renegotiation of RBF arrangements, increasing trans-
action costs. From a control perspective, Payout instruments allow 
entrepreneurial managers, vis-à-vis investors, to retain more 
control of the board of directors and other governance aspects of a 
startup. But concomitantly an investor’s nonmonetary assistance to 
a company is likely to be lower than an equity investor’s nonmone-
tary help. A Payout investment structure is also likely to involve 
greater contractual restrictions on company actions. 
 
 279. JAFFE & LEVENSOHN, supra note 187 (discussing the ways in which board members 
provide startups with social, intellectual, and interpersonal capital). 
 280. Id. 
 281. In an equity investment, for example, a “lead” investor (i.e., the investor who 
negotiates the deal and often invests the most capital in a round) commonly exercises control 
through active governance participation that includes board representation as well as 
shareholder voting rights. 
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Finally, while the new typology highlights common economic, 
time, and control dimensions of Payouts, Payouts do not share 
uniform regulatory attributes. Notably, prepayment fundraising is 
unique in that it does not involve an investment contract under 
securities laws. The new typology highlights that, while RBF and 
venture debt instruments create debt for tax purposes, prepayment 
and SAFTs do not. 282 
Figure [7] summarizes notable characteristics of Payout instru-
ments, as seen through the prism of economic, time, control, and 
regulatory aspects of an investment. 
Figure [7]: Notable characteristics of Payout instruments 
 Common Characteristics Variations and Exceptions 
Economics • company valuation is not 
required at time of investment 
• investor’s upside (i.e., profit) 
is capped or otherwise limited 
• investor’s primary desired 
return is not pegged to 
underlying valuation of 
company 
• warrants sometimes provide a 
Payout investor an option to 
purchase stock with uncapped 
upside to share in residual 
proceeds upon liquidation 
 
 
Time  • investor anticipates returns 
prior to company-wide liquidity 
event 
• staging is less frequent than in 
Lock-in structures 
• early-stage investor does not 
“look like a founder” over 
subsequent investment rounds 
• time horizon for a secondary 




 282. The intended tax treatment for SAFTs is that they are a forward contract; however, 
the IRS’ willingness to respect this intention remains to be seen. See Lisa Zarlenga & John 
Cobb, What ICO Issuers and Investors Need to Know About Taxes, COINDESK (Apr. 16, 2018, 
11:02 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/ico-issuers-investors-need-know-taxes (while “in-
tended tax treatment of the SAFT is as a forward contract[,]” tax treatment depends on “facts 
and circumstances[,]” and it is “obvious from this discussion that there is little guidance from 
the IRS on how to treat a token offering . . . [or a] SAFT . . . for tax purposes”). 
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Control  • contractual provisions, such 
as restrictive covenants and 
information requirements, 
relied upon more than 
governance rights 
• there is a paucity of control 




• varies across instruments • instrument may be debt or 
equity for tax purposes 
• instrument may be investment 
contract or not for security 
purposes 
D. Summary Overview: 
Classifying Startup Financial Instruments with the New Typology 
Figure [8] below classifies startup finance instruments within 
the new typology. 
Figure [8]: New typology classifications of instruments 
Park-n-ride  Lock-in Payout 
• Convertible debt 
• Simple Agreement for 
Future Equity (Safe) 
• Keep It Simple 
Security (KISS) 




• Common equity 
• Preferred equity 





• Demand dividend 
• Prepayment 
fundraising 
• Simple Agreement for 
Future Tokens (SAFT) 
• Venture debt 
 
When comparing Figure [8], which classifies instruments under 
the new typology, with Figure [2], which classifies instruments 
under the debt/equity dichotomy, three advantages of the new 
typology merit elaboration. One, the new typology more defini-
tively classifies instruments. The debt/equity scheme, in contrast, 
struggles to classify instruments that are hybrids. Further, the 
debt/equity binary results in neither-fish-nor-fowl difficulties. 
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Several emerging instruments—including the Safe, KISS, Fixed 
Percentage Convertible Equity Agreement, unequity, prepayment, 
and SAFT—fall outside of debt/equity boundaries. 
Two, from a functional perspective, the new typology better 
sorts “like” with “like” instruments. The functional framework of 
the new typology helps surface “the economic and sociological 
realities” of a startup-investor relationship.283 This is because the 
typology’s analysis accounts for economic, control, time, and regu-
latory dimensions of a deal. For example, consider three different 
types of startup investment loans: venture debt, RBF, and convert-
ible debt. Under a debt/equity scheme, reflected in Figure [2], each 
of these instruments classifies as “debt” for purposes of corporate 
law. Two dimensions bind the holders of these instruments—
namely, (1) upon company liquidation, each is entitled to payment 
before shareholders, and (2) each has control associated with the 
right to “call” a note where it is overdue. Despite these common 
elements, however, the debt classification obscures stark differ-
ences in how the instruments function. 
In contrast, the new typology makes plain that creditors in 
venture debt, RBF, and convertible debt share little in common 
with respect to risk and reward associated with the economic and 
time characteristics of an instrument. A holder of convertible debt 
invests in an instrument that has economic and time aspects that 
are much more like a Safe than venture debt or RBF. The economics 
of convertible debt’s favorable return hinges on the value of 
enterprise over time. In contrast, the economics of venture debt’s 
return hinges on an ability to pay contractually predetermined 
amounts back to the venture bank lender, an event uniquely 
secured by implicit guarantees from a third-party VC. Meanwhile, 
an RBF investor, reliant upon company revenues associated with 
variable repayment, stands in contrast to a venture bank lender’s 
risk and reward profile. Convertible debt takes fewer contractual 
controls than RBF and venture debt.284 The new typology shows 
 
 283. Mitchell, supra note 26, at 447 (contending that we live in an era when we “attempt 
to ground legal doctrine in what we perceive to be the economic and sociological realities of 
various relationships”). 
 284. While convertible debt is secured by a startup’s assets, a startup’s most important 
asset, typically intellectual property, tends to have diminished value in contexts outside the 
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that whether an investor is labeled “shareholder,” “creditor,” or 
“derivative holder” is more a matter of formalistic choice than a 
fundamental reflection of the risk and reward associated 
with investment.285 
A final advantage is that the new typology’s comparative 
structure across instruments, designed to enhance understanding, 
promotes more precise selection of an instrument tailored to the 
circumstances presented by a startup fundraising. Most important, 
the new typology’s analytic framework surfaces aspects of an 
investment that are relevant to determining whether the interests 
of managers and capital providers are aligned. In this way, the new 
typology helps entrepreneurs, investors, and practitioners to better 
understand efficient and inefficient uses of instruments. 
Part V next examines implications of the new typology. 
V. PUTTING THE NEW TYPOLOGY TO USE 
So what? If the new typology is indeed a better way to analyze 
the expanded menu of startup investment instruments, what 
consequences flow from its use? This Part explores two impli-
cations. One, section A examines issues associated with different 
instruments that provide investors with disparate contingent and 
residual rights in a company. In particular, new types of horizontal 
conflicts among startup investors emerge when a startup uses 
diverse instruments to effect financings over its lifecycle. Two, a 
further implication involves the diminished role of corporate law 
as novel instruments gain traction. Startup investors are increas-
ingly not shareholders for purposes of corporate law. Section B 
observes that this is a ripe time for legal scholars, judges, and 
 
startup. In economic terms, the IP has “high asset specificity.” Asset Specificity, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/asset-specificity.asp [https://perma.cc/F7PV-VRQ8] 
(“An asset with a high level of specificity has use in only certain situations or for cer-
tain purposes.”). 
 285. Coyle and Green come to a similar conclusion about formalism in instrument 
labels. See Green & Coyle, supra note 14, at 182 (“[A]ll of these instruments—SAFEs, 
convertible notes, common stock, preferred stock, etc.—are simply labels. It is not the name 
of the instrument that matters so much as the terms set forth within it, that is, the balance 
struck between issuer and investor. It is possible to issue ‘common stock’ that contains terms 
commonly used in ‘preferred stock’ financings. It is also possible to issue ‘SAFEs’ that contain 
terms that make them virtually indistinguishable from ‘convertible notes.’”) 
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policymakers to study and reevaluate the role of corporate law as 
it relates to entrepreneurial investment. 
A. New Types of Horizontal Conflicts 
One implication of the new typology is that new types of start-
up investor conflicts become visible. A “horizontal conflict” refers 
to a divergence in interest between participants in a company’s 
capital structure.286 A horizontal conflict is in contradistinction to a 
“vertical conflict,” which arises between the sources of corporate 
power (e.g., corporate directors, officers, and the corporation itself) 
and other corporate constituent groups subject to exercise of that 
power (e.g., shareholders and others in the capital structure).287 
The classic horizontal conflict is between common and prefer-
red shareholders.288 Another significant type of horizontal conflict 
within startups, as Robert Bartlett documents, is between VC 
investors.289 Bartlett describes the “dynamic character of agency 
problems” generated by VC horizontal conflicts.290 Over a startup’s 
lifecycle, a viable company typically raises capital from more than 
one VC investor. VC investors within the same startup have 
divergent interests that drive different preferences about a 
company’s decisions (such as whether and when to exit). VC funds’ 
time duration and compensation structures drive differences in 
 
 286. Mitchell, supra note 26, at 449 (explaining that horizontal conflicts can be between 
shareholders and may also arise with “bondholders, employees, and other corpo-
rate constituencies”). 
 287. Id. at 449–50. 
 288. A simple hypothetical provides an example. StartupCo’s preferred shareholders 
two years ago invested $2 million and have a 2x liquidation preference. StartupCo is now 
about to run out of money and, further, is having trouble finding an investor willing to 
provide more capital. BuyerCo offers to purchase StartupCo for $3 million. The preferred 
shareholders would like to sell StartupCo. The preferred investors’ economic rights entitle 
them to the full $3 million, and rather than the company going broke, they would receive a 
fine return on their investment. But the common shareholders, which include current and 
former founders and employees, as well as angel investors, oppose the sale. They stand to 
make nothing. The board of directors faces a dilemma: any decision will benefit one group 
at the expense of the other. A horizontal conflict results from distributional disparities that 
flow from disparate economic rights between the common and preferred shareholders. As a 
practical matter, under these circumstances, the preferred shareholders would likely carve 
out some of the proceeds for StartupCo’s management team, as both a reward and an 
inducement for the team to support the sale. 
 289. Bartlett, supra note 10, at 111. 
 290. Id. 
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investor preferences. Additionally, VC investors purchase prefer-
red stock from a startup at different times, at different prices, and 
with different terms.291 Sophisticated VC investors secure terms to 
protect against undesirable actions—whether such actions are 
initiated by management, the board, or other VC investors—that 
are contrary to their interests. “Paradoxically” the terms that VCs 
secure for their protection also generate conflicts between investors 
by providing the “means to engage in rent-seeking behavior vis-à-
vis other investors.”292 
The new typology highlights a new type of dynamic agency 
problem: conflicts between investors are not limited to divergent 
interests between shareholders.293 The time dimension of the new 
typology shows, for example, that Payout instruments that relax 
investor lock-in inherently misalign Payout investors with Lock-in 
investors. Conflicts also arise with Park-n-ride holders. The new 
typology surfaces two new permutations of horizontal conflicts 
involving non-shareholder investors: (1) anticipatory conflicts and 
(2) post-investment conflicts. These are each addressed in turn. 
I define an anticipatory conflict as where a would-be investor 
declines to invest in a company due to a prospective misalignment 
with an existing investor (or investors). Speak with early-stage 
investors and lawyers today and you will hear versions of stories 
where an investor passes on an investment opportunity due to an 
anticipatory horizontal conflict.294 Of course, concerns of this flavor 
are not entirely new. The rights of preexisting shareholders in a 
company’s capitalization table, and where a prospective investor 
would fit within a payout waterfall, are a well-established part of a 
sophisticated investor’s calculus. But the expansion of novel non-
shareholder startup investment instruments, which interact with 
other instruments through layers of investment rounds, generates 
new types of anticipatory conflicts. 
An example shows how anticipatory conflicts arise from use of 
different types of instruments across startup fundraises. ScaleCo is 
 
 291. Id. at 42. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Baird & Henderson, supra note 13, at 1311 (“Others, such as lenders, bondholders, 
and preferred stockholders, also stand to gain or lose with right or wrong decisions.”). 
 294. Axelrad Interview, supra note 83. See generally FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 7, at 
171–72. 
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a hypothetical startup that successfully launched a company 
without institutional investment. Previously, in lieu of taking VC, 
ScaleCo raised two rounds of financing from angel investors 
through a convertible note (a type of Park-n-ride instrument) that 
included a conversion cap and discount. Most recently, ScaleCo 
took capital through a Payout instrument, an RBF loan that ScaleCo 
pays back at up to two times the principal through 5% of its 
revenues. ScaleCo now recognizes a large market opportunity and 
needs an infusion of $5 million and strategic guidance about its next 
steps. This is ideal for a venture capitalist and ScaleCo is soon in 
talks with VC1. 
VC1 loves ScaleCo’s team, product, and market opportunity. 
But the layers of previous investment, and the interests of non-
shareholder Park-n-ride and Payout investors, present an antici-
patory horizontal conflict. First, while the Park-n-ride creditors 
would convert to shareholders upon a VC financing, the conversion 
itself may result in excessive dilution to the common shareholders 
(including the management team). VC1 is concerned that this 
would result in a demotivated team or, alternatively, require 
issuance of new equity to the team (which would dilute VC1’s 
ownership stake). Second, RBF investors would like ScaleCo to 
optimize for near-term revenues, an interest that would be cross-
wise with VC1’s interest in long-term growth. VC1 would prefer to 
reinvest all available funds into the company.295 Ultimately, due to 
concerns arising from the Payout and Park-n-ride instruments, VC1 
decides not to invest in ScaleCo. 
The second type of horizontal conflict, post-investment conflict, 
also comes into view through the new typology. Consider another 
hypothetical startup, JumpCo, which raises a pre-seed round of 
funding through a Safe instrument. JumpCo does well. So well, in 
fact, that JumpCo sees a path to solid profitability without 
additional financing. Common shareholders, including the man-
agement team, would like to move forward with the company as a 
profitable entity. The management team may take a high salary that 
reflects the company’s rosy position. A Safe holder, meanwhile, 
would like to see a path to ownership conversion and, eventually, 
 
 295. One option is that VC1 could provide sufficient funds to “take out” the RBF 
investor by paying off the loan. But VCs are generally reluctant to see their capital used in 
this way. 
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a return through company-wide liquidation. Yet the Safe holder 
may be frozen in an investment purgatory without ability to force 
conversion or to exit the company. 
The new typology highlights that horizontal conflicts will 
increasingly ensnare startup investors who are not shareholders. 
As next discussed in section B, the protections of corporate law will 
not extend to non-shareholder investors. 
B. The Diminished Role of Corporate Law for Startup Investments 
A second implication, made plain by the new typology, is an 
important but little discussed development: novel entrepreneurial 
financial instruments push more and more startup investors 
beyond the boundaries of corporate law. Traditional Lock-in 
instruments, such as preferred stock, structure investment such 
that investors are shareholders entitled to corporate law’s 
protections, including fiduciary duties owed by directors to 
shareholders.296 Dual application of corporate law and contract law 
with respect to preferred stock generates difficult questions for 
courts and provides an attractive conceptual knot for scholars.297 
VCs and their attorneys have learned—sometimes the hard way—
through the Benchmark line of cases that preferred shareholders 
must expressly delineate any special rights in writing.298 From a 
corporate law perspective, nonetheless, the status of a preferred 
 
 296. “A board of directors, as Adam Smith observed long ago, is charged with taking 
care of other people’s money, and it is usual in such cases for the law to impose special and 
unremitting duties.” Baird & Henderson, supra note 13, at 1310 (footnote omitted). 
 297. “On the one hand, the corporate paradigm instructs that managing to the common 
stock, since stockholders are residual interest holders, maximizes value; on the other hand, 
the contract paradigm instructs that holding parties to contractual risk allocations maximizes 
value.” Bratton & Wachter, supra note 211, at 1820–21 (“The Delaware courts have emerged 
as the dominant arbiters of preferred stock disputes.”). Much hand-wringing concerns the 
extent of corporate protections owed by directors to preferred investors. “[A]ll is not well 
jurisprudentially with preferred stock.” Mitchell, supra note 26, at 443. See supra note 33. 
 298. “[T]he special rights, powers, or preferences of preferred stock must be expressed 
clearly and will not be presumed . . . .” C. Stephen Bigler & Jennifer Veet Barrett, Words that 
Matter: Considerations in Drafting Preferred Stock Provisions, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan. 23, 2012, at 2 
(analyzing Delaware line of cases). See also Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, 
2002 WL 1732423 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002), aff’d, 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003); Greenmont Capital 
Partners I, L.P. v. Mary’s Gone Crackers, Inc., 2012 WL 4479999 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2012). 
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stock investor as a shareholder entitled to basic corporate law 
protections is not in dispute.299 
A consequence of novel instruments is that many startup inves-
tors fall outside the boundaries of corporate law. For example, Safe 
investors who provide capital at the earliest stages of a startup’s 
lifecycle, with the intention that a company will use the capital for 
an extended period of time, are not shareholders during the “park” 
period of investment.300 Many startup investors currently should be 
characterized as something other than a shareholder.301 Convertible 
debt results in investor as creditor (at least prior to conversion). 
Prepayment results in investor as a consumer. And the SAFT 
results in investor as a future token holder. Indeed, the vast 
majority of emerging startup investment instruments, classified 
within the Payout and Park-n-ride categories, place investors 
outside the role of shareholder. These developments shift a burden 
to contract law to interpret and determine the relationship as set 
forth in an investment instrument between a startup and its non-
shareholder investors.302 Default corporate law rights are generally 
unavailable. Absent insolvency, directors do not owe fiduciary 
duties to creditors.303 Only shareholders, moreover, are entitled as 
 
 299. Preferred stockholders are a “statutorily recognized corporate constituency.” 
Mitchell, supra note 26, at 445 (citing In re Hawkeye Oil Co., 19 F.2d 151, 152 (D. Del. 1927) 
(preferred stockholders are stockholders, not creditors) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1989 
& Supp. 1994)). 
 300. A Safe results in investor as a derivative holder (at least prior to conversion). 
 301. Baird and Henderson, observing a broader set of instruments than startup finance, 
make a similar observation. Baird & Henderson, supra note 13 at 1311 (“As financial 
innovation has accelerated over the past two decades, the terms ‘shareholder’ and 
‘debtholder’ or ‘creditor’ have become less meaningful. Identifying only shareholders as 
investors, as opposed to all providers of capital, is misleading.” (footnote omitted)). 
 302. “Stockholders are corporate, lenders are contractual, and a well-understood wall 
separates their legal treatments.” Bratton & Wachter, supra note 211, at 1819. 
 303. Directors owe creditors fiduciary duties where a corporation is insolvent. 
Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 551 (Del. Ch. 2015) (stating that upon 
insolvency “the creditors replace the stockholders as the equitable owners of the firm’s assets 
and the initial beneficiaries of any increases in value”); In re Cent. Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 
1068 (7th Cir. 1987). A “zone of insolvency” line of cases under Delaware law once 
complicated this picture. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns 
Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (explaining that 
directors owe duties to creditors and sharholders where company is in the “zone of 
insolvency”). But since North American Catholic Education Programming Foundation, Inc. v. 
Gheewalla, Delaware courts appear to have backed away from the zone of insolvency view. 
930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007); see also Kelli A. Alces & Larry E. Ribstein, Directors’ Duties in Failing 
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a matter of corporate law to books and inspection rights under 
Delaware law.304 And only noncontrolling shareholders may assert 
claims due to officer and director violations of the corporate 
opportunity doctrine.305 
Of course, contractual rights may fill gaps for non-shareholders. 
Indeed, scholars often assume that non-shareholder investors 
secure sophisticated contractual terms that protect their interests in 
the absence of fiduciary duties.306 But the new typology under-
scores that this depends upon the form of instrument. Often, as 
seen with the angel paradox, the result is surprising. The new 
typology identifies investors that are most vulnerable to oppor-
tunistic behavior by officers and directors. The Safe and SAFT, for 
example, feature few control protections. While non-shareholder 
investors certainly may negotiate for protections, it is uncommon 
for contractual terms to expressly make an officer or director a 
fiduciary to a non-shareholder investor. Perhaps extralegal pro-
tections such as reputation and relational norms might prevent 
 
Firms, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. (2008) (zone of insolvency does not shift fiduciary duties; business 
judgment rule explains cases that suggest otherwise). The court in Quadrant held that, while 
directors owe creditors fiduciary duties once a corporation is insolvent, a “zone” of 
insolvency does not appear to trigger any shifting duties. 115 A.3d at 546. 
 304. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2011). 
 305. The corporate opportunity doctrine is a legal principle that prohibits officers, 
directors, and controlling shareholders of a company from seizing business opportunities for 
themselves that may benefit the company. See generally Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, 
Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity 
Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017). 
 306. See, e.g., Baird & Henderson, supra note 13, at 1310 n.8 (“So-called ‘contract’ 
creditors, or ones who voluntarily enter into loan, bond or other debt agreements with the 
firm usually set out many obligations in the investment contract.”); see also Bratton & 
Wachter, supra note 211, at 1819 (“Lenders sit ‘outside’ of the corporation, and look to 
specific, bargained-for rights to protect their interests rather than the apparatuses of 
governance and fiduciary duty.”). Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen observe—at least 
in the public company context—how creditors may obtain outsized levels of control through 
loan covenants. “When a business trips one of the wires in a large loan, the lender is able to 
exercise de facto control rights—such as replacing the CEO of a company—that shareholders 
of a public company simply do not have.” Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private 
Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (2006). 
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opportunism.307 But at times the conditions for reputation markets 
to shield early-stage investors may not exist.308 
A baseline theory about corporate law, including the purpose 
of the corporation and the role of fiduciary duties, goes a long way 
toward a view about whether the developments that move 
investors outside the boundaries of corporate law are problematic. 
Contractarians, who see investors as sophisticated parties that 
exercise equal power as company actors, are likely untroubled. In 
fact, contractarians may welcome a diminished role of corporate 
law vis-à-vis investors since contract and securities law may be up 
to the task.309 In contrast, if one’s baseline theory is that corporate 
law crucially protects investors due to structural power and 
informational imbalances relative to company actors, then the 
trend toward a diminished role of corporate law is more worri-
some.310 Vertical and horizontal conflicts may be unsettling to mar-
kets, especially in instances where directors’ decisions appropriate 
 
 307. High reputation is a “lure” insofar as entrepreneurs are more likely to select high-
reputation VCs over others. The certification value of associating with high-reputation VCs 
lures entrepreneurs even when this decision entails less favorable economic terms for a 
company. “Offers made by VCs with a high reputation are three times more likely to be 
accepted, and high-reputation VCs acquire start-up equity at a 10 to 14% discount.” David 
Hsu, What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation?, 59 J. FIN. 1805, 1805–06 (2004). 
 308. Four conditions generally must exist for reputation markets to effectively function: 
“(i) repeat behavior must be anticipated by participants; (ii) there are shared expectations 
about appropriate behavior; (iii) a party’s conduct is observable for those who consider doing 
business the party in the future; and (iv) consequences exist for social norm violations.” 
Bernthal, supra note 1, at 175. In particular, repeat behavior with the angel investor may not 
be anticipated. Moreover, an aggrieved angel may have difficulty making bad conduct by a 
company observable for those who consider doing business with the company or its 
management team in the future. 
 309. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 192. For a survey of contractarian 
theory, see Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 
31 J. CORP. L. 779 (2006) (presented at Symposium, Robert Clark’s Corporate Law: Twenty Years 
of Change). 
 310. Mitchell, supra note 26, at 457–58. 
  Fiduciary duty, by contrast, arises from a situation that is quite the opposite 
from the supposed free autonomy underlying contract. It is imposed in situations 
of significant power disparity, where one party is given responsibility and power 
over something that matters to another party and that vulnerable party is at the 
mercy of the power-holding party. Once the relationship has been established, the 
dominated party effectively loses any control over the subject of the relationship, 
while the power-holder remains autonomous. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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wealth from non-shareholders to shareholders.311 Further, if the 
scope of “constituencies” that directors account for in decision-
making should go beyond shareholders, then the questions about 
corporate law and startup investors become more complicated.312 
CONCLUSION 
Startup investment instruments remain under-theorized 
despite a variety of structures. This Article shows the spike in the 
number of instruments used in entrepreneurial finance today as 
compared to twenty years ago. Scholars have yet to reflect upon a 
classification scheme to promote comparison and understanding of 
instrument forms. The debt/equity dichotomy is the default 
classification within law and entrepreneurship literature. Yet most 
startup investment instruments are hybrids that interleave 
elements of debt and equity. Still other instruments entirely defy 
categorization as debt or equity. A new way to analyze and classify 
startup instruments would be useful. 
I propose a three-fold classification scheme: Payouts, Lock-in, 
and Park-n-ride. A useful typology would liberate contractual 
analysis from legacy categories to promote understanding of how 
instruments work. The new typology has two broad advantages, 
relative to the debt/equity distinction, that improve understand-
ing. Most important, the new typology is multidimensional, 
providing a tool to examine economic, control, time, and regulatory 
aspects of instruments. In this way, the typology incorporates 
broadly accepted analytic tools from law and entrepreneurship. 
Second, the typology’s categories more accurately classify 
 
 311. Id. at 452 (“The difficult question arises, however, when the motivation for a 
transaction is not maximization but expropriation. That is, when directors, whose duty is to 
maximize common stockholder wealth, do so not by creating new wealth but by transferring 
existing corporate wealth from the preferreds to the commons, the character of the risk 
encountered by the preferred stockholders is different. Now, it is no longer the reasonable 
expectation that they might lose because a risky (but positive net present value) transaction 
fails. Instead, it is the risk that the directors will make an unanticipated zero-sum transfer. 
The loss in this case is not the unintended (although anticipated) consequence of wealth 
creation. It is, rather, the direct and intended consequence of directorial action.” (foot-
note omitted)). 
 312. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 276–87, 314 n.178 (1999); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments 
for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192–95 (2002). 
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instruments, including categorization of unfamiliar and novel 
instrument types. 
This Article points toward three areas for further investigation. 
First, how does the expansion in startup instruments square with—
and inform—theories of contractual innovation?313 Theories of 
contractual innovation should be examined in view of the relatively 
sudden proliferation of instruments. What is the relative impor-
tance of path dependence, transaction costs, standardization, and 
the existence (or not) of a market-maker in adoption of new instru-
ments? Why do some instruments survive while other instruments 
go away? Moreover, deeper study of emerging instruments is also 
warranted. Legal scholars, for example, have yet to carefully 
analyze structures such as RBFs and SAFTs. Scholars should ask 
“why now?” and “why is there a new instrument in this context but 
not in another?” 
Second, many emerging instruments push investors outside the 
protections of corporate law. Principal-agent problems not 
managed by oversight or fiduciary obligations merit further 
investigation. Horizontal conflicts will also emerge between 
investors that are not shareholders. Now is a ripe time for law and 
entrepreneurship scholars to consider whether corporate law–type 
protections should extend to non-shareholder investors. Several 
specific questions emerge, such as whether directors should have 
any sort of obligation to think about non-shareholders? In some 
cases, reputational markets should constrain inefficient opportun-
ism by firms at the expense of investors, but not necessarily in 
others. Under what circumstances will greater contractual protec-
tions be required? Current developments in startup investment 
instruments broadly raise issues about how modern entrepre-
neurial realities challenge the policy objectives of corporate law, as 
well as the structure of startup investment instruments. 
Third, the focus of this investigation is upon startup financial 
contracts. Regulatory classifications that embed the debt/equity 
distinction properly influence decisions about which instrument is 
appropriate to structure a deal. Regulatory factors alone are not 
 
 313. See, e.g., Jennejohn, supra note 175, at 77 (providing a “preliminary empirical study 
of the process of contract innovation in the M&A market”). Coyle and Green start down the 
path of examination of new instruments through the prism of innovation theory. See, e.g., 
Coyle & Green, supra note 4, at 133. 
001.BERNTHAL_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
858 
dispositive about the nature of a contract, however, and should be 
contextualized within a broader analytic framework. The logic 
behind the need for a better way to classify instruments applies to 
financial instruments outside the startup world. This Article does 
not take a position on the utility of the new typology’s categories 
for instruments in other sectors of finance. But this Article proposes 
a way to shed conceptual limitations inherent in the legacy of the 
debt/equity dichotomy. Further work may examine whether new 
frameworks to functionally analyze and classify instruments would 
be fruitful in other areas of law and finance. 
 
